It is a common saying that, the cause of an evil being known, the remedy is readily discovered; and, upon the strength of this maxim, several, who think they have hit upon some one cause of evil in the political government of Bengal, have taken upon them to prescribe a remedy; which is pronounced an universal panacea, a salve for every sore: but no sooner have they produced their ware, than the eye hath discovered it to be mere powder of post; or something equally unavailing.

Few of these prescriptions have at all attracted notice; the proposal for protecting the liberty of the subject from the despotism of government, by the institution of native juries, was indeed extremely well calculated to please British speculation; and therefore, like the device of hanging the bell about the cat’s neck, it was 47highly applauded by those who never adverted to the difference betwixt Britain and Bengal, in point of general constitution of government and disposition of the natives. But, for practice, it must appear a mere chimera to such as consider, on the one hand, that men, who are slaves to their government and its officers in every other capacity, cannot possibly be free in that of jurymen; and that juries, if they are not free and impartial, avail nothing: and, on the other hand, that if the natives should be actually endowed with the real cap of liberty in the jury room, there is danger, nay, there is a certainty, that they would make bold to wear it elsewhere; and then, adieu to the English dominion in Bengal. In few words, the power of the English government, and the freedom of native juries, are two things that cannot possibly exist together in Bengal; the life of the one must unavoidably cause the death of the other: and, however harsh this doctrine may sound in a freeborn English ear, the force and truth of it will immediately strike the politician.

48Equally unavailing is that proposal for securing the liberty and property of the subject, from the oppression and extortion of government, by granting to the native a perpetual property in land; without providing him the smallest security for the free possession of its produce; which, so long as government stands on its present footing, is liable to be wrested from him so soon as acquired.

But it would seem, that the reason why these political physicians have been so unlucky in their prescriptions is, that they have proceeded upon false principles; as having mistaken the nature of the malady. For they have either assigned no one certain cause of evil; or else they have traced it no farther than to the persons who have executed the government of those countries, otherwise to the Directors: as if all the evil had proceeded from some particular viciousness in their disposition, as if they had been sinners above all men, or as if no men would have done the wicked deed but they: whereas he who is the least acquainted with human nature will allow, that few, if any men, would have made any better use of their powers and 49opportunities; nay he will add, that every other government on earth, would act the very part that this Bengal government hath done, provided it held the same views and interests, together with the same powers and opportunities. And, if so, what can be more absurd, than the proposal to remedy the evils and abuses of this government, by sending out Supervisors, with the same or greater powers, and consequently possessing greater opportunities of promoting their own views and interests; which are exactly the same as these of the persons complained of; seeing that, as the same cause of evil which existed in the Governors, would have existed in the Supervisors, these similar causes must have operated similar effects.

Indeed we shall err widely, if we look for the original cause of evil in these Governors: for, on inspecting the preceding description of this Bengal government, we perceive, that their maladministration is itself but an effect, or consequence, naturally flowing from the total want of certain fundamental principles or powers; which, in every other government, serve to restrain the party governing from doing 50or permitting injury, and impel it to promote the good of the party governed: and as the want of these restraining and impelling powers hath unavoidably produced, the first tyranny, and the latter anarchy, it is plain, that all the evils and abuses in the government of Bengal have sprung from this deficiency. It farther appears, from the same description, that the want of these restraining and impelling powers arises from two different causes; the first being the particular condition and constitution of the sovereign: and the second is there termed the distance of situation, betwixt the sovereign residence and the country governed; tho’ the sequel will evince this latter to be rather a radical defect in the nature of that system, which the Directors have adopted for the government of this distant dominion. That these have been the two original causes of the tyranny and anarchy, and consequently of all the evils and abuses in this Bengal government, including these of the commercial despotism, is sufficiently evident. We shall therefore proceed to point out the means of removing these causes, as the only effectual method 51of remedying the evils. And as each of the two causes hath contributed its proper share of the evil, and each demands a distinct remedy, we shall consider them separately.

With regard to the condition and constitution of the Company, we have already mentioned the several circumstances that disqualify her for the office of a supreme sovereign; here therefore we shall only recapitulate, or collect them into one point of view. The first defect is, her impotence, or want of power to promote good government in her dominion: and this proceeds from her being, with respect to her deputed government, a meer fellow subject, totally void of supreme legislative and judicial powers; and consequently incapable of inforcing obedience; or of punishing disobedience: and this want of authority and power in the sovereign, we have shown to be a principal cause of despotism in the deputed government. A second defect in the constitution of the Company is her want of inclination, or rather of interest, to discharge the duty of a good sovereign; and this arises from the fluctuating and hourly mutable state 52of the proprietary, the temporary and short duration of her corporate existence, the still shorter tenor of this sovereignty, and the annual rotation of her executive government; for, in consequence of these several circumstances in her situation, her views are narrow, contracted, and rapacious; the sole aim of all her measures being to make the most of the present moment. The third defect is the mercantile capacity of this sovereign Company; and from this defect alone flow evils sufficient to ruin the interest of the country subjected to her government: for, in consequence of her mercantile capacity, her deputed government acts as a merchant; and, in consequence of her sovereign capacity, all her mercantile servants assume the authority of sovereigns.

These are the principal defects in the being and constitution of this sovereign Company; and it is evident, that such defects in the sovereign, must have contributed largely towards the existence of abuse, in the deputed government. But these defects might have been, in a great measure, remedied, and their consequences prevented, by a simple act of parliament, 53past by the national government, at the time it thought proper to commit the charge of this important branch of national interest, to the care of the Company. This act might have been entitled, “An act for better enabling the East India Company to administer the political government, and to protect, maintain and defend certain states and countries in India, which have become subjected to the dominion of Britain, and which, for sundry weighty considerations, it hath been judged proper to commit to her charge.” And it might have been conceived in the following, or such like terms.

“Whereas it appears, that the want of a proper legislative authority over the ministers and servants, employed by the Company to execute the sovereign government of these subjected dominions, must be productive of many abuses, detrimental as well to the interest of the Company, as to the honour and interest of the British nation. Be it enacted by &c. that, from the time of passing this act, the Company shall possess the power of legislation, or making laws, for the government of this foreign dominion: and the laws thus 54enacted by the Company, shall be equally binding on all her ministers, servants, and subjects, in that dominion, as are the acts of parliament on the subjects of Britain. And being farther sensible of the many inconveniences, that must arise from the Company’s incapacity of punishing the offences committed by her ministers, and servants abroad, otherwise than by applying to courts of justice that are foreign to her government; where she cannot convict, through the difficulty of obtaining the evidence required by the forms of these courts; and where she is deterred from prosecuting, by the fear of divulging the secrets of her government; insomuch that, rather than apply to these courts, she must submit to the most audacious acts of disobedience, and maladministration; and considering that such incapacity in the Company must discourage all good government, and produce tyranny and anarchy in this dominion; be it enacted, that the Company shall have authority to erect courts of justice, and appoint judges; with the like powers, as are vested in his majesty’s judges, and courts of judicature, for trying and judging 55all suits and causes, or offences committed within the limits of this Indian dominion; and for punishing the same, either capitally, or by fine, imprisonment, and banishment, though to Europe only. And whereas it is probable, that some of the ministers or servants of the Company may, by various methods, elude the justice of her courts abroad, and escape to Europe; in order therefore to prevent such dangerous illusion of justice, it is enacted, that the Company’s court of directors shall, on due information being made to them, have power at all times to call before them such escaping delinquents, and to try and punish them, for the offences they may have committed within the limits of this Indian dominion, in like manner as they could have been tried or punished by the Company’s courts abroad. And because the liberty of appealing from the Company’s courts of justice, to the judgment of any other courts, must be productive of the same inconveniences to the Company, as a trial of the same cause in the first instance would have been, and must therefore deter the Company from ever availing herself of the judicial powers 56granted by this act; it is enacted, that delinquents shall have no liberty of appealing from the Company’s courts abroad, excepting to the Court of Directors at home, or to a general court of Proprietors; whose judgment in all such cases shall be final. And as the Court of Directors have, and may be, discouraged, from prosecuting or punishing the crimes of their rich servants, by the fear of danger to their own private interest, from a combination of the friends and abettors of such rich delinquents at a future annual election, be it enacted, that the 24 Directors, being such at the time of passing this act, shall continue in office, durante vita.

“And whereas it appears, that the liberty of daily selling, transferring, and alienating the shares in the Company’s stock, of which this sovereign dominion forms a part, tends to infuse into the proprietors a spirit of rapacity, that may be productive of much damage to the several interests concerned; and hath many other very pernicious consequences; whilst it reflects disgrace on the dignity of all other sovereigns; be it enacted, that no proprietor in this Company’s stock, of which 57the sovereignty forms a part, shall have power to send his share in the said sovereignty to market, like as it were a hog or bullock, and to sell, transfer, and alienate the same; but that the several proprietors of this stock and sovereignty, being such at the time of passing this act, shall remain and continue proprietors, without the power of alienation, except in the cases that shall be hereafter specified.

“And whereas it hath been represented that the Company’s holding this sovereignty by lease, and for a short term, may not only alienate her care and prevent her from studying and promoting the lasting welfare of the country, but may induce her to pillage, plunder and waste it; be it enacted, that the Company shall hold the sovereignty of this dominion, quamdiu se bene gesserit; to the end, that she may consider and treat it, not as the property of another, but as her own inheritance.

“And whereas the Company exercises traffic in this dominion; and, in consequence thereof, her ministers do likewise traffic; and whereas the exercise of traffic is evidently repugnant to a due discharge 58of the duties of government, as being unavoidably productive of destructive monopolies and oppression; all which it is impossible to prevent, so long as the Company herself shall continue a merchant; be it enacted, that this Company’s commercial charter shall be dissolved; and she, and her ministers, shall be restrained from trading or trafficking, directly or indirectly, within the limits of this Indian dominion, under certain penalties to be mentioned in a new charter, which shall be granted to this Company, constituting her the United Company of English East India Sovereigns.”

These powers, grants, limitations, and restrictions, would have qualified the Company, so far as the nature of things could admit, for administring the political government; but, in her military capacity, as the sovereign protector, maintainer and defender of this Indian dominion, she hath been still less qualified, and would therefore have required still more extraordinary powers. These however we shall not specify, as apprehending, that what hath been already demanded will shock. The grant of supreme legislative and judicial powers 59to subjects, over their fellow subjects, must seem an absurd communication of that which is incommunicable: the prohibition of selling and transferring the shares of stock, would be termed a tyrannical restraint on private property: the perpetual grant of this sovereignty to the Company, must be deemed an unjust alienation of the Crown’s and Nation’s rights: and the dissolution of the Company’s commercial charter, would alter her very being and nature. In short, if we regard the proposed act simply, it will appear a collection of absurd inconsistencies, and ridiculous nonsense: but if we consider it conjunctly with the cause or purpose for which it is required, then every absurdity vanishes from the act, and centers in the cause that renders it necessary. For we appeal to common sense, whether every circumstance, specified in this proposed act, is not indispensably necessary, to qualify the Company for the sovereign office of administring the political government of this Indian dominion: and, if that necessity is admitted, then doth the act become a rational and necessary consequence, of government’s having previously committed 60that sovereign charge to the Company. Nay, we must take the liberty to add, that government, by committing such a charge to the Company, and at same time totally neglecting to capacitate her for supporting it, is in a great measure accessory to all the ruinous consequences that have ensued from her incapacity.

I am sensible it will be urged, that we proceed upon false premises; for that government never considered these countries as subjected to the dominion of Britain; that it never granted the sovereignty of them to the Company; nor supposed her to be the sovereign; but that it only acquiesced in her holding the Dewanny, on condition of her paying a part of the revenues to the nation; and, of consequence, that government never considered the inhabitants of those countries as subjects to the government of Britain. But this is a most flimsy evasion, like that of shutting our eyes to the sun, that we may deny it is day: government granted to the Company a right or permission to hold the Dewanny; which is explained to be, the power of collecting and appropriating the 61revenues of Bengal; and, in consideration of this grant, government demanded and received a share of these revenues; government therefore, in its legislative capacity, admits a knowledge, that the Company did possess the power of collecting, and also of applying the revenues of Bengal, ad libitum; and, amongst other purposes, to that of defraying the charges of the military, as well as the civil, government: and government well knows, that the power which defrays the charges of the military and civil government, must hold the absolute direction of both: and what constitutes sovereign power, but the absolute direction of the military and civil government, together with the disposal of the revenues? But, exclusive of the Dewanny contract, the Company hath applied, in every other characteristic of a sovereign, to government, in its legislative capacity: she hath brought a bill into parliament, for the grant of certain military powers and indulgences, for the better enabling her to defend, what she there modestly, though vaguely, terms her territorial acquisitions, (but which, by referring to the Dewanny contract, is explained 62to include Bengal): and she hath applied for certain juridical powers and grants, for the better administration of the jurisdiction, not in her commercial factories, but over the whole country of Bengal: therefore government hath been informed, in its legislative capacity, by the Company herself, that she administred the military and civil government, and appropriated the revenues of Bengal; consequently that she was, in every sense and respect, the actual sovereign of that country.

Now government could not be ignorant that the Company is a subject to the national government of Britain; and that, as such, she could have neither right, power, nor force to subject this dominion, or afterwards to hold it in subjection, saving what she derived from the national government; consequently government, as it understood that these countries were subjected to the Company, must have known that they were subjected to the dominion of Britain. And as government did permit the Company to retain this dominion; and furnished her with a military force, knowing it to be for the purpose of maintaining 63dominion, it is plain, that the Company hath held this dominion, no otherwise than by the grant and support of government.

But if the Company be the sovereign of Bengal, the inhabitants must, per force, be her subjects; and if the Company holds this sovereignty as a subject to the government of Britain, by virtue of the grant or permission of that government, and by means of a force furnished by the same government, in what relation can this government regard the inhabitants of Bengal? In that of subjects surely; tho’ the degree hath, by the deed of government, been somewhat implicated; like that of a child begot by the father upon his own daughter. And subjects they have been to the government of Britain, in every sense and meaning; they have yielded obedience to those subjects of this government whom it appointed to rule over them; and they have yielded the fruits, as well as the duties of obedience.

But the government of Britain, which hath thus by force subjected the inhabitants of Bengal to its dominion; which hath, for a series of years, held them in 64subjection; and hath, all along, exacted from them the tribute of subjection; hath withheld from them the protection due to subjects. For it hath scrupulously withdrawn itself from all regard or attention to their government; and hath left it implicitly to the guidance of a few merchants; whom it knew to be perfectly unqualified for administring any sort of government: in consequence of which these wretched people have, for many years, been ruled, without law, justice, or government. Unhappy subjects, who are forced to obey a sovereign that refuses them protection, and leaves them exposed to all the horrors of tyranny and anarchy.

It will nevertheless be still insisted that government could not, without committing a number of irregularities and absurdities, endow the Company in the manner specified; as also that the Company, when thus endowed, would still have been altogether unequal to the charge of regularly administring a sovereign government. But surely government, if it would not or could not capacitate the Company to regularly govern those countries, ought not to have furnished her the means of oppressing, 65ravaging, pillaging, and ruining them; to the disgrace of humanity, and the indelible reproach of the British name. Government would have acted a part far more consistent with the rules of honour and humanity, if, instead of furnishing to the Company this military power, it had restrained her from availing herself of the advantage, gained by force and chance, over that mild, unwarlike, but industrious people; and obliged her to leave them to their own government.

But then the situation of affairs in those countries, where the nation and Company held such a valuable commercial interest, rendered it highly improper and dangerous to leave the native government to itself: moreover the nation and Company could not, in such case, have acquired the mighty wealth and other benefits that have been derived from the conquest, or assumed dominion, of those countries. Oh wealth, basely acquired, and foolishly applied! Was there then no medium, no middle channel, thro’ which government might have steered the Nation and Company to this same wealth and benefits, clear of all these irregularities, incongruities, inhumanities, 66and reproaches? Yes surely; and one so obvious and conspicuous, that it is impossible to conceive how government could be so industrious as to shun or miss it. Had the national government taken upon itself the charge of superintending the government of those countries, as reason and the nature of things directed, then would it have furnished them a sovereign, naturally free from all the defects of the Company, and completely endued with all the qualifications of power, ability, and inclination from interest, to protect and regularly govern them.

For it is plain, that the national government, possessing supreme legislative, and judicial power, must have been capable of enforcing obedience to the laws which it might have enacted for the good government of those countries; and of punishing disobedience, not only in the natives, but in the ministers whom it would have employed to execute that government; as these must have been its own subjects. And, on the other hand, the nation being an immutable body, and holding this sovereignty in her own right, and by perpetual tenor; her government 67must have been actuated, by the strong motive of self interest, to exert itself in promoting the real and lasting welfare of those countries. And as to the commercial despotism, it could never have existed under the national government.

It therefore follows, that the national government, being perfectly free from all the defects of the Company, would, by the simple, natural, and rational act of assuming the administration of government in those countries, have prevented or reformed all the several abuses or evils that have sprung from the defective constitution of the Company, as sovereign. But besides the mighty reform of abuses, that must have been immediately caused by thus changing the person of the sovereign; there is another advantage, which, though it cannot be said to spring directly from that change, yet would it have ensued as a natural consequence of the national government’s taking upon itself this sovereign charge; and that is, the creation or institution of a new interest in that country; a sort of middle state, betwixt the native subjects and their foreign government.

68The middle state here meant is the East India Company, (or which is the same, her servants in Bengal;) which, being now reduced to the condition of a subject, tho’ still retaining all her commercial privileges and interests in that country, would have formed an intermediate link in the political chain, serving to connect the natives with their government, and government with the natives. For, in every one circumstance that respected the liberty of the subject, this middle state must have held precisely the same interest as the natives; and, in consequence, the same inclination to oppose all oppression of government: and, in every thing that respected the real interest, the power, or honour of the sovereign, the community of Natale Solum must have led it to support the measures of government. Therefore, this middle state, holding a great weight in that dependent dominion, (not indeed from its numbers, but from the powerful support and influence of the Company, which would have been still very respectable in the sovereign country,) must have carried a mighty poise into the scale of liberty, in opposition to the despotism of government; 69whilst, at same time, it would have created no danger to the power of the sovereign. And a middle state of this nature must have been of inexpressible utility; facilitating, in many respects, the establishment of a regular political ?conomy

in the government of these countries. For, in such case, the sovereign could, with propriety, efficacy, and safety, have conferred every reasonable privilege on the whole body of subjects in this foreign dominion: seeing that the exertion of these privileges might have been artfully confined to this middle state: and, as on the one hand, this finesse would not have, in any shape, withheld the benefit of these privileges from the natives; but, on the contrary, would have rendered them more effectually useful to the whole body of subjects, than if they had been committed either entirely or in common to the natives; because the Company’s servants would, from interest, have had the same inclination as the natives, to exert these privileges for the common good; and they would have had infinitely greater power, from their superior activity, intrepidity, and firmness, as also from their superior 70opportunities of obtaining redress elsewhere against any infringement made by government: so, on the other hand, the authority of the sovereign could have incurred no risk from these privileges in the hands of Europeans; whereas there is great danger in attempting to confer on the natives a power to controul even the despotism of government. With this middle state the power of juries would have been effectual to the subject, and harmless to the sovereign: however, we shall have occasion to be more particular on this head in the sequel.

But if the national government could, by taking this sovereign charge upon itself, have prevented or reformed these many evils and abuses that have arisen from the defects of the Company; and could have likewise created other such advantages, facilitating the establishment of a regular government in those countries; what reason can be assigned for government’s declining this charge, and devolving it on the Company? Government could not surely suppose that this important concern would be managed to greater national advantage by the Company, than 71by itself: seeing that common sense might have foreseen, what experience hath since proved, that, under the management of the Company, the interest of Britain in those countries would, in the space of a very few years, be completely annihilated; that the countries themselves would either be completely ruined, or otherwise lost to enemies; and that the wealth, which was extorted from them by rapine and general havoc, being imported into Britain in the hands of a few indiscreet individuals, would create a torrent of profusion, extravagance, luxury, and prodigality, that would sweep all before it into the gulf of bankruptcy, perdition, and despair. Whereas, under the regular administration of national government, those countries might have been still preserved in a flourishing condition; and, in consequence, still capable of yielding to Britain a tribute little inferior to the surplus revenue which the Company received in the first year of the Dewanny: which tribute, arriving immediately at the public treasury of Britain, and being there applied to the diminution of taxes, and consequent reduction of the price of necessaries and labour, would have proved a 72gentle universal shower, reviving our decayed and drooping manufactures and commerce.

But neither could government be induced to confer this sovereignty on the Company, by any motive of regard to the true interest of the proprietors: seeing it was palpably evident that this charge, being so unmeasurably superior to her powers of supporting it, must unavoidably crush her to ruin, and, along with her, the countries subjected to her rule; and, it is to be feared, even that community of which she forms a part. Whereas, if the national government had taken into its own hands, and carefully administered the government of those countries, whilst it continued the Company in possession of her commercial privileges, she would have continued to divide, in the first place, the six per cent. which her commerce, (unaided by revenue) afforded; even when burdened with the necessary expence of a small military force maintained for the guard of that commerce in those foreign countries, and which must have been equal to four per cent. on her capital: but this commercial military expence being rendered in a great measure unnecessary, 73by the immediate protection of national government, the saving thereof would have added two per cent. to her dividend: and the equivalent, which government would have paid for her fortresses, munition, &c. being added to her capital stock, would have encreased her dividend nearly one per cent. more; whilst her stock itself would, at this day, have been really, and intrinsically worth 220 l. instead of ........ its present real and intrinsic value.

It would be insulting the understanding of ministry, to suppose that it had been restrained from assuming this sovereign charge, by any delicacy of regard to the ideal right of the Company; derived from either conquests, as subjects; or from the sham grant of a man, who had not power to dispose of a single bega of land, nay, not of a cocoa-nut-tree in that country; and consequently whose grant of the sovereignty of Bengal could contribute nothing more to investiture or possession, than his grant of the crown of Britain could. Though if we should (for the sake of argument) suppose, that ministry had really admitted some such right, we must still 74esteem its acquiescence in that right a most absurd and wildly mistaken indulgence; seeing it evidently tended to the ruin of the party whom it meant to favour.

There hath been, however, one weighty argument against government’s assuming this Indian charge, which is, the danger arising to national liberty from government’s, (or, in other words, the crown or ministry’s) acquiring such an accession of influence, as must arise from the possession of the many emoluments, places, posts, &c. annexed to this Indian charge: whereas liberty is completely secured from such danger, whilst the Company possesses it. And the certainty of this double maxim, viz. the danger from government’s possessing this charge, and the security whilst it is in the hands of the Company, is as generally established as almost any one human principle: for, being violently enforced by those whose personal views lead them to oppose administration, and at same time not simply allowed, but even inculcated by ministry itself, it hath been readily credited by those who, their personal interest not being so deeply concerned, were less curious to investigate the truth.

75It may be deemed presumptuous in an individual, to question the orthodoxy of a maxim so powerfully enforced by one party, readily allowed by the other, and almost universally credited: tho’ the extraordinary circumstance, of two violent rival parties concurring so exactly on a point, where their personal interest seems to be so materially and so oppositely engaged, would lead a bystander to suppose, that either one of the two parties must be mistaken; or otherwise, that one or both must misrepresent: at any rate, that uncommon instance of candour, in ministry’s preaching up a doctrine so repugnant to that which it pretends to be its own personal interest, would induce such bystander to suspect its sincerity. However, as a right understanding of this point may consi............