From Raschevsky's diary, November 18: 'We have to wait and wait, which makes things very difficult. It is far easier to fight a fierce action which would be decisive than to waste away by slow degrees. Sickness has already begun to break out. The troops seem to be losing their energy, and there is a shortage of supplies; in fact, the state of affairs is daily becoming unendurable, and we are not in a condition to endure any ill-fortune.'
In reality the position of the Fortress, owing to the decrease in energy, was getting alarming. Writing these lines, I can plainly see before me Raschevsky's well-built figure, as he used to report to the Commandant about the progress of work at the front. If the energetic, indefatigable Raschevsky began to feel tired, what must the faint-hearted have felt? Raschevsky did not live, he seemed to boil over with energy, and his eventual loss to the army was irreparable. Arthur was indeed being burned in a slow fire, but no one had been heard to talk of a surrender except chez St?ssel. We all longed for a fierce, decisive battle and a quick end—better death than a shameful surrender. Meanwhile the enemy were on the whole silent, occasionally firing at us, gathering together their strength for the future. This lull, this weary uncertainty, was hard to bear. To continue quoting from the diary:
[Pg 234]
'News has been received from Chinese spies that the seven guns which were lying on the shore of Louisa Bay have been mounted at Nangalin. They also say that the Japanese, annoyed at their want of success in the north, have decided to seize Arthur between November 21 and 26, whatever it may cost, and that if this assault, for which they have about 40,000 men and will use their fleet, is not successful they will not attempt another.'
At this time there occurred one or two episodes which seemed to be indicative that the idea of surrender was already held in certain quarters.
General Smirnoff was now paying special attention to the third line of defence, already armed with naval guns, and having excellently laid out redoubts and deep trenches. On this it was intended to oppose the enemy should we have to withdraw from the second line, and Admiral Wiren was to be appointed to command it. In the middle of November the Commandant unexpectedly received a definite order to cease work, not only on the third but also on the second line (the Fortress works), and at the same time to send men from the main reserve direct to the first line of defences—the forts, and intermediate works—of the north-east front. Though General Smirnoff thoroughly appreciated the important r?le which the second and third lines must play in the future defence, he obeyed the order and also sent the Chinese coolies to the first line, but at the same time continued to carry on the works on the second and third lines energetically, so that by the middle of December they were almost finished. St?ssel's definite order to cease work on the second defence line, which was most important, could only mean that he either did not understand the importance of this line, or that, under the influence of General Fock, he had an ulterior motive. The course of later events forced me to suppose[Pg 235] that the order was founded on a previously formed conclusion that the Fortress could no longer be held, once the enemy should have established themselves on the part of the first line between Tumulus and B Batteries, from the highest point of which—Eagles' Nest—they could observe and direct the fire of their guns on to any point up to the sea. Another incident, which took place directly after the interruption of communications in April or May, possessed in conjunction with the one just described a curious significance. From the moment when the railway was cut, the majority of the inhabitants had wisely withdrawn their deposits from the Russo-Chinese Bank, and consequently scarcely any ready money remained in hand. The Defence Fund deposit could not be drawn upon, but in the treasure chest of the 3rd Corps there was ￡120,000. As the Chinese labourers had to be paid almost daily, cash was a necessity, and General Smirnoff asked the Officer Commanding the District, through Colonel Grigorovitch, to advance him ￡5,000 in order to pay them; but St?ssel declined. Then the Commandant himself went to St?ssel and tactfully and politely explained to him the absolute necessity of paying the labourers, and he said that if this was not done all the work on the defensive lines would be stopped. The reply he received was: 'The money belongs to the 3rd Corps, and should stay at its credit.'
'But, sir! I have absolutely no money with which to pay the Chinese, and shall have to stop work altogether in two or three days. And, if they find they can't get work here, they'll all leave the place. At present great progress is being made with the defences; the labour is absolutely essential, and I must have money.'
He argued, and tried for a long time to convince the Officer Commanding the District, but when he had done speaking St?ssel bluntly refused his request with the words:
[Pg 236]
'It is nothing to do with me.'
Realizing what menaced the Fortress if money for these labourers was not forthcoming, the Commandant sent General Kondratenko to St?ssel to endeavour to get something out of him, if only a small sum. Roman Isidorovitch[32] went and, after great difficulty, eventually got St?ssel to lend ￡1,500 to the Defence Fund. Later it was found necessary to borrow several more thousands of pounds from the Corps treasure chest, but to each request St?ssel at first gave a refusal, doing everything in his power to hinder and prevent the money being lent, though the Corps did not require it, the men having nothing to spend their savings on. It was due to this difficulty of getting money, that right up to the strict investment, the works were not made on the liberal scale on which they should have been, but were constructed from hand to mouth according to the money available. It was due to this action of St?ssel's that much in the Fortress was found unfinished and unready at the beginning of the blockade. Everything which was incomplete had to be finished anyhow—by the superhuman efforts of men who, since May, had begun to feel the effects of being on short rations.
Early in November, Field-Marshal Oyama joined the besieging army, with orders to ascertain on the spot the reasons for the siege being so long protracted. The enemy were alarmed at the vision of the approaching Baltic Fleet, for, so long as Arthur held out and afforded protection to what remained of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, this, after uniting with Rojdestvensky's squadrons, would shake their position at sea. They were accordingly most anxious to take the place, and at a council of war it was decided that Nogi must seize it at any cost. Fresh troops were pushed up to the front and the tired ones relieved;[Pg 237] more guns were mounted, and ammunition was replenished.
All along our front men lived just like every one else—they ate, slept, hoped, and died. To the noise of bursting shells and firing they had long got accustomed. A shell burst; a man—perhaps two or three—were killed. Up came others to separate the wounded from the dead; but there was no bustling, no excitement; it was nothing unusual—merely routine! Habit is indeed wonderful! When a fairly long lull took place we at first enjoyed it, but after a bit began to feel the want of something. It was thus all along, except on the extreme flanks and on the shore-line, where there was almost absolute safety, especially on Tiger's Tail and on Liao-tieh-shan. Of course, in some parts of the front, where the enemy were within 15 to 20 yards of our parapets, life was a little difficile. Neither side dared show up to the other; each was always waiting for a shot. It was particularly so with Erh-lung-shan, Chi-kuan-shan, and Fortification No. 3. Here the merciless, dogged struggle never relaxed for a moment. It was our most vulnerable point, to which the enemy stuck like leeches, daily establishing themselves more firmly. They dug, dug, dug, and burrowed like moles, laid fougasses, exploded mines, pounded us with shells, and showered bullets.
We now started the November 'assault season,' which began on the 20th. It was begun by a bombardment, followed by an assault of several companies, which dashed into the ditch ............