AMERICA’S RELATIONS TO THE CONTROVERSY.

Attention was called above to the repeated conferences between Pitt and the South American agitator, Miranda. The fact was pointed out that these conferences occurred at the critical periods of the English-Spanish negotiations.[350] To repeat briefly: The first was on February 14, just after the receipt of the first Spanish communication on the Nootka affair, and before the British Court had formulated its reply. Miranda had previously proposed his “grand plan” for the advantage of England united with South America. At this conference the plan was admitted to be beneficial. It was decided that it should be put into execution in case of a war with Spain. In consequence of Pitt’s request, Miranda presented, some three weeks later, a written statement of the commercial and military resources of South America. Again, on May 6, when the war excitement in London was at its highest, the great minister and the South American had a conference on the same subject. Pitt was on his way to a cabinet council and was taking with him for consideration at the council the papers which Miranda had presented. Grenville was present at the interview. The conversation was on the prospect of war with Spain, and on the disposition of the people of South America toward joining England in order to gain independence. Various interviews took place at Pitt’s house while the Spanish negotiations were in progress.[351]

[413]

At some time during the year Miranda’s plan was presented in the form of a draft of a constitution for the Spanish-American colonies after they should have gained their independence. The proposed new empire was to include all of South America, except Brazil and Guiana, and the portion of North America west of the Mississippi River and south of the forty-fifth parallel. Cuba was to be included as the key to the Gulf of Mexico. The government was to be modeled in a general way on that of Great Britain. The executive power was to be lodged in an inca, under the title of “emperor,” with hereditary succession. The upper chamber was to be composed of members nominated for life by the inca. Further details of the government were worked out.[352] Miranda reminded Pitt that the latter had seemed pleased with his ideas and had asked him to leave the draft for further perusal. Plans for carrying on the war were discussed, and the most favorable point for attack in South America was considered. Means were devised for enlisting the interest of Jesuits in Italy who were natives of South America and had been exiled by the King of Spain. Accounts of recent insurrections in Spanish America were given to show how ready the people were for emancipation. Later, a detailed plan of attack was presented, with maps to illustrate it. At Pitt’s request a plan of the defenses of Havana was left with him.

This shows what extended plans the British Cabinet was considering. It was to be expected that England would persist in her demands, for if Spain would not yield there was much to expect from a war. Secret agents at various places in America were collecting information looking toward military operations to carry out these schemes. Besides the overtures to the United States through Canada, to be discussed presently, there were secret emissaries at Charleston and New York, and information was being collected concerning New Orleans, the Floridas, and the Mississippi country. The feasibility of marching troops from New Orleans to Mexico was considered, and reports were made by men who were familiar with the country. Some of the secret employees were enthusiastic over the possibility of making a great English colony out of the Floridas and the Mississippi Valley.[414] Agents of the Creek and Cherokee Indians were negotiating for a friendly connection with England. The plan, as far as it had taken shape, seems to have been for England to seize the heart of North America for herself and erect the remainder of Spanish America into a client state.[353]

As mentioned above, the British Cabinet sent instructions on May 6 to Lord Dorchester, the governor of Canada.[354] He had intended to visit England during the summer, but was requested to remain and prepare for the impending struggle. Besides strengthening his own dominions he was to make friendly overtures to the United States.[355] In consequence of these orders Lord Dorchester gave instructions on June 27 to Major Beckwith, whom he had selected as the medium through which these overtures should be made. Beckwith was given double instructions. The one set was to guide his conversations in discussing public questions in a general way. The other was secret and for his private guidance. In the first he was instructed to say that the appearance of war with Spain rendered it improbable that Dorchester would obtain his expected leave of absence that season. He was to return hearty thanks for the friendly approbation of Dorchester’s proposed trip through the United States on his way to England. He was to express the hope that the appearance of a war with Spain, or even its actual occurrence, would not alter the friendly disposition of the United States toward Great Britain. He was to mention the pretensions of Spain to absolute control over navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, and discuss the evil effect on the United States if such control should be conceded. These things he might say freely and publicly. But his secret instructions were to guide him in conversing with those whom he might select as proper persons in whom to confide. From them he was to learn the disposition of the Government and the people toward England if the affair with Spain were not considered. Then he was to discover what difference a war with that country might make. He was to ascertain whether in case war should occur they would be likely to join Spain, and also to find what might[415] induce them to join Great Britain in such an event. In discussing the Mississippi question he was to be cautious, but might suggest that England would probably assist in obtaining its navigation. Naval and military movements should be watched.[356]

Dorchester reported to the home office, on July 7, that Beckwith had been hastily sent back to New York.[357] The latter did not have to wait long to find the right man to converse with on the matter contained in his secret instructions. On July 8, Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, made a memorandum giving the substance of a communication from him. The major had spoken of the expected rupture and had observed that all commercial nations must favor the views of England.

It was therefore presumed, should a war take place, that the United States would find it to their interest to take part with Great Britain rather than with Spain.[358]

It seems that Hamilton communicated the matter to the President at once, for in a letter reporting a later conversation with Beckwith he says:

I have made the proper use of what you said to me at our last Interview [July 8].[359]

Under date of July 12, Jefferson, the Secretary of State, prepared a paper entitled, “Heads of a consideration on the conduct we are to observe in the war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly should the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas.” As one would expect, Jefferson inclined toward Spain rather than England. He brought out the danger to the United States if England should get control of New Orleans and the neighboring territory. He suggested the idea of joining Spain in guaranteeing the independence of these countries instead of allowing Great Britain to take them. The paper seems to have been prepared to serve as a guide in an approaching interview[416] with the Canadian agent, for he says, “As to England, say to Beckwith,” etc.,[360] then gives the substance of what Hamilton reported as having been said to that gentleman in an interview of July 22, at which Jefferson was present.

In this interview the fact was brought to light that Beckwith was not an authorized British agent, but that he had been sent by Dorchester with the knowledge of the British Cabinet. Owing to his unofficial character nothing of importance passed, but he was told that the United States was ready to answer when it should be presented in an official form. Hamilton had said that, at the time, he—

would not mean either to raise or repress expectations. … Something was said respecting the probable course of military operations in case of a war between Britain and Spain, which Mr. Beckwith supposed would be directed toward South America, alleging, however, that this was mere conjecture on his part. I hinted cautiously our dislike of any attempt on New Orleans.

Hamilton added in a note:

The views of the Government were to discard suspicion that any engagements with Spain or intentions hostile to Great Britain existed; to leave the ground in other respects vague and open, so as that in case of a rupture between Great Britain and Spain the United States ought to be in the best situation to turn it to account in reference to the disputes between them and Great Britain on the one hand and Spain on the other.[361]

Beckwith reported to Dorchester that Hamilton had said:

We are perfectly unconnected with Spain, have even some points unadjusted with that Court, and are prepared to go into a consideration of the subject.[362]

Scott, a member of the House of Representatives from western Pennsylvania, told Beckwith that the prospect for a rupture made most forcible impressions on all classes in the States. There was a deep interest, he said, in the prospect of England’s possessing New Orleans. The possible dismemberment of South America and the opening of commerce[417] with that continent was of interest, as well as the question of navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific. He thought that the moment was very favorable for England; and he saw no reason why the United States should not assist her.[363] After news of the declaration and counter declaration, signed at Madrid July 24, reached America, Beckwith reported general dissatisfaction in the United States at the prospect of pacification. Agricultural interests had expected that the war would bring them high prices, and the shipping interests were expecting a share in the English carrying trade and hoped for free commerce with the Spanish West Indies. Friends of England thought that she ought to take the opportunity for ruining the Spanish marine, which they imagined to be an easy matter. British possession of New Orleans was expected and desired, except by the Government which hoped to gain from a neutral position when the settlement should come. At the same time he reported another conversation with Hamilton. The Secretary had said:

We consider ourselves at perfect liberty to act with respect to Spain in any way most conducive to our interests, even to the going to war with that power, if we shall think it advisable to join you.[364]

These reports were doubtless colored by the desire of the Canadian agent to send as favorable news as possible; but after allowing for the exagger............