The English East India company is, under the title of Dewan, the real and actual sovereign of Bengal, Behar, and Orixa: a dominion equal to almost any one state in Europe, in respect of either extent and fertility of country, or numbers of ingenious and industrious subjects; and exceeding most of them in the internal materials of commerce, or resources of wealth. The Company executes the government of this dominion by a deputation, consisting of a Governor and Council; who reside at Calcutta, the Company’s original presidency, or chief factory in Bengal. And the Directors, who, as possessing the executive authority of the Company, may be termed the supreme sovereigns of this Indian dominion, have preserved to themselves the sole power of immediately ordering, directing and controuling 18the government; for this deputed government communicates its purposes, receives its orders, and accounts for its conduct to none but the Directors.

But it is evident, that the distance of situation must render the immediate controul of the Directors perfectly impotent, ineffectual, and nugatory; for it would be absurd to suppose, that the government of Bengal should defer the execution of any one purpose until it shall have communicated with, and received the opinion of the Directors, which cannot be effected in the space of a whole year; consequently the directors cannot interfere in the direction, or ordering of this government, farther than in some few cases of the most general or invariable nature: but the execution of even these general orders depends upon the will and discretion of the deputed government; seeing the Directors cannot, at that distance, enforce it themselves: and the same cause puts it out of their power to prevent or restrain abuse; so that they hold neither positive nor negative authority in the immediate execution of this government. And the condition or situation of these directorial sovereigns 19at home, renders their retrospective controul equally impotent and ineffectual; for they have no power in themselves to inflict other punishment on their deputies, for the most audacious disobedience, or for maladministration, than dismission from their service; and this becomes no punishment, because the delinquents are previously prepared for it, being ready to set out of their own accord with a princely fortune for the mother country; where they set the authority of the Directors at defiance; for there these sovereigns of India are themselves subjects, and cannot call their quondam ministers to account, except in an ordinary court of justice; and the difficulty of obtaining evidence requisite to convict in these courts; the dread of bringing to light, in the course of a legal process, some abstruse mysteries of government; and the apprehension of danger arising to the interest of the present direction from a powerful combination at the next election, will ever deter the Directors from seriously prosecuting a lawsuit against their deputies, even in cases of peculation from the sovereign; but if it respects only the interest 20of the subject, they will be more apt to palliate and defend the offence. We must therefore perceive, that this deputed government acts perfectly independent of either the immediate controul, or future awe of the sovereign: whilst the sovereign is compelled to blindly support, with its whole power, the authority of this government; and, without choice, to enforce all its measures; seeing that to oppose the will of the deputy, is opposing the authority of the sovereign.

And, as to the native subjects, the power of this deputed government over them is perfectly absolute and complete. For the inhabitants of those countries, being disposed by nature or climate to passive obedience, and by long custom habituated to despotic authority, and being farther impressed with a particular awe of Europeans, from a notion of their natural superiority, implicitly submit to the will of their present government, without once daring to either examine its right, dispute its authority, or question its conduct. The subject therefore holds not the smallest voice in the administration of government; the jurisdiction, the police, the 21finances, the military government and defence, are all incontroulably directed by the Company’s deputation: and the entire interests of those countries, the lives and property of the inhabitants, are subjected to its discretion, and depend on its will.

So that this deputation of the Company executes the government of Bengal with a power perfectly unlimited by any exterior controul; and if we consider that it is at the same time foreign to the country governed, mutable, and of very short duration, we shall find that it is equally unrestrained by any internal check. It is therefore the most unlimited government on earth; or rather it is the only government that can, with propriety, be termed arbitrary and despotic.

For all other deputed governments are sufficiently restrained by the authority of the sovereign; and we have no idea of despotism, except in governments that are supreme or sovereign. But the idea of actual despotism in a supreme government is merely imaginary; seeing that, in one and all of these governments, the power of governing is conditional, limited by 22rule, and subjected to controul both external and internal. For it is evident, that, in all supreme governments, the power of governing, and the means that support this power, must needs be derived from the people governed; and therefore cannot exist in despight of their consent; and though, in some of these governments, the condition, upon which this power and these means are granted, is not specially expressed, yet is it perfectly understood, and invariably enforced in all of them; inasmuch as there are examples in each, of sovereigns who have suffered the utmost punishment, for attempting to transgress the limits of this condition; nay, there is scarce one instance where the prince, thus transgressing, escaped the resentment of the people; and examples of this nature are most frequent in these governments that are falsely termed despotic. These examples must therefore convince all sovereigns, that there is a power in the people, superior to, and capable of controuling them; and the sense of this must ever prove an effectual external controul on the conduct of a supreme government. But self-interest, 23that primum and perpetuum mobile of human action, which we may term an internal check, operates still more forcibly, constantly, and immediately on the will of a supreme government; not simply restraining it from doing or permitting injury, but impelling it to promote the good of the people governed. For a government that is sovereign, and perpetual (or durante vita and hereditary) cannot possibly separate its own private interest from that of the community which it governs; being indeed itself a part of that community: and this is so evident, that no prince ever attempted to advance a distinct interest of his own, at the expence of the general weal, who was not a fool, before he became a tyrant. But a wise sovereign considers his people as the channel through which alone he can receive substantial good or evil; and, acting upon this principle, he will, however absolute and disposed by nature to tyranny, abstain from injuring the general interest, because he is sensible that such injury will recoil upon himself; and he will exert himself to promote the prosperity of his people, as the only means of advancing his own power, 24grandeur, or wealth. So that a sovereign prince, who understands his own real interest, though otherwise void of virtue, will ever study to govern well; nay, the private vices of such a prince do often operate public good; a striking instance of which we meet with in our Henry the Seventh; whose extreme and sordid avarice was the source of English commerce and wealth; and his mean self-love, and jealousy of power, established universal liberty.

But the nature of this Bengal government differs, in every circumstance, from that of a supreme government; being deputed, foreign, mutable, and temporary, it is no way interested in the lasting prosperity of the community which it governs; on the contrary, this government holds an interest which is not only distinct from, but diametrically opposite to that of the subject. For these Governors return to Europe immediately on the expiration of their office, which seldom dures above three years, often less; therefore their sole aim is to amass all the wealth they can, during the short term of their power, in order to transport it along with their 25persons to their own country. But the wealth which a government amasses, must needs be extorted from the people governed; consequently self-interest leads this government to pillage and plunder the subject: and we have seen that it is not restrained, by any external controul, from advancing its own distinct interest at the expence of the community which it governs, seeing it is perfectly exempted from all awe of either the sovereign or the subject; and it cannot be restrained by any internal check, because it holds no concern in the lasting welfare of the people.

Such then is the ruling principle of this government: nor are the means which it employs to promote its own interest less extraordinary than is its power to enforce them. For this government, which arbitrarily directs the jurisdiction and police, together with the imposition and collection of taxes, doth at same time act in the capacity of a merchant. And this commercial despotism, or despotic power lodged in the hands of a few foreign merchants, hath, in its nature and consequences, proved infinitely more destructive to the interest of that commercial 26country, than all the operations of political tyranny have been: for from it sprung these cruel monopolies, which struck at the very root of manufacture, commerce, and even population.

To attempt describing the particular methods which this government hath practised to promote its own interest at the expence of the people, in its double capacity, of an absolute sovereign and a despotic merchant, would be a tedious, invidious, and even an unprofitable undertaking; for it is almost impossible to properly delineate the conduct of a tyranny so various and irregular in its operations; and, to those who are unacquainted with the modes, customs, and interests of the country in question, the recital of a few particular instances would only serve to mislead their judgment, and darken or diminish the truth. By attending to the general description given of the nature views and interests of this government, we shall form a more complete and just notion of its conduct and deportment, than can be acquired from any disjointed account of particulars. Let us suppose a few foreigners sent into a rich commercial 27country, with absolute and unlimited power over the lives and property of the inhabitants; actuated by no other principle than that of acquiring riches, and stimulated thereto not only by avarice but ambition, or the desire of excelling; unrestrained by any species of present awe or future apprehension; but on the contrary, encouraged by precedent to expect in their own country, titles, dignity, respect, and consequence, each in proportion to the sum he imports; and whatever methods we can suppose would be practised by such foreigners, to accomplish their purpose, within a short limited term, we may suppose to have been actually employed by this Bengal government. The enormous amount of numerous fortunes, imported by the persons employed in this government, together with the rapidity of acquisition, are circumstances seen and known in this country; and these will thoroughly warrant our supposing, that the acquirers have availed themselves to the utmost of their powers, as well as their opportunities. However, we shall err greatly in our estimate of the damage caused to those countries, by their government’s prosecuting 28its own distinct interest, if we shall confine the reckoning to only the loss of so much specie, as hath been extorted and exported by these foreigners: for this, though in itself a ruinous grievance, is merely trivial, when compared with the havoc and waste committed on the manufacture, the commerce, agriculture, and population, by the methods employed to acquire these sums. A herd of hogs, broke into a well dressed vineyard, will gorge their voracious maws; but that which they eat and devour doth not destroy the vineyard; it is their manner of eating, their rutting up, their tearing down, and trampling under foot.

Hitherto we have regarded this government in only one point of view: we have seen it acting for itself; but we have not seen the part it acts for the people, in its capacity of a sovereign ruler, administring the government of a mighty state in all its different offices or departments; and entrusted with the care of the whole and entire interests of a numerous commercial nation. But, in the discharge of this sovereign trust, we shall find the government of Bengal a mere Vis inerti?, void 29of the two efficient principles of action, ability or power of acting, and will or inclination. For how can we expect to find the ability, of governing well, in the men employed by the Company to execute the government of those countries? to attain the knowledge of any one science or mystery, demands an effort of the mind; but it is impossible for the brightest natural genius to arrive at even a moderate degree of skill in the art of governing, which, as it is the most elevated, so is it the most difficult, abstruse, various and complicated of all human sciences, without long and intense application, study, and reflection; and, we may add, a series of practice; and all these gradations to skill, in governing, are wanting to our Bengal governors. Their scholastic education extends no farther than to qualify them for merchants clerks; and, immediately on being taken from school, they are dispatched to India; where the manner of life is consonant to the climate, voluptuous to a degree of dissoluteness, vain, idle, dissipated, and an enemy to study or reflection: the juvenile part of their life being spent in this manner, they arrive 30at the charge of government with minds perfectly uninformed, and so very averse to application, that they commit and implicitly confide the charge of their own private concerns to servants. If such men should possess the skill or address of governing well, it must certainly be acquired instantaneously and supernaturally; infused into them by miracle, like the gift of speech into the ass of Balaam.

But the want of will or inclination is an obstacle to their governing well, still more prevalent than is the want of ability. Labour, fatigue, and difficulty are evils, to which the human mind is so naturally averse, that, unless it is urged by some strong impulse of passion, such as the fear of some superior evil, or the hope and desire of some mighty good, it will decline and evade them: what stimulum then can be sufficiently powerful to urge the habitually indolent minds of our Bengal governors to encounter the difficulties, the labour, and fatigue attending a due discharge of the duties of government; which, of all human undertakings, is the most replete with these mental evils? Yet this government, which demands a stronger 31stimulum than any other government that ever yet existed, is in effect urged by no one motive or consideration to discharge the duties of its office; for, as it holds no interest in the lasting welfare of the people governed, neither its hopes nor its fears are at all interested in the good or evil consequences that may be caused by its own vigilance or neglect: being ............