The Company’s system of military government and defence in India is, at least, equally defective, faulty, and absurd; and, therefore, doth equally demand reformation, as doth her political system. For the same cause that renders the power of the Company’s several deputed governors perfectly arbitrary and discretional, in civil matters; namely, the Directors having preserved to themselves the charge of immediately directing and superintending those governments; confers, upon these deputed governors, a like arbitrary and discretional power, in military matters. And surely it is impossible to conceive any thing more ridiculously extravagant, 157than is this military system of the Company; which affords to each governor of four different capital settlements, the absolute, independent, and discretional power, of applying the military force of his own government; and likewise of directing the measures of defence: whilst each, of these four governors, holds a particular interest of his own, which is, not only distinct from, but opposite to that of all the others.

Can it be supposed that four men, thus opposite in their personal views and interests, and thus independent of each other, should heartily concur in general measures; or should cordially unite in a system of common defence? Common sense informs us that they will not; and experience convinces us that they do not. For it hath been known that one, of these settlements, hath furnished arms and ammunition; and hath otherwise befriended a power, at open war with one of the others. And, in the case of any one of these settlements being attacked, the others are extremely backward in supporting it; because each, of the four governors, giving the preference to his own particular 158charge, in which his own personal interest is more immediately concerned, considers all communication of his force, to any of the other settlements, as a diminution of his own security, and even of his importance. So that, upon such terms, the union betwixt these four distinct, and mutually independent, governments, can scarcely be termed federal.

Moreover, each of these four governors possesses, within the limits of his own government, the discretionary power of making war and peace. And, so, hath the opportunity, whenever it shall suit the purpose of his own personal interest, to pick a quarrel, and engage his government in war, with some one of the neighbouring native states. Nor is this an imaginary evil; or a simple supposition of what may possibly happen; it is a real case; an abuse that hath actually existed. For we can produce several instances where these governors, more particularly on the coast of Cormondel, have commenced, and industriously protracted, wars with the neighbouring states, expressly for the purpose of plunder and peculation.

159And, from this discretionary power of peace and war lodged in the hands of these several governors, and the consequent abuse thereof, flow the following evils to the sovereign. First, the governor, thus warring, exhausts and consumes the treasure of his constituent; to the end that he and his associates, may gain occasion to pocket a part. Second, by these offensive wars, he wastes and destroys that force, which was intended by the sovereign for defence: and, thereby, exposes his own charge, naked and defenceless, to the attack of other enemies. And third, by these wanton unnecessary and unjust wars, he provokes the hatred and jealousy of all the neighbouring states; and, thus, converts into enemies, those native powers, who would, otherwise, be amicable and friendly to the sovereign.

To correct these, and many other abuses of a like nature, which flow from this absurd military system of the Company, it is evidently and indispensably necessary, that there should be instituted, one supreme head of military government. Which, being vested with the supreme power of making peace and war in India, 160shall restrain these several territorial governors, from engaging in unnecessary wars with their neighbours. And which, possessing the supreme direction of the common force, shall, in the case of particular or general danger, apply that force to the most proper and necessary purposes.

Now it is naturally proper, that the same intermediate supreme power, which superintends the political government, should likewise supremely superintend the military government, and defence, of those Indian dominions. And, for this latter purpose, the choice of a proper situation, for the residence of that supreme power, becomes likewise a point of most essential consequence. For it is evident, on the one hand, that this military superintending power ought not to exist in any one of these territorial governments; nay it ought not to reside in the immediate neighbourhood of any one rich native state; because, in either of these two situations, it is liable to be tempted, by views of avarice or ambition, to apply the general force, to its own personal purposes; and, if so, the cure would be worse than the disease: and, on the other hand, it is 161no less evident, (from the reasons assigned on the similar head in the political system) that this supreme military power ought to be situated so centrically near, to all the several territorial governments, as that it may, at all times and seasons, be capable of keeping up a ready and speedy correspondence with each.

The distant and unconnected situation, of these four capital governments, is likewise a mighty obstruction to a secure system of defence. For, the wind, blowing in those seas for six months from one quarter of the compass, and for the other six months from the opposite quarter, doth, alternately, cut off in a great measure all naval communication betwixt these four governments. For instance, during the violence of the south west monsoon, that is, from the middle of April till the middle of July, it is almost impracticable for ships to pass from Bengal to Madrass: and, during the three more moderate months of that monsoon, this passage is difficult and tedious. And during the north east monsoon, the passage is much the same from Madrass to Bengal. But the communication betwixt Bombay, and these 162two settlements, is still more obstructed. For Bombay, being situated in lat. 19 deg. north, on the west side of the peninsula of India, it is almost impossible, from the latter end of November till the middle of February, for ships from Bombay, bound for the Bay of Bengal, to round the island of Ceyloan: and, for the other three months of the north east monsoon, they are obliged, in order to weather Ceyloan, to stand over to the eastward almost as far as Atchen head, and back again to the island; a run of about 20 degrees. From the end of April till August, it is almost impracticable for ships from the Bay and bound for Bombay, to round Ceyloan; and in the other three months of the south west monsoon, that passage is difficult and tedious. And, even in the fair passage, the run betwixt Bengal and Bombay is seldom made in less than a month. Moreover, during the force of the south west monsoon on the west side of the peninsula, that is, from the middle of May till the middle of August, it is extremely dangerous for ships to attempt running in for Bombay: the weather being then so extremely thick, that sometimes a solar observation 163cannot be obtained for several days together: and if a ship should, in such circumstances, run in for the land, which in such weather is not distinguishable at three leagues distance, and should miss the opening of the harbour, which is but small, it is more than probable that she would not be able to clear the shore, with the wind blowing fiercely right on, and rolling before it a heavy sea. As to Bencolen, circumstances are nearly the same with it, as betwixt Bengal and Madrass.

Now it is evident, that this obstructed naval communication, betwixt the four chief governments must, in many respects, greatly weaken the common defence: and must greatly augment, to the sovereign, the charge, in both men and money, of maintaining and defending those dominions and possessions. Seeing it must necessitate him to keep up, in each of those governments, a force sufficient to defend it against the whole united strength of an offensive enemy, without trusting to any aid from the others: because, otherwise, he runs the risk of losing them all 164singly, to a force that can overpower but one of them.

But all the danger, inconveniences, and extraordinary expence, arising from this obstructed naval communication, may be obviated and removed, by establishing one supreme center of military defence; so situated, with respect to the several parts of those truly valuable territorial dominions, as that the communication betwixt it and them shall, in either monsoon, be not only practicable but speedy and easy. For it is evident that, in such a situation, this supreme center of defence could, at all times, receive speedy notice of any impending danger, or actual attack; and that, upon such notice, it could immediately transport its own garrison, by sea; as well as collect aid from the other settlements. So that the garrison of this supreme center of defence would act as an army of observation; ever ready to pour in, at any quarter, on the back of an aggressive enemy. And, of course, such a center of defence must connect, and unite, the strength of all the several parts of British dominion in India.

165Now it appears that, the situation of residence, becomes a circumstance, highly essential to the efficacy of each purpose, proposed from this supreme intermediate power. And it farther appears that one, and the same, situation is required, for all these several purposes: seeing that, from a convenient naval port, situated at a proper distance from the limits of all the territorial governments; and, at the same time, so centrically near to each, that the communication with all the several parts of dominion will be speedy and easy; this supreme power would, in the first place, completely and effectually, faithfully and honourably superintend, enforce, and controul the measures of political government, as well as the conduct of military government: and, in the second place, it would unite and connect the general strength of those dominions, and completely secure the defence of the whole.

But, of the several settlements possessed by the Company in India, Bengal and Madrass are evidently disqualified for this seat of residence; not only because the communication betwixt them and the other settlements is, at certain seasons, altogether cut 166off; but because they are, themselves, territorial governments; and therein, the very object to be controuled. Bencolen is, in every respect, out of the question. And, there then remains only Bombay; which is so far possessed of the properties requisite to this residence, in that it is, at present, not greatly embarked in territorial dominion; and is, likewise, a sea port. But in respect of communication, with the truly valuable possessions of Britain in India, Bombay is altogether unfit to be either the residence of the supreme controuling power, or yet the center of defence; as must appear from the preceding description; which was more particularly enlarged, for the express purpose of evincing this. Far from being a proper center of defence, all the force that is lodged at Bombay becomes detached, and completely lost to the defence of Britain’s truly valuable possessions; at least on any sudden emergency. Indeed Bombay is, in every thing, respecting either dominion or commerce, a dead load, and useless settlement; saving it be for the sole purpose of a naval port, or a place for refitting our squadrons.

167But the choice of Bombay for a naval port, is the most dangerous and fatal error, in the whole absurd system of the Company’s defence: seeing that, by this absurd choice, Britain loses the use of her naval force; which is her capital strength of defence, against the attack of France, her only dangerous enemy in India—As will appear—It is impossible that ships, the best fitted from Europe, can subsist, in those seas, for two years, without a thorough repair: and more particularly in time of war; when action hath happened, and is again expected. And this thorough repair they cannot obtain but in a naval port, properly filled with docks, or careening platforms. Bombay is the only naval port, thus fitted by Britain, in India; consequently the squadron of Britain must retire, at least every second year, to Bombay, for repair. But the British squadron being once retired to Bombay, (as is common, in October,) which is situated in lat. 19 degrees north, on the west side of the peninsula; it is as effectually excluded, for five months, from the bay of Bengal, and more particularly from Bengal itself, as if it was still in Europe. And, 168during these five months, the enemy may either scour that Bay with single cruizers, or she may transport, and, without opposition, land a force in Bengal; and these said five months are the very fittest in the whole year for land operations. This must be thoroughly understood by all those who are acquainted with the navigation of those seas: and could be here readily demonstrated; was it not that, by publickly pointing out our own weakness, we should point out to the enemy her strength. It is most certain that, if France understands her own advantage, (and it is to be apprehended she is but too well acquainted with it): she may either waste and consume the British squadron, through preventing its repair; or otherwise she may effect every purpose, against Bengal, nay against Madrass, with as great security, as if there was no British squadron in India: ever so long as Britain shall continue her only naval port at Bombay. Nor is there any alternative. For as to that ridiculous notion, of carrying a squadron of large ships up the river of Bengal to repair, no commander in his senses would, in the time of war, when he expected to be equally 169matched by the enemy, so soon as the season arrived, incur the risk of losing some of his ships, in the passage up and down that incredibly dangerous river; and still less would he subject himself to the certainty of losing half his hands, by that putrid unhealthy air at Culpee, or Ingelee. Neither would he be mad enough, in the while of a hot war, to use that dangerous expedient, of half repairing at Trincamalay; where he is liable to be surprized by an enemy, in the act of repairing. In fine, so long as Bombay continues to be our only naval port, our commanders must, of necessity, either waste and lose their squadron; or else they must retire to Bombay, at the least, once in two years; and, thereby leave the seas, with all our valuable possessions in the Bay of Bengal, freely exposed to the attack of an enemy, for five months.

It therefore follows that, if Britain means to avail herself of her naval force, which is the principal defence of her dominion and commerce in India, she must establish a proper naval port, on the east side of the peninsula; because, on that side lay all her truly valuable possessions, 170and commerce. And that port, which I mean to propose, is in every respect completely qualified for this purpose: though I cannot, in this publication, specify the place; lest the enemy should anticipate, and take the advantage of our shameful neglect.

I am sensible it will be immediately exclaimed that we have already too many possessions in India; and that this is no time to increase our settlements there; an............