"George William Foote, William James Ramsey, and Henry Arthur Kemp," cried the Clerk of the Court at the Old Bailey. It was Thursday morning, March 1, 1883, and as we stepped into the dock the clock registered five minutes past ten. We were provided with chairs, and there were pens and ink on the narrow ledge before us. It was not large enough, however, to hold all my books, some of which had to be deposited on the floor, and fished up as I required them. Behind us stood two or three Newgate warders, who took quite a benevolent interest in our case. Over their heads was a gallery crammed with sympathisers, and many more were seated in the body of the court. Mr. Wheeler occupied a seat just below me, in readiness to convey any messages or hand me anything I might require. Between us and the judge were several rows of seats, all occupied by gentlemen in wigs, eager to follow such an unusual case as ours. Sir Hardinge Giffard lounged back with a well-practised air of superiority to the legal small-fry around him, and near him sat Mr. Poland and Mr. Lewis, who were also retained by the prosecution. Justice North was huddled in a raised chair on the bench, and owing perhaps to the unfortunate structure of the article, it seemed as though he was being shot out every time he leaned forward. His countenance was by no means assuring to the "prisoners." He smiled knowingly to Sir Hardinge Giffard, and treated us with an insolent stare. Watching him closely through my eye-glass, I read my fate so far as he could decide it. His air was that of a man intent on peremptorily settling a troublesome piece of business; his strongest characteristic seemed infallibility, and his chief expression omniscience. I saw at once that we should soon fall foul of each other, as in fact we did in less than ten minutes. My comportment was unusual in the Old Bailey dock; I did not look timid or supplicating or depressed; I simply bore myself as though I were doing my accustomed work. That was my first offence. Then I dared to defend myself, which was a greater offence still; for his lordship had not only made up his mind that I was guilty, but resolved to play the part of prosecuting counsel. We were bound to clash, and, if I am not mistaken, we exchanged glances of defiance almost as soon as we faced each other. His look said "I will convict you," and mine answered "We shall see." Sir Hardinge Giffard's speech in opening the case for the prosecution was brief, but remarkably astute. He troubled himself very little about the law of Blasphemy, although the jury had probably never heard of it before. He simply appealed to their prejudices. He spoke with bated breath of our ridiculing "the most awful mysteries of the Christian faith." He described our letterpress as an "outrage on the feelings of a Christian community," which he would not shock public decency by reading; and our woodcuts as "the grossest and most disgusting caricatures." And then, to catch any juryman who might not be a Christian, though perhaps a Theist, he declared that our blasphemous libels would "grieve the conscience of any sincere worshipper of the great God above us." This appeal was made with uplifted forefinger, pointing to where that being might be supposed to reside, which I inferred was near the ceiling. Sir Hardinge Giffard finally resumed his seat with a look of subdued horror on his wintry face. He tried to appear exhausted by his dreadful task, so profound was the emotion excited even in his callous mind by our appalling wickedness. It was well acted, and must, I fancy, have been well rehearsed. Yes, Sir Hardinge Giffard is decidedly clever. It is not accident that has made him legal scavenger for all the bigots in England.
Mr. Poland and Mr. Lewis then adduced the evidence against us. I need not describe their performance. It occupied almost two hours, and it was nearly one o'clock when I rose to address the jury. That would have been a convenient time for lunch, but his lordship told me I had better go on till the usual hour. As I had only been speaking about thirty minutes when we did adjourn for lunch, I infer that his lordship was not unwilling to spoil my defence. How different was the action of Lord Coleridge when he presided at our third trial in the Court of Queen's Bench! The case for the prosecution closed at one o'clock, exactly as it did on our first trial at the Old Bailey. But the Lord Chief Justice of England, with the instinct of a gentleman and the consideration of a just judge, did not need to be reminded that an adjournment in half an hour would make an awkward break in our defence. Without any motion on our part, he said: "If you would rather take your luncheon first, before addressing the jury, do so by all means." Mr. Ramsey, who preceded me then, had just risen to read his address. After a double experience of Judge North, and two months' imprisonment like a common thief under his sentence, he was fairly staggered by Lord Coleridge's kindly proposal, and I confess I fully shared his emotion.
Sir Hardinge Giffard had grossly misled the jury on one point. He told them that even in "our great Indian dominions, where Christianity was by no means the creed of the majority of the population, it had been found necessary to protect the freedom of conscience and the right of every man to hold his own faith, by making criminal offenders of those who, for outrage and insult, thought it necessary to issue contumelious or scornful publications concerning any religious sect." In reply to this absolute falsehood, I pointed out that the Indian law did not affect publications at all, but simply punished people for openly desecrating sacred places or railing at any sect in the public thoroughfare, on the ground that such conduct tended to a breach of the peace; and that under the very same law members of the Salvation Army had been arrested and imprisoned because they persisted in walking in procession through the streets. Under the Indian law, no prosecution of the Freethinker could have been initiated; and, in support of this statement, I proceeded to quote from a letter by Professor W. A. Hunter, in the Daily News. Judge North doubtless knew that I could cite no higher authority, and seeing how badly his friend Sir Hardinge was faring, he prudently came to his assistance. Interrupting me very uncivilly, he inquired what Professor Hunter's letter had to do with the subject, and remarked that the jury had nothing to do with the law of India. "Then, my lord," I retorted, "I will discontinue my remarks on this point, only expressing my regret that the learned counsel should have thought it necessary to occupy the time of the court with it." Whereat there was much laughter, and his lordship's face was covered with an angry flush.
Later in my address I had a long altercation with his lordship. I wanted to show the jury that such heresy as I had published in the Freethinker abounded in high-class publications, but Justice North endeavoured (vainly enough) to prevent me. The verbatim report of what occurred is so rich that I give it here instead of a summary version:
     "Now, gentlemen, I told you before that one of the reasons,
     in my opinion, why the present prosecution was commenced,
     was that the alleged blasphemous libels were published in a
     cheap paper, and I asked you to bear in mind that there was
     plenty of heresy in expensive books, published at 10s., 12s.,
     and even as much as L1 and more.  I think I have a right to
     ask that you should have some proof of this statement.  I think
     I can show you that similar views are expressed by the leading
     writers of to-day—not, perhaps, in precisely the same language—
     for it is not to be expected that the paper which is addressed
     to the many will be conducted on just the same level, either
     intellectually or aesthetically speaking, as a publication,
     in the form of an expensive book, which is only intended for
     men of education, intelligence and leisure; but such views are
     put before the public by the most prominent writers of the day.
     You will, of course, expect to find differences in the mode of
     expression, and as a matter of course, differences of taste; but
     I submit that differences of taste affect the question very little
     unless, as I have said, they actually lead to breaches of the
     peace.  But in a case like this there ought to be no distinction
     on grounds of taste.  Surely the man who says a thing in one
     way is not to be punished, while the man who says the same
     thing in another way is to go scot free.  You cannot make a
     distinction between men on grounds of taste.  I can imagine
     that if there were a parliament of aesthetic gentlemen, and
     Mr. Oscar Wilde were made Prime Minister, some such arrangement
     as that would find weight before the jury; but, in the present
     state of enlightened opinion, I do not think that any such
     arrangement would be accepted by you.  Now, gentleman, I shall
     call your attention first of all to a book which is published
     by no less a firm than the old and well-established house of
     Longmans.  The author of the book——
 
     Mr. Justice North: What is the name of the book?
 
     Mr. Foote: The book is the 'Autobiography of John Stuart Mill.'
 
     Mr. Justice North: What are you going to refer to it for?
 
     Mr. Foote: I am going to refer to one page of it, my lord.
 
     Mr. Justice North: What for?
 
     Mr. Foote: To show that identical views to those expressed in the
     cheap paper before the court are expressed in expensive volumes.
 
     Mr. Justice North: I shall not hear anything of that sort.  I am
     not trying the question, nor are the jury, whether the views
     expressed by other persons are sound or right.  The question is
     whether you are guilty of a blasphemous libel.  I shall direct
     them that it will be for them to say whether the facts are proved
     in this case.
 
     Mr. Foote: I will call your attention, my lord, to the remarks
     of Lord Justice Cockburn in a similar case.
 
     Mr. Justice North: I will hear anything relevant to the subject.
     My reason for asking you was to find out whether you were going
     to quote a law book.
 
     Mr. Foote: I will quote a verbatim report.
 
     Mr. Justice North: I can hear that.
 
     Mr. Foote: It is the case against Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant.
 
     Mr. Justice North: By whom is your report published?
 
     Mr. Foote: It is a verbatim report published by the Freethought
     Publishing Company—the shorthand notes of the full proceedings,
     with the cross-examination and the judgment of the court.
 
     Mr. Justice North: There is no evidence of that.  Did you hear it?
 
     Mr. Foote: I did not personally hear it, but my co-defendants did.
 
     Mr. Justice North: I will hear you state anything you suggest as
     being said by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn.
 
     Mr. Foote: Mrs. Besant was about to read a passage from
     'Tristram Shandy'——
 
     Mr. Justice North: You have not proved the publication.
 
     Mr. Foote: Quite so, my lord; but although this is not formal
     evidence, and only the report of a case, I thought your lordship
     would not object to hear it.
 
     [Mr. Foote here handed in a copy of the report to the judge,
     and pointed out that the Lord Chief Justice had said he could
     not prevent Mrs. Besant from committing a passage to memory,
     or from reading books as if reciting from memory].
 
     Mr. Justice North: I will allow you to go on, either quoting
     from memory or reading from the book; but I cannot go into
     the question of whether this is right or not.
 
     Mr. Foote: I am not proposing that.  I am only going to show
     that opinions like those expressed here extensively prevail.
 
     Mr. Justice North: That is not the question at all.  If they
     extensively prevail, so much the worse.  What somebody else
     has said, whoever that person may be, cannot affect the question
     in this case.
 
     Mr. Foote: But, my lord, might it not affect the question of
     whether a jury might not themselves, by an adverse verdict, be
     far more contributing to a breach of the peace than the publication
     on which they are asked to adjudicate?
 
     Mr. Justice North: I think not, and it shall not do so if I
     can help it.  It is a mere waste of time to attempt to justify
     anything that has been said in the alleged libel by showing
     that someone else has said the same thing.
 
     Mr. Foote: In all trials the same process has been allowed.
 
     Mr. Justice North: It will not be allowed on this occasion.
 
     Mr. Foote: If your lordship will pardon me for calling attention
     to the famous case of the King against William Hone, I would
     point out that there Hone read extracts to the jury.
 
     Mr. Justice North: Very possibly it might have been relevant
     in that case.
 
     Mr. Foote: But, my lord, it was precisely a similar case—it was
     a case of blasphemous libel.  Lord Ellenborough sat on the bench.
 
     Mr. Justice North: Possibly.
 
     Mr. Foote: And Lord Ellenborough allowed Mr. Hone to read what
     he considered justificatory of his own publication.  The same
     thing occurred in the case of the Queen against Bradlaugh and Besant.
 
     Mr. Justice North: We have nothing to do to-day with the
     question whether any author has taken the views which are
     taken in these libels, whoever the author was.
 
     Mr. Foote: Does your lordship mean that I am to go on reading or not?
 
     Mr. Justice North: Go on with your address to the jury, sir;
     that's what I wish you to do.  But you cannot do what you were
     about to do—refer to the book you mentioned for any such purpose
     as you indicated.
 
     Mr. Foote: I hope your lordship does not misunderstand me.  I am
     simply defending myself against a very grave charge under an old law.
 
     Mr. Justice North: Go on, go on, Foote.  I know that.  Go on with
     your address.
 
     Mr. Foote: Your lordship, these questions are part of my address.
     Gentlemen (turning to the jury), no less a person than a brother
     of one of our most distinguished judges has said——
 
     Mr. Justice North: Now, again, I cannot have you quoting books
     not in evidence, for the sake of putting before the jury the
     matters they state.  The passage you referred to is one in which
     the Lord Chief Justice pointed out that that could not be done.
 
     Mr. Foote: But the action, my lord, of the Lord Chief Justice
     did not put a stop to the reading.  He said he would allow
     Mrs. Besant to quote any passage as a part of her address.
 
     Mr. Justice North: Go on.
 
     Mr. Foote: No less a person than the brother of one of our most
     learned——
 
     Mr. Justice North: Now did I not tell you that you could not do that?
 
     Mr. Foote: Will your lordship give me a most distinct ruling in
     this case?
 
     Mr. Justice North: I am ruling that you cannot do what you are
     trying to do now.
 
     Mr. Foote: I am sorry, my lord, I cannot understand.
 
     Mr. Justice North: I am sorry for it.  I have tried to make
     myself clear.
 
     Mr. Foote: Does your lordship mean that I am not to read from
     anything to show justification of the libel?
 
     Mr. Justice North: There is no justification in the case.  The
     question the jury have to decide is whether you, and the persons
     present with you, are guilty of a libel or not.  For that purpose
     they will have to consider whether the matters in question are
     a libel.  If so, they will have also to consider whether you
     and the other defendants are guilty of having published it.
     If they think it a libel, and that you have published it, they
     will have answered the only two questions they will have to
     put to themselves.
 
     Mr. Foote: My lord, in an ordinary libel case justification can
     be shown.
 
     Mr. Justice North: Go on.
 
     Mr. Foote: I do not wish to occupy the time of the court
     unnecessarily, but really I think your lordship ought to
     remember the grave position in which I stand, and not stand
     in the way of anything which I consider to be of vital importance
     to my defence.
 
     Mr. Justice North: I have pointed out to you what I consider
     to be the question the jury have got to decide.  I hope you
     will not go outside the lines I have pointed out to you; but,
     with these remarks, I am very reluctant to interfere with any
     prisoner saying anything which he considers necessary, and I
     will not stop you.  I hope you will not abuse the concession
     I consider I am making to you.
 
     Mr. Foote: I should be very sorry, my lord.  I am only stating
     what I consider necessary."
This is a very fair specimen of his lordship's manners. Unfortunately, it is also a fair specimen of his lordship's law. When I read similar extracts in the Court of Queen's Bench, Lord Coleridge never interrupted me once; nay, he told the jury that I had very properly brought those passages before their notice, that I had a perfect right to do so, and that it was a legitimate part of my defence. Since then I have conversed with many gentlemen who were present, some of them belonging to the legal profession, and I have heard but one opinion expressed as to Judge North's conduct. They all agree that it was utterly undignified, and a scandal to the bench. Perhaps it had something to do with his lordship's removal, a few weeks afterwards, to the Chancery Court, where his eccentricities, as the Daily News remarked at the time, will no longer endanger the liberty and lives of his fellow-subjects.
When I cited Fox's Libel Act and asked that my copy, purchased from the Queen's printers, might be handed to the jury for their guidance, his lordship sharply ordered the officer not to pass it to them. "I shall tell them," he said, "what points they have to decide," as though I had no right to press my own view. He would never have dared to treat a defending counsel in that way, and he ought to have known that a defendant in person has all the rights of a counsel, the latter having absolutely no standing in court except so far as he represents a first party in a suit. "May they not have a copy of the Act, my lord............