THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE FAMILY COMPACT—EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATION.

The decree of the National Assembly, in May, ordering the armament of 14 vessels of the line has been studied in a former chapter. Attention was there called to the fact that this step was taken before Spain had made a formal demand for assistance under the family compact. It was also noted that the formal demand was made in the middle of June, but that the King, fearing the consequences, had delayed laying the matter before the Assembly.[382] On August 2, more than six weeks later, a letter from Montmorin informed the Assembly that Spain had demanded in the most positive manner the execution of treaties in case the negotiation with England did not turn out as desired. The King, hoping, for a speedy settlement, had thought it wise to defer provoking a discussion of the matter in the National Assembly; but in view of the continued preparations of England he could delay no longer. Therefore he had charged the writer to warn the Assembly and thought that it would be prudent to increase the French armament. He laid before the Assembly the letter of the Spanish ambassador of June 16, with copies of the letters and documents accompanying it, recounting the history of the dispute and the negotiations to the time when it was written. The minister asked the Assembly to deliberate on the demand of the Court of Madrid. All of the documents were referred to the diplomatic committee.[383]

On the next day, August 3, another letter from Montmorin notified the Assembly that a courier from Madrid had brought news of the signature of a declaration and counter declaration that gave hope of an amicable settlement. Great applause greeted the announcement. The letter and declarations[425] were referred to the diplomatic committee. Dupont de Nemours then announced that he had some observations to present on the treaty with Spain known as the “family compact;” but to save the valuable time of the Assembly he would bring them to the attention of the Deputies by having them printed. Another Deputy announced that he also would present some remarks on the Spanish demand in the same manner.

Dupont, in his observations on the treaty, first announced the principles on which he proposed to examine it. It had been made, he said, thirty years before, when political philosophy had made scarcely any progress. It was antiquated and inconsistent in some respects, but these defects did not prevent its being just and salutary in principle. Some, he said, wished to break the treaty and abandon our allies, but reason, common sense, and honor point to the contrary—that we should confirm it. He declared that defensive and commercial arrangements ought to be kept, but anything involving offensive warfare ought to be struck out. He thought that it ought to be so modified that instead of a family it would be a national compact. Wherever the word “crown” occurred he would substitute the word “nation,” and instead of “the Kings agree,” etc., he would have it read “the nations (through their Kings).” He examined the treaty article by article and measured each by these standards. Most of the stipulations he would preserve, with slight modifications; a few he would strike out entirely. The stipulation which provided that the mere requisition should be sufficient to establish the obligation of the nation called upon to furnish the aid was wholly untenable, he declared. The need should be first established, and the nation called upon should have the right of judging. Instead of limiting the alliance to the House of Bourbon, he thought that all nations having similar sentiments ought to be admitted.

The other Deputy, who presented the observations on the Spanish demand, declared that Spain had been a faithful ally. She had taken up a failing cause in 1761 and shared in the unhappy sacrifices of two years later. She had aided in the American Revolution and had prepared to assist in[426] the trouble with the Netherlands in 1787. Gratitude would command France to reciprocate; but he wished to appeal to reason and not to sentiment. Spain and France were natural allies because of common interests. The treaty of 1761, no longer a family but a national compact, offered many advantages. Spain was still the most important outlet for French commerce. France had profited more from the alliance than Spain, hence was indebted to her. The financial embarrassment at the time was serious, and a war would be dangerous, but even this ought not to cause France to sacrifice honor. He thought that the armaments ought to be continued and all the forces of France ought to be offered to Spain. If this should be done, England would probably give way. The war, if it should come, ought to have the support of all France and be waged on new and noble principles.[384]

It was more than three weeks before the diplomatic committee was ready to report. The principal member of the committee was Mirabeau. He was spokesman when the report was presented to the Assembly on August 25. He began by saying that the peace was not likely to be disturbed; that the territory in dispute between Spain and England belonged to neither, but to the natives; that it was not worth the loss of blood and treasure; that France, because of internal conditions, ought to avoid war; and that there would soon be universal peace and no need of allies. After giving these pacific assurances, he admitted that France ought to change her political principles, but declared that this ought not to be done suddenly. She could not remain isolated from the world. The suspension of treaties would be perilous. All treaties made by the King ought to be observed by the nation until they were annulled or changed. He recited the history of Spain’s faithful observance of the family compact; then asked whether it would be right for France to annul such a solemn engagement at a time when Spain was threatened by the same danger that she had three times warded off from France. In view of the great English armament,[427] self-interest obliged France to strengthen her alliance with Spain. That would require a faithful observance of the treaty. If England did not really desire war, but was arming simply to conduct the negotiation more favorably, increasing the French armament would doubtless delay the result. But if the abandonment of French engagements should force Spain to make peace with England more promptly, a great wrong would be done to French credit and French commerce. If England desired war, then France ought to support Spain with all her resources. For if England should force Spain to succumb, France would be the next object of her ambition and vengeance. It was not proposed, he said, to ratify the compact as a whole, but only the defensive and commercial stipulations. He proposed to notify the King of Spain that the alliance would be preserved, and at the same time to refer the treaty to a committee for revision, after which it should be renewed.

The King of France was to open negotiations with the King of Spain at once for this purpose. He also proposed that the fleet be raised to 30 ships of the line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels. After a few short favorable addresses on the report the discussion was postponed to the next day.[385]

When the discussion was resumed on August 26 the report met with very little opposition. There was a futile attempt, led by Pétion, to postpone the decision until further information might be obtained. L’Abbé Maury favored confirming the treaty as it stood, declaring, rightly as events proved, that it would give England a great advantage to leave the alliance so indefinite. Ricard considered 30 vessels too small an armament and proposed increasing it to 45. Others favored his idea and Mirabeau embodied it in his report. With this modification, the decrees proposed were unanimously adopted by the Assembly. The essential points were: First, defensive and commercial arrangements with Spain were to be observed; secondly, negotiations were to be opened with Spain for the purpose of renewing and perpetuating the alliance; thirdly, the armament should be raised to 45[428] ships of the line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels.[386]

On August 30 Montmorin informed the Assembly that the King had sanctioned the decrees and would proceed at once to carry them out. The minister for marine, he said, had already received orders for the armament. Only 16 vessels would be fitted out at once, which, added to the 14 already armed, would make 30. Preparations would be made to complete the armament to 45 if that should become necessary.[387] On September 1 Montmorin replied to Fernan Nu?ez’s letter of June 16. He told of the action of the Assembly and inclosed a copy of the decrees. The King, he said, was taking steps to carry them out. The reason that only 30 ships instead of 45 would be armed immediately was to avoid the appearance of hostility to England. The French King hoped for a peaceful settlement and reciprocal disarmament.[388]

To one who did not scrutinize the decrees closely the action of the Assembly seemed to be all that Spain could desire. If the support had been tardy, yet it was enthusiastic. It seems that at heart most of the Assembly really desired to support Spain and thought that they were doing all that could be expected; but their irrepressible tendency to theorize blinded them to the practical. Apparently they did not realize that their proposal to modify the treaty at such a critical time nullified it as far as any immediate assistance under it was concerned. It seems possible that if Mirabeau had stood firmly for ratifying the treaty as it was he might still have carried the Assembly with him.[389]

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The French Government was anxious regarding the effect that the action of the Assembly might have on England. The French view of England’s conduct was well expressed in a letter from Montmorin to Luzerne, the ambassador from France to the English Court. After remarking that the British Court would probably be astonished at the decrees, he explained that the step was necessary to sustain the honor of France. It had not been taken precipitately, he said, but had been delayed as long as possible, even provoking complaints from Spain. When it was learned that Spain had given satisfaction to England, and still the latter refused to disarm, the French Government was compelled to suppose that the British Cabinet had some ulterior purpose and was not certain that it did not concern France. Either England did not wish to terminate the Nootka affair justly or she had other objects, for which this was to furnish a stepping-stone. If it was a question of Spain, France was interested in saving her ally; if the French themselves were concerned, argument was unnecessary. Luzerne was to use these arguments with Leeds and Pitt. He was also to use confidentially the fact that the Assembly had decreed a larger armament than the Government had asked. This, Montmorin remarked, ought to make an impression. Luzerne might again suggest French intervention, but with much circumspection, since it had been refused before.[390] On the day after writing the above private instructions for the ambassador, Montmorin asked him to assure the English King that the armaments were purely precautionary and had no object except those designated by the Assembly. The French King hoped for a peaceable settlement. He had been pleased with the declaration and counter-declaration, but would have been more pleased if a proportionate disarmament had followed, or at least an agreement not to increase the armaments.[391]

Gower, the British ambassador at Paris, had promptly expressed to Montmorin his surprise at the action of the Assembly. He reported on August 27 to his Government that Montmorin was surprised also, and had told him that orders would be given to commission more ships, “but that[430] it would be done (this he said in the utmost confidence) avec le plus grande lenteur.”[392] A dispatch of the next day hinted that Spanish money might have influenced the Assembly.[393] On September 1 instructions were sent from London telling Gower to renew the English assurances of friendliness for France, but to observe that it would be impossible for the harmony to continue if France should support Spain. He was to represent that any aid or encouragement to Spain would be a cause of umbrage to England, since it would make a just settlement more difficult.[394] On September 4 Gower presented a memorial demanding an explanation of the armament.[395] Montmorin’s letter to Luzerne of August 28, referred to above, was presented to the English Court on September 7.[396] On September 10, in reply to Gower’s of the 4th, Montmorin referred the English Court to a letter written September 9 to Luzerne, which the latter would present. For some reason Luzerne delayed handing this to the British Court, and on September 21 Gower was instructed to demand a formal reply to his memorial. When this demand reached Paris, Montmorin was out of the city. Having returned, he answered, October 4, that he did not understand Luzerne’s delay. He declared that France had no wish to influence the negotiations, but in case the matter could not be amicably settled she might be compelled to support Spain. Before this reached London Gower had been instructed to demand that the French fleet make no move to join the Spanish. On October 14 Montmorin agreed that no movement should be made until England should have received a reply from Spain to the ultimatum which the British Court had sent a few days before.[397] Hugh Elliot was sent secretly as a special English agent to argue with the French Court against supporting Spain. He met members of the diplomatic committee and thought, at least, that he had converted them to the English view. W. A. Miles co?perated with Elliot in this undertaking. Only obscure and[431] mysterious references to their mission are extant, and many curious speculations have been made concerning it.[398]

Before news reached Madrid of the action of the National Assembly negotiations had begun for a final settlement of the Nootka question.

The declaration and counter declaration signed late in July had been accepted by England as affording the satisfaction demanded. This had opened the way for a pacific discussion of the respective rights to Nootka and the neighboring coast.[399] On September 8 Fitzherbert presented to Floridablanca the first projet of a treaty. It had been formulated in London three weeks earlier and had been sent with instructions to the British ambassador. These instructions declared it to be the purpose of the British Government to avoid requiring Spain to make any mortifying renunciation of rights, but at the same time the stipulations were to be so worded that they would not imply an admission of the Spanish claims by the British Government. It was impossible for His Majesty to recognize them, either directly or indirectly. They were merely a matter of pride with Spain, it ............