It has been told how Mr. Scott was on his way to Mawkmai, when Twet Nga Lu\'s enterprise caused him to turn his course to M?ngnai. He now returned to the original object of his expedition, namely, the expulsion of the Karennis from Mawkmai and the restoration of the Sawbwa Hkun Hmon, whom they had expelled. He reached Mawkmai with the force under Colonel Sartorius on the 16th of May, 1888, and found that the Karennis had not awaited his coming. Mawkmai was occupied, and Sawbwa Hkun Hmon reinstated. Colonel Sartorius returned to Fort Stedman with the main portion of his command, leaving, in accordance with the instructions given to him, a hundred and fifty rifles, under Lieutenant Fowler, at Mawkmai, which was considered to be the most fitting post for the civil officer and his escort.
Mawkmai being only a long march of twenty-five miles from M?ngnai, a detachment of twenty-five rifles was thought enough to support the Sawbwa, and in June, Hkun Hmon reported that the Karennis had quitted his country. All seemed to have settled down. The Superintendent did not hesitate, therefore, to call Mr. Scott to Fort Stedman for various business matters. Mr. Scott reached Fort Stedman on the 28th of June, and reported that all was well. Lieutenant Fowler was at that time in Mawkmai. On the 1st of July he moved his headquarters to M?ngnai, leaving the detachment of twenty-five rifles to garrison Mawkmai. The Karennis, it may be presumed, were watching his movements, for on the 3rd of July, in the evening, a body of Karennis attempted to rush the town. They were repulsed, but[189] kept up a fire on the defenders until long after dark. The twenty-five Beleuchis, seconded by the Sawbwa and his armed rabble, returned the fire and inflicted some loss on the enemy, who had withdrawn to a short distance. Considering it unsafe, after this experience, to leave Mawkmai with so small a detachment, Lieutenant Fowler moved his headquarters back to that place.
The monsoon was now in full force. With roads of the most primitive kind and swollen rivers, rapid travelling was difficult. Mr. Scott left Fort Stedman as soon as the news of what had happened reached him. Leaving his baggage to make what speed it could, he rode on and arrived at Mawkmai half-starved and dressed in some Shan garments which he had borrowed on the way to replace his dripping clothes, only to find that the fighting was over. Lieutenant Fowler, learning that the enemy had taken up a position within a day\'s march of Mawkmai, went straight for them, carried their entrenchments at the point of the bayonet, and drove them out with a loss to them of sixty men. This experience ought to have diminished the arrogance of Sawlapaw. He was very little moved by it. He wrote on the 13th of July in the most royal style, requesting the withdrawal of British troops from Mawkmai lest they should be "accidentally harmed" by his men when he attacked Hkun Hmon. This letter was returned to Sawlapaw\'s messengers by the Chief Commissioner\'s orders. A letter written in August, in which he explained his claims against Mawkmai, and asserted that he did not know the relations of that State to the British Government, was dealt with in the same way. Both these letters were written in a style that was inconsistent with the position of the Karenni chief, and they meant defiance.
In July, 1888, the matter was referred to the Government of India, and their sanction was received in August to demand from Sawlapaw compensation for the damage done to Mawkmai and securities for his future good behaviour, and to enforce these demands if they were not complied with.
In September, as the Karenni chief showed no signs of yielding, or willingness to meet Mr. Hildebrand, the[190] Chief Commissioner prepared and placed in the Superintendent\'s hands an ultimatum in the following terms: Sawlapaw was required firstly to come in to Fort Stedman, and there make in person his submission as a chief subordinate to the Queen-Empress. Secondly, to pay an indemnity of two lakhs of rupees to cover the damage done to Mawkmai and the cost of the expedition sent to relieve that State; thirdly, to surrender five hundred serviceable muskets; lastly, to covenant to pay annually a tribute of five thousand rupees to the British Government. This ultimatum was placed in the Superintendent\'s (Mr. Hildebrand\'s) hands, but he was instructed to withhold it until November, and meanwhile to endeavour by all possible means to persuade Sawlapaw to come to terms.
In October it seemed as if the Karenni chief was beginning to have some misgivings. He adopted a tone of humility and apology, which led Mr. Hildebrand to hope for a peaceful ending. To make it easier for him, a reduction of the indemnity and of the number of the guns to be surrendered was allowed to Sawlapaw if he made his personal submission without delay. Later on, at Mr. Hildebrand\'s request, the Chief Commissioner allowed Mawkmai to be substituted for Fort Stedman as the place to which the chief should come, so that he should have a very short distance to travel beyond his own borders. On November 16th, as the obstinate chief showed no signs of yielding, the ultimatum was despatched. On the 17th a letter was received by the Superintendent bearing the date of November 5th. This letter, which had been written in a much more friendly tone, had been delayed en route. In it Sawlapaw proposed that Mr. Hildebrand should meet him at Loikaw on December 14th, accompanied "by a small escort," so that the people "should not be alarmed." "The reason," he added, "why I propose Loikaw is that at present I am like a mother with her child in her arms; she has to be with it always in order to prevent it crying; my people will feel my absence if I go to Fort Stedman." Mr. Hildebrand was permitted to accede to this request, provided Sawlapaw brought with him the two lakhs of rupees and the five hundred muskets required by the ultimatum. As an alternative the chief was told that if before the 14th of December he sent in the money and arms to Fort Stedman, to prove his good faith, the date for his personal submission at Loikaw would be postponed to the 1st of January, 1889. These concessions, which were made in the hope of avoiding a conflict, led to nothing except, perhaps, the hardening of Sawlapaw\'s heart. To leave the shelter of his own territory, and present himself before a foreign potentate whom he is conscious of having offended, was a hard thing to ask of a half-civilized ruler. But there was no evidence that Sawlapaw had any honest intention of submitting. He was said on all sides to be preparing to resist us. It is just possible that if the Superintendent had been allowed further latitude he might have persuaded the Karenni to make some sort of apology. To the Chief Commissioner it appeared absolutely necessary, as an example, to insist on open and unmistakable personal submission.
Group of Red Karens.
[191]
During all these negotiations, preparations for the expedition had been going on. It was expected that the main strength of Sawlapaw\'s resistance would be on his northern boundary. He would in all likelihood raid the districts of Lower Burma on his south; or, if he were hard pressed, he might try to escape in that direction, or he might cross into his own territory on the east of the Salween. It was settled, therefore, that there should be two columns. The main force, which was to make the real attack and to occupy Sawl?n, the capital of Eastern Karenni, was to concentrate at Saga, thirty-six miles south of Fort Stedman, on the 27th of December. The other was to travel up by the Salween via Papun, and march on Bawlaké in Western Karenni. Its duty was to cover the districts of Lower Burma, and at the same time to distract the attention of the enemy and also prevent his retreat southward. The command of this force was given to Colonel Harvey. To meet any attempt on Sawlapaw\'s part to escape eastward, a suggestion made by the British representative at Bangkok that the Siamese might be asked to co-operate had been accepted in August, and no further measure in this direction was thought necessary.
With Colonel Harvey were one hundred rifles of the Cheshire Regiment and one hundred and fifty rifles of[192] the 8th Madras Infantry. Fifty rifles of the latter regiment had been advanced to Papun early in November, and the frontier posts of that district, which were held by Gurkha and Karen (Lower Burma) police, were reinforced. At the same time, in order to bring pressure to bear upon Sawlapaw and the Karennis, who depend to a large extent on imported food, a blockade was established and all exports from British territories stopped.
On the 7th of December Mr. Hildebrand reported that the Mawkmai Sawbwa had received letters from Sawlapaw announcing his intention to fight. On the 10th of December he telegraphed from Mobye that there was no hope of a peaceful solution. Lest an advance from the south should endanger a settlement, Colonel Harvey had been held back by the Chief Commissioner\'s orders. On the receipt of Mr. Hildebrand\'s telegram from Mobye, he was ordered to cover the frontier of the Salween district, arranging to reach Bawlaké on the date on which the Northern Column hoped to occupy Sawl?n. Colonel Harvey arrived at Papun on the 19th of December. Two days previously Kyaukhnyat, a village on the Salween River north-east of Papun, was attacked by a considerable number of Karennis. The village was burnt and the bazaar plundered under the eyes of the police, who were content to defend their own post. The delay, intended to avoid bloodshed, resulted, as often happens, in encouraging the enemy to strike the first blow. Another post was also attacked about the same time. As a precaution Colonel Harvey was strengthened by the addition of fifty British and one hundred Madras Rifles, and moved from Papun to Bawlaké on the 26th of December. Pazaung, a stockade held by Karennis, was taken without difficulty, and as that place offered a favourable position for covering the frontier of Lower Burma, Colonel Harvey remained there until he heard of the occupation of Sawl?n. The bulk of his column then returned to their quarters, leaving some Madras Rifles to strengthen the police outposts for a time.
The Northern Column was commanded by Brigadier-General H. Collett, C.B. It was composed of the following troops:—
2 guns, No. 1 Mountain Battery, Bengal.
[193]100 rifles, 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade.
250 rifles, 1st Beluchi Light Infantry.
4 signallers and 40 Mounted Infantry, Rifle Brigade.
70 Mounted Infantry, 1st Beluchi Light Infantry.
25 Queen\'s Own, sappers and miners, with medical and commissariat staff.
On the 19th of December final orders were communicated to Mr. Hildebrand by wire. They prescribed the course to be followed in each of the possible cases that might arise, while at the same time allowing him a wide discretion in arranging the details. The main points on which the Chief Commissioner insisted were that the East Karenni chief should make his submission in an unmistakable fashion, and give substantial guarantees for his future good conduct. Accordingly, whether Sawlapaw met Mr. Hildebrand at Loikaw or not, the Superintendent, with the column, was to proceed to Sawl?n, and there arrange the conditions on which he was to retain his position as a feudatory chief, of which open personal submission was the most essential.
The instructions then proceeded as follows: "If your march is opposed by armed force, the nature of the measures to be taken will be a military question, to be decided by the officer commanding; except on purely military grounds of urgent necessity, the Chief Commissioner does not wish villages to be burnt; in no case must villages be sacked. Your object should be to show the people that our quarrel is not with them, but with Sawlapaw. Loikaw should not be destroyed, unless the officer commanding thinks it necessary on military grounds. You should remain at Sawl?n till the future administration is settled. If you are forced to turn out Sawlapaw, it will be necessary for you to stay there till you receive the Chief Commissioner\'s orders on your recommendations; this may involve delay, but it cannot be avoided. It is desirable to humble Sawlapaw, and ensure his peaceful behaviour in future; but very undesirable to cause him to fly and leave the country in confusion. The object is to keep him in a friendly, subordinate alliance. You have liberty, if he submits, to mitigate the terms to such extent as you may think necessary to secure his future friendship, and to let[194] him see that we have no desire to harm him. If he does not submit, it will be necessary to punish him."
The terms and tenor of these orders will suffice to show that although the Chief Commissioner had little expectation of the peaceful settlement still hoped for by Mr. Hildebrand, he was anxious to avoid a conflict. It appeared to him that further delays and concessions could only result in encouraging Karenni arrogance, and would be misunderstood by others. There were military reasons, moreover, for finishing the business quickly and letting the troops return from the field.
General Collett, having assembled his force at Saga, left that place on the 29th for Sawl?n, Sawlapaw\'s capital. His route lay by Loikaw. As far as Nga Kaing, a village one march from that place, a good road had been cleared and bridged by the Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, the Myoza of Saga, and in that portion of it which passed through Sawlapaw\'s territory by Karennis acting under the instructions of the Mobye Sawbwa. On the part of the peasantry there was no enmity towards us.
The road for some way before reaching Nga Kaing passed through scrub jungle, which gave an enemy every chance of annoying the troops. Nothing, however, occurred, and on the 1st of January, 1889, the force debouched into the wide open paddy plain of Karenni without being molested. While the camp was being pitched, the Beleuchi Scouts, who were exploring some wooded ground near the village, were fired upon. They were immediately joined by the Beleuchi Mounted Infantry, under Lieutenant Tighe. The enemy, driven through the wood and compelled to break cover, attempted to make for the high ground; but, our men getting between them and the hills, forced them into the plain. They numbered two or three hundred, most of them Shans under two of Sawlapaw\'s officials, and were not without courage. Several times they turned and stood to face their pursuers; but, ill-armed and without discipline, they had not a chance. The threescore of Mounted Infantry broke them up, rode them down, and drove them almost up to Loikaw, eight miles distant, inflicting heavy loss. Some of them, seeing escape to be hopeless, turned fiercely on their enemies, and the Beleuchis lost four killed and seven wounded in the pursuit.
[195]
There was little chance for a combatant soldier to gain distinction against such a foe. Captain Crimmin, of the Indian Medical Service (Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel John Crimmin, V.C., C.I.E.), was awarded a Victoria Cross for gallantry in this action.
General Collett pressed on at once with a portion of his force, in order to complete the rout. He reached Loikaw after dark, and found it deserted.
Loikaw consisted of two parts, inhabited by two separate communities, the one of Shans, the other of Karens. The latter was quite deserted. But the Shans sent out a mission with green leaves, the equivalent of a flag of truce, to welcome our people, and did what they could to make the bivouac on the ground north of the village comfortable for them. Thus the night of New Year\'s Day saw General Collett with Mr. Hildebrand and a part of the force occupying Loikaw, while the remainder of the troops and the baggage were in the rear at Nga Kaing. On the next day, the 2nd of January, General Collett halted, to allow the rest of the column and the baggage to come up. The difficulty of moving even five hundred men in this country, destitute as it was of supplies for British and Indian soldiers, and equally destitute of roads, was great. The transport bullocks numbered thirteen hundred; there were ponies and elephants and camp followers innumerable. The 3rd of January was taken up in getting the column ferried across a stream named the Balu, which runs below Loikaw, and is eighty yards wide and unfordable.
While the soldiers were thus occupied the Superintendent used the delay to distribute a proclamation issued by the Chief Commissioner, explaining why the force had entered the Karenni country, and promising that the peaceful inhabitants should suffer no harm. The result of this was that some of the elders came in to ask for flags or other tokens which they might use to show that their villages were not hostile. The peasants generally had left their homes, they said, and fled to the hills, and would not return unless they had some assurance of safety. Mr. Hildebrand, therefore, having found in the baggage some red cloth, made flags and gave them to the elders for distribution. Before the evening of the 3rd people were returning in numbers to[196] their homes, and applications for red flags came in from all sides. When the force continued its march flags were found placed on the paths leading up to villages from the main track.
Sawl?n was found to be four marches from Loikaw. On the 4th General Collett began to move, and encamped at Kawpiti, where trees had been felled and thrown across the road, and the advance-guard of Mounted Infantry was fired on. Our men replied, and the enemy, having suffered some loss, retreated. Some villagers came up with a red flag to warn our men that the jungle on either side of the road had been spiked, as Sawlapaw had taken measures to oppose us. The warning was useful, and only one pony was injured.
On the 5th the ferry on the Pon Chaung River, at a place called Tilanga, was reached. There had been no opposition hitherto, but directly the scouts appeared on the river bank fire was opened on them from the other side, a distance of one hundred and fifty yards. There was a village on the far bank from which the shots came. Our men returned the fire, but, as it seemed, with no effect. The guns were brought up, and two shells were dropped into the village, and set it on fire. All resistance then ended; but the river had to be crossed. Empty rum casks had been brought with the force, and the sappers began to make rafts. The river, however, was deep and rapid, and the attempt to cross the force on rafts had to be given up. The enemy had removed and concealed their boats. A close search was made for them, and six or seven were discovered. A ford at some little distance was found practicable for elephants, and amongst the Shans who followed the force sufficient skilled boatmen were found to man the boats. On the next day, the 6th of January, General Collett began to cross his men, and by the evening the whole force was on the other side of the Pon Chaung. The elephants and boatmen were exhausted, and could do no more that day, while all the commissariat bullocks and their loads still remained to be brought across the stream.
On the 7th, leaving a guard for the bullocks and baggage which had not crossed, the main force pushed on. The road now became very difficult. It narrowed down to a[197] steep path, on the east side of which rose abruptly a range of rocky hills, on the west side ran the Pon Chaung, with its tangled jungle, affording the best of cover to an enemy. The ascent was sometimes severe. Small parties of the enemy were concealed on the slopes of the hills at short distances, and occasional shots were fired from the opposite bank of the river. An enemy with more knowledge or better arms might have made the advance very difficult. As it was, the hillsides on our left had to be searched and cleared before the main body could pass. It was dusk before Sakangyi, about six miles from the last bivouac, was reached. The casualties were one man in the Rifle Brigade killed and one wounded; two Beleuchis severely wounded; and Surgeon Manders shot through the thigh.
During the night the baggage came slowly in. The last bullock was not in camp until several hours after sunrise. The enemy made no attempt to annoy the baggage or the rear-guard. Leaving on the 8th, as soon as the men had breakfasted and the rear-guard was in camp, the force worked its way on in the same manner as on the day before. Firing went on incessantly, but the flanking parties of Beleuchis did their work perfectly. The woods within range were thoroughly beaten and cleared of the enemy, and the force passed through the defile (capturing two guns, both mounted on carriages, on the hilltop) and entered the more open country without a casualty.
Sawl?n was now in view. The Beleuchis, under Colonel Sartorius (Colonel George Conrad, C.B.), were sent forward at once to occupy the town, which stands on a plateau some three hundred feet above the river. It was found to be quite deserted. The rest of the column encamped on the bank of the river below.
It may be well here to give some account of Sawl?n, the capital of the Red Karen country, as it was in January, 1889. It stands on some high ground about a mile to the east of the Pon Chaung. The hills at this point rise by three steps, the first and second of which open out into two small plateaux. The town is on the first step. To those looking at it as the force left the defile, it appeared to consist of a few huts. On ascending the hill, however, it was found to be well laid out, and to contain some really[198] fine houses. Three broad streets ran through the town parallel to each other, and were crossed at right angles by connecting roads of lesser width. There was an excellent water-supply. A stream from the plateau above the town had been led down the face of an almost perpendicular rock, and formed a very picturesque waterfall. On reaching the level it flowed through the town from ea............