We shall probably never be able to realise a hundredth part of what Germany has done by her spy system, but we know enough to realise that, for years, no country and no walks of life—from the highest to the lowest—have been free from the presence of her ubiquitous and unscrupulous secret agents. Nothing in the way of espionage has been too large, or too small, for attention. Her spies have swarmed in all cities, and in every village; her agents have ranked among the leaders of social and commercial life, and among the sweepings and outcasts of great communities. The wealthiest of commercial men have not shrunk from acting as her secret agents. She has not been above employing beside them the very dregs of the community. No such a system has ever been seen in the world; I hope it is safe to say that no such system will ever be seen again. Indeed, so despicable is this German spy system that even the leader of the Opposition in the Reichstag, Herr Richter, one day rose from his seat and protested[Pg 94] against "the more than doubtful morality of the individuals employed." This protest was made because it was known that the Secret Service of Germany countenanced rank immorality and vice, the suborning of high officials, and the shameless engagement of women of ill-fame in the search for information. The official feeling in Germany concerning such debased methods was well illustrated by the reply of Herr Von Puttkamer, the Minister for the Interior, who said:—
"It is the right and duty of the State to employ special and extraordinary methods, and even if that honest and estimable functionary, Police-Councillor Rumpff, has employed the methods of which he is accused, in order to secure for the State the benefits of useful intelligence, I here publicly express to him my satisfaction and thanks."
That statement is certainly informing. It reveals to us the low, vile methods of our enemies.
The German spy system, as we know it to-day, is the creation of one Carl Stieber, and it dates back to about the year 1850.
Stieber, who was an obscure Saxon, began his career of espionage by betraying the revolutionary Socialists, with whom he pretended to sympathise, and so successful was he in this respect that he very soon obtained employment among the regular police, and was afterwards created head of a department[Pg 95] which finally worked quite independently, and was beyond police control.
Stieber could never have achieved the success he did but for the luck or good management which, during his work among the revolutionaries, brought him to the notice of Frederick William, the King of Prussia. Under the royal patronage he was secure against counter-plotters among the military and the police, both of whom hated him beyond measure as an interloper who was seen to be dangerous to their interests. Up to this time, it should be remembered, the game of espionage, so far as military matters were concerned, had been a matter solely for the military authorities, and they did not fail to resent the new influence, which very speedily threatened to make itself all-powerful—as, indeed, it ultimately did—in this particular field of Prussian activity.
It must not be supposed that Stieber—upon whose model the Russian Secret Police was afterwards established—confined his activities to either the enemies or the criminals of Prussia. He established a close watch on persons even of high rank, and many a tit-bit of information went to regale the mind of his royal master. In a sense, Frederick William was, like the modern Kaiser, the master-spy, for without his confidence Stieber could never have achieved the success he did, against both the military and the police, influences which, even in those days, were[Pg 96] almost, but not quite, all-powerful in Germany.
Stieber's greatest achievement in the field of actual spying was his work which led to the crushing of Austria at Sadowa in 1866. At this he laboured for years, and it is not too much to say that his work assured the success of the campaign. By the time the Prussian armies were on the move, Stieber had established such an army of spies and agents throughout Bohemia, that it was a matter of absolute impossibility for the unfortunate Austrians to make a single move without information being promptly carried to their enemies.
So successful was Stieber's method found, that it was only natural that it should be tried in other countries. France was the next victim, and the campaign of 1870-71 is so recent that it is hardly necessary to do more than remind the reader how thoroughly the Germans were served by their spy system.
As in the present war, the advancing Germans found, in every town and village, swarms of agents who were ready to provide them with information and guidance, and it was even said that the German invaders were better acquainted with the country they were attacking than were the officers entrusted with its defence. We have seen the same thing in the present war, when time after time the Germans have been led into towns and districts by men who have lived there[Pg 97] for years and, in many cases, had even become naturalised Frenchmen the better to carry on their work. It speaks volumes for the perfection of the German military machine that, on the outbreak of hostilities, these men should have been able, without the slightest difficulty, to join the corps operating in the districts with which they had become perfectly familiar by years of residence.
And they were able, not merely to give topographical information, but even to indicate where stores of food and petrol could be found, and to point out to their comrades where the best prospects of loot and plunder existed.
All this was merely a natural development of the system which Carl Stieber established, and which his successors have developed to the highest pitch of unscrupulous perfection.
After the war of 1870-71, the system which Stieber invented found its place in German administration, and it has continued ever since as a separate and highly-organised department, spending vast sums of money—about ￡720,000 a year—and extending its ramifications to an incredible extent. It may be mentioned, incidentally, that its workings and methods have been copied by the German commercial world, and many a British employer has, during the past few years, paid dearly through his closest commercial secrets being given away to his keenest German rivals by the patient, diligent[Pg 98] and hard-working German clerk, who was willing to work for a mere pittance for the advantage of "learning English" and studying British methods.
There cannot now be the slightest doubt that thousands of these German employees were, before the war, really in the pay of German firms, and were busily engaged in sending to Germany all the information they could possibly pick up which would tend to help the German and injure the British merchant and manufacturer.
I hope they have over-reached themselves, and that when the war is over we shall see a great deal less of the English worker being supplanted by spying Germans, whose apparent cheapness has been the costliest labour Englishmen have ever employed.
"Never trust or employ a German, and always make him pay cash" ought to be the British commercial motto for the future.
Stieber died in the early nineties, but he was succeeded by others quite as clever, and even more unscrupulous than himself, some of whom—though by no means all—have become faintly known to us through the revelations made in the too few cases of espionage where prosecution has been undertaken by our sleepy authorities. I say "very few," of course, in the comparative meaning of the phrase. Actually, there have been a fair number of cases, but when we consider the slyness of German methods we must come[Pg 99] to the conclusion that not a fraction of the whole have been dealt with, in spite of the amusing claim of Mr. McKenna that he has succeeded in smashing the German spy organisation in this country. Our leniency in this respect is a matter of amazement to people in France, and other countries where, from bitter experience, the German spy-peril is better understood, and it is also a matter of some resentment. Every blow at England, it is argued, injures the cause of the Allies as a whole, and the worst blows are likely enough to be struck by the undetected and unpunished spy.
In almost every case of espionage in England in recent years, the name of Steinhauer, "of Potsdam," has figured prominently. He is, at the moment, the chief of the Kaiser's spy-system, and there is no doubt that he fully enjoys the confidence and friendship of his royal master.
Steinhauer—as he is known to our Secret Service—is an officer in the Prussian Guard, and is about forty years of age. Personally, he is a man of charming manners, of splendid education, and of excellent presence, capable of taking his place—as he has frequently done—in the very best society. Steinhauer—the man of a hundred aliases—acting under the direct instructions of the Kaiser, and with the closest support and co-operation of the German military authorities, established in England such a network of naval and[Pg 100] military spies as, when it was tardily discovered, fairly made our authorities aghast.
The allegations I have made in these pages are borne out by Mr. McKenna's own admission, that hardly anything was done in the matter until about the year 1911; yet, as I have indicated, long before this the Germans were actually plotting war against England, and were preparing for it and looking forward to the day when they might hope to wage it with every prospect of success.
The following extract from a public statement by the Home Secretary is worth quoting. It will be noticed that Steinhauer's name is not mentioned, but there is no doubt that he was the head of the organisation of which the Home Secretary speaks.
Mr. McKenna stated in his remarkable and somewhat ludicrous communiqué of October 9th, 1914:—
"The Special Intelligence Department ... was able in three years, from 1911 to 1913, to discover the ramifications of the German Secret Service in England. In spite of enormous effort and lavish expenditure by the enemy, little valuable information fell into their hands.... There is good reason to believe that the spy organisation, crushed at the outbreak of the war, has not been re-established.... How completely that system had been suppressed in the early days of the war is clear from the fact disclosed in a German Army Order—that on 21st August the German military commanders were ignorant of the dispatch and movements of the British Expeditionary Force, although these had been known for many days to a large number of people in this country."
[Pg 101]
Such an attempt as this to lull us into a false sense of security was little short of criminal.
If not from spies, asked a correspondent of the Globe, from whom did Germany obtain, in 1912, the very valuable information that oil was to be the sole source of motive power for the "Queen Elizabeth" (v. Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten, January, 1913)? Certainly not from any English official source; for we were kept entirely in the dark as to this momentous change until the Morning Post announced in July, 1913, that the battleship in question would consume liquid fuel only. Even minor details did not escape the notice of German spies during the period specified by Mr. McKenna. For instance, the Taschenbuch for 1914 contains this statement:—
"'Hermes,' at present tender to air-craft, and as such only carries eight 6in. guns."
Yet it was not until the "Hermes" had been sunk in the Channel by a German submarine, that any official statement was made as to how she had been employed and her armament reduced!
Again, there is irrefutable evidence to show that German agents were ready waiting in France for the disembarkation of at least some details of the British Expeditionary Force, and the whole world knows that the German Emperor's insolent reference to Sir John French's Army was made before August 21st.
[Pg 102]
Further evidence of the activity of German spies before and since the outbreak of the war is to be found in the following extract from a letter written by an English naval officer, and published in the Times of November 20th under the heading, "In the North Sea":—
"Their (i.e., the Germans') submarines are outside even now, and it seems funny where they get their information. But, at any rate, they are well served, as they knew where the Fleet was when we were at Devonport, and we did not know ourselves."
Taking all these facts into consideration, it is evident that the German spy system is more than a match for the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty War Staff.
Steinhauer—the chief of German Espionage—was the author and inspiration of these "enormous efforts," and of the lavish expenditure of money.
With unlimited means at his disposal from the German Secret Service funds, a close personal friend of the Kaiser, a man of undoubted ability, great charm of manner and unquestionable daring, the man known as Steinhauer must be ranked as one of the most dangerous of our enemies. I have met him more than once. He speaks English practically like an Englishman, and, out of uniform, might well pass for an Englishman in any cosmopolitan gathering. About eight years ago he was appointed to look after the German Secret Service, with special[Pg 103] instructions from the Emperor to particularly devote himself to England.
He made frequent visits to this country; he got to know many German residents here of the better class, whose efforts might be of value to him, and within twelve months—while our red-tape-tangled Government Departments closed their eyes and dreamed—had actively at work a swarm of agents in every dockyard town and garrison where the picking up of information of value would be possible or likely. How he must have smiled! Every important town and city, many villages on the coast, every naval base had its agent or agents, and there can be no doubt that it was the result of Steinhauer's wonderful activities that at last aroused even the supine British Home Office, which for years had jeered at me and reassured the public with official denials that there were no spies in England, and had laughed at the numerous warnings to them to "sit up and take notice."
And all this in face of a great and terrible national peril!
I would here like to pay a tribute to the thoroughness with which the Confidential Department have all along done their work. Up to the limits to which the staff were allowed to go, they did magnificently. There can be no doubt that a good many of the most active German spies were detected and accounted for. The trouble is that the[Pg 104] Intelligence officers were not allowed to go far enough—indeed, since the war the director, who knew many of the spies personally, has actually been relieved of his post. Why, we may well ask. Do not let us inquire, however, but let us realise that after six months at war we still have at large amongst us some 27,000 alien enemies who would, in any other country, be safely under lock and key. This spy peril means the loss of our sons and our loved ones, and a blow at our Empire. Even the Department is subject to ordinary human limitations, and we shall never be free from the spy-peril until we recognise with Sherman that during war the military authority is superior to the civil; until ............