Lisle had heard of the operations that had been carried on by the brigade under General Gazelee, under the general supervision of Sir William Lockhart. The object was to cross by the Zolaznu Pass, to punish two of the hostile tribes on the other side; to effect a meeting with the Khuram column; and to concentrate and operate against the Chamkannis, a tribe of inveterate robbers. On the 26th General Gazelee started, and the newly-arrived wing of the Scottish Fusiliers, and two companies of the Yorkshires was to follow, on the 28th.  
The approach to the pass, which was four miles to the left, was across a very rough country; and as, after advancing four and a half miles, a severe opposition was met with, most of the day was spent in dislodging the tribesmen from the villages, and turning them out of the spurs which covered the approach to the pass. Finding it impossible to make the summit that night, they encamped and, although they were fired into heavily, but little damage was done.
 
At dawn the expedition started again but, by accident, they ascended another pass parallel with the Lozacca. At nine o'clock the Ghoorkhas and Sikhs arrived at the top of the pass. It was very difficult and, as the baggage animals gave great trouble on the ascent, and were unable to go farther, the party camped on the top of the pass.
 
General Lockhart left the camp early that morning, but was also opposed so vigorously that he was obliged to encamp, three miles from the top of the pass, after having burnt all the villages from which he had been fired upon. In the morning he joined the advance party, and went ten miles down the pass. On arriving there, he found that the Queen's and the 3rd Sikhs had pushed on farther to Dargai. This was not the place previously visited of this name, which appears to be a common one in the Tirah. Plenty of hay and straw stores were found, and the troops were vastly more comfortable than on the previous night.
 
It was here that Lisle had overtaken the column.
 
Next day the whole force was encamped at Dargai, where they were received in a friendly manner by the villagers; who expressed themselves willing to pay their share of the fines imposed, and also to picket the hills. The rear guard, of two companies of Ghoorkhas and two companies of Scottish Fusiliers, arrived late in the day. They had met with great opposition. The tribesmen would, indeed, have succeeded in carrying off the guns, had not a company of the Ghoorkhas come up and, fighting stubbornly, driven them off.
 
Next morning the headmen of the village were summoned, to explain why they had failed to pay the number of rifles they had promised; and fire was applied to one of their houses. This had an instantaneous effect and, in a quarter of an hour, the rifles were forthcoming and the fine paid.
 
The force then moved on to Esor, where helio communication with the Khuram column had been effected and, that day, Sir William Lockhart and Colonel Hill--who commanded it--met. The country traversed was a beautiful one. It was admirably cultivated, and the houses were substantially built.
 
That day two columns went out: one under General Gazelee, to collect the fines from one of the tribes; the other commanded by Colonel Hill, to punish the Chamkannis. This was a small, but extremely warlike and hardy tribe. A short time before, they had raided a thousand head of cattle from across our border, and got clear away with them.
 
A portion of the force was told off, to work its way into the valley by the river gorge, while the main body ascended the path over the Kotal. They reached this at a quarter-past ten and, while they were waiting for the head of the column that had gone up the gorge to appear, fire was opened upon them. This, however, was kept down by the guns. It was an hour before the column appeared, but the whole force was not through the defile until it was too late to carry out the destruction of the villages. The column therefore retired, severely harassed, the while, by the enemy.
 
Next day Colonel Hill was again sent forward, with the Border Scouts, the 4th and 5th Ghoorkhas, part of the Queen's, and the Khoat Battery. They were over the Kotal at nine o'clock, and the 5th Ghoorkhas and the scouts were sent to hold the hills on the left. The Chamkannis had anticipated a sudden visit, and were in force on the left, where they had erected several sangars.
 
The little body of scouts, eighty men strong, fought their way up the hill; and waited there for the leading company of the 5th. Lieutenant Lucas, who commanded them, told off half his company to sweep the sangar, and then the remainder dashed at it.
 
The Chamkannis stood more firmly than any of the tribesmen had hitherto done. They met the charge with a volley, and then drew their knives to receive it. The fire of the covering party destroyed their composure and, when the scouts were within thirty yards, they bolted for the next sangar.
 
Lucas carried three of these defences, one after another, and drove the enemy off the hill. The Ghoorkhas scouts, who had been engaged thirty-six times during the campaign, had killed more than their own strength of the enemy, and had lost but one man killed and two wounded; and this without taking count of the many nights they had spent in driving off prowlers round the camp.
 
The work of destruction now began. Over sixty villages were destroyed in the valley and, on the following day, the expedition started to withdraw. The lesson had been so severe that no attempt was made, by the tribesmen, to harass the movement.
 
The column marched down to the camp in the Maidan--the Adam Khels, through whose country they passed, paying the fine, and so picketing many of the adjacent heights as to guard the camp from the attacks of hostile tribesmen. When they reached Bara they decided to rejoin the Peshawar column, without delay, as the outlook was not promising. The evacuation began on the 7th of December, but the rear guard did not leave till the 9th. It was divided into two divisions in order, as much as possible, to avoid the delay caused by the large baggage column. The 1st Division was to march down on the Mastura Valley, while General Lockhart's 2nd Division would again face the Dwatoi defile. Both the forces were due to join the Peshawar column, on or about the 14th.
 
General Symonds, with the 1st Division, was unmolested by the way. It was very different, however, with Lockhart.
 
The movement was not made a day too soon. Clouds were gathering, the wind was blowing from the north, and there was every prospect of a fall of snow, which would have rendered the passage of the Bara Pass impossible. The 3rd Ghoorkhas led the way, followed by the Borderers, with the half battalion of the Scottish Regiment and the Dorsets. Behind them came the baggage of the brigade and headquarters, the rear of the leading column being brought up by the 36th Sikhs. General Kempster's Brigade followed, in as close order as possible; having detached portions of the 1st and 2nd Ghoorkhas, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry, to flank the whole force.
 
The Malikdin Khels were staunch to their word, and not a single shot was fired till the force had passed through the defile. The difficulties, however, were great, for the troops, baggage, and followers had to wade through the torrent, two-thirds of the way. The flanking had used up all the Ghoorkhas, and the Borderers now became the advance guard.
 
Everything seemed peaceful, and the regiment was halfway across the small valley, when a heavy fire was opened on the opposite hill. General Westmacott was in command of the brigade. The Borderers were to take and hold the opposite hill, supported by a company of Dorsets and of Scottish Fusiliers. The battery opened fire, while a party turned the nearest sangars on the right flank. By three o'clock the whole of the crests were held, and the baggage streamed into camp. Fighting continued, however, on the peaks, far into the night.
 
No explanations were forthcoming why the enemy should have allowed the force to pass through the defile, without obstruction, when a determined body of riflemen could have kept the whole of them at bay; for the artillery could not have been brought into position, as the defile was the most difficult, of its kind, that a British division had ever crossed.
 
The day following the withdrawal of the rear guard, it rained in the Bara Valley, which meant snow in the Maidan. The pickets on the heights had a bad time of it that night, as some of them were constantly attacked; and it was not till three in the morning that the baggage came in, the rear guard arriving in camp about ten.
 
The camp presented a wonderful sight that day, crowded as it was with men and animals. The weather was bitterly cold, and the men were busy gathering wood to make fires. On the hills all round, the Sikhs could be seen engaged with the enemy, the guns aiding them with their work. The 36th Sikhs, as soon as they arrived, were sent off to occupy a peak, two miles distant, which covered the advance into the Rajgul defile. The enemy mustered strong, but were turned out of the position.
 
The next morning the villages were white with snow. A party was sent on into the Rajgul valley, where they destroyed a big village.
 
Immediately after leaving Dwatoi, the valley broadened out till it was nearly a mile wide. On the right it was commanded by steep hills; on the left it was, to some extent, cultivated. The 4th Brigade this time led the way, the 3rd bringing up the rear.
 
From the moment when the troops fell in on the 10th, till they reached Barkai on the 14th, there was a general action from front to rear. The advance guard marched at half-past seven. At eight o'clock flanking parties were engaged with the enemy in the hills and spurs. Serious opposition, however, did not take place until five and a half miles of the valley had been passed.
 
Here the river turned to the right, and the front of the advance was exposed to the fire of a strongly-fortified village, nestling on the lower slope of a hill, on a terrace plateau. The village was furnished with no fewer than ten towers, and from these a very heavy fire was kept up.
 
The battery shelled the spur; while the Sikhs, in open order, skirmished up the terraces to the plateau and, after a brisk fusillade, took the village and burnt it.
 
A mile farther, the head of the column reached the camping place, which was a strong village built into the river cleft. On the left the 36th Sikhs and part of the Ghoorkhas cleared the way; while the Bombay Pioneers, and the rest of the Ghoorkhas, became heavily engaged with the enemy in some villages on the right. All along the line a brisk engagement went on. The camp pickets took up their positions early in the afternoon, and a foraging party went out and brought in supplies, after some fighting.
 
Kempster's Brigade had not been able to reach the camp, and settled itself for the night three miles farther up the valley. It, too, had its share of fighting.
 
All night it rained heavily, and the morning of the 11th broke cold and miserable. It was freezing hard; the hilltops, a hundred feet above the camp, were wrapped in snow; and the river had swollen greatly. The advance guard waded out into the river bed, and the whole of the brigade followed, the Ghoorkhas clearing the sides of the valley. In a short time they passed into the Zakka-Khel section of the Bara Valley.
 
Curiously enough, the opposition ceased here. It may be that the enemy feared to show themselves on the snow on the hilltops; or that, being short of ammunition, they decided to reserve themselves for an attack upon the other brigade. Scarcely a shot was fired until the valley broadened out into the Akerkhel, where some small opposition was offered by villagers on either bank. This, however, was easily brushed aside.
 
The advance guard of the 3rd Brigade almost caught up the rear guard of the 4th and, by four in the afternoon, its baggage was coming along nicely, so that all would be in before nightfall. The rear guard of the brigade, consisting of the Gordons, Ghoorkhas, and 2nd Punjab Infantry, had been harassed as soon as they started and, as the day wore on, the enemy increased greatly in numbers. As the flanking parties fell back to join the rear guard, they were so pressed that it was as much as they could do to keep them at bay.
 
When about three miles from camp, the baggage took a wrong road. In trying a piece of level ground, they became helplessly mixed up in swampy rice fields. The enemy, seeing the opportunity they had waited for, outflanked the rear guard, and began pouring a heavy fire into the baggage. The flanking parties were weak, for the strain had been so severe that many men from the hospital escort and baggage guard had been withdrawn, to dislodge the enemy from the surrounding spurs.
 
The Pathans were alm............