Latin-American trade and British diplomacy—Serious handicap inflicted by the Government—Sacrificing British interests to American susceptibilities—The British Foreign Office\'s attitude towards its diplomatic representatives—Why British trade has been lost to Salvador—Free Trade and its advocates—The Salvadorean view—German competition—Methods of bribery in vogue—The Teutonic code of trade honour.

If ever the secret veil which shrouds diplomacy in all countries from betrayal could be drawn aside, and some wholesome sidelights could now and again be thrown upon the proceedings of our responsible Ministers, a great many disquieting, and even alarming, things would come to light. These would show, for example, that the great declension in British trade during the past few years has been in a very considerable measure due to the astounding character of the British Government\'s instructions to representatives abroad in regard to the attitude of the United States of America. It will be news—and very disquieting news—to the general public to know that every effort has been made by our Government to consult the wishes and the feelings of the United States in reference to almost every trade treaty which has been either suggested or entered into. The failure of our diplomats abroad to carry to a successful issue a commercial treaty proposed or desired has not infrequently been attributed to the neglect, or perhaps to the inability, of the particular[121] Minister employed. In practically every case, however, it would be fairer to place the blame for the failure upon the shoulders of the Foreign Office.

I know of several cases in which this is the undoubted and undeniable cause of the breakdown of our negotiations in the very moment of their imminent success. A craven and absurd desire not to "hurt the feelings" of our greatest rivals and our most clever competitors—the Americans—has dictated a policy which has resulted in the earnest efforts of our skilled and able diplomatic representatives abroad being absolutely wasted, and they themselves being placed in a deeply humiliating position, which I need not say has been as keenly resented.

This was the case with a highly important treaty which we were upon the point of completing with Cuba; it has been the case with a similar agreement entered into tentatively with the Republic of Honduras, and it has been so likewise with the Republics of Guatemala and Salvador. With how many other possible excellent trade markets it has also had effect I do not know; but it is not very difficult to imagine.

So pronounced has this policy become of late, that it is now having a decidedly bad effect upon our commercial and financial relations generally with the Latin-American Republics. Formerly these small independent States looked upon Great Britain as the one Power to whom appeals could be made in all matters of dispute, no matter about what or between whom, with a moral certainty of a just and impartial decision being given. This was in the days when Great Britain still preserved her dignity and independence of thought, and before her Government had learned to truckle to the bluff of the Roosevelt-Philander[122] Knox diplomacy. To-day, although there is more reason than ever to ask for the calm and disinterested advice of Great Britain in the numerous, and even dangerous, questions which are continually arising between the Latin-American Republics and the United States of America, it is recognized by the former that it is entirely useless to appeal to C?sar any longer, since C?sar has become an advocate for, or a creature of, the United States, and, so far from acting as judge, merely now pleads as an amateur attorney.

It is necessary to travel in these Latin-American countries to thoroughly comprehend the full effect of this mistaken and—I do not hesitate to apply the term—degrading British policy. The result is that the Republics themselves deride us, the United States laugh at us, and our trade is meantime leaving us. The small Republics are frightened to enter into any private negotiations with our diplomatic representatives, since they are fearful, in the light of previous unfortunate experiences, that their secrets may in due course be revealed to Washington as a sop to the United States, and that their efforts to strengthen their commercial bonds with us will merely serve to embitter their own relations with the powerful Americans, and without in the least improving their position with Great Britain.

It is almost inconceivable that our Foreign Office should ask the opinion, and to all intents and purposes solicit the approval, of the United States before completing any trade compact with the Latin-American Republics. What our Government has to fear or to hope for from the United States, Heaven only knows; nevertheless it is the sanction of Washington which[123] is sought for before any treaty can be now concluded with any of the Latin-American States; and, what is much more sad to have to add, without such sanction no treaty seems possible. That the United States of America is, or ever has been, foolish enough to consult our Government under similar circumstances is not upon record.

Our Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, the Right Hon. James Bryce, is credited, by those who are privileged to know him, with the decidedly Utopian idea of associating the trade aspirations of both America and England in Latin-America. It is doubtful if there exists another equally eminent individual in the world who entertains any such wild and impossible notion. It would be as easy to associate fire and water as to form a bond, or even an understanding, between the traders of America and England, since they are, and always must be, keen rivals in the markets of the world. Mr. Bryce thinks, perhaps, that it is feasible to divide up the universe into commercial and financial zones, which shall be, thereafter, apportioned among the United States and Great Britain for their lasting benefit? He must be a very innocent and a very unimaginative individual if this be his conception of the methods of latter-day trade competition. Mr. Bryce has perhaps cherished the idea that our common language should form a bond of union, and that this should become the central pivot upon which our relations with the United States should revolve? He is even credited with the aspiration that a Customs union might be formed on the basis of reciprocal Free Trade, with mutual advantage to all. The commercial jealousy between the two[124] nations has upon more than one occasion been demonstrated, as witness the disputes some years ago, and the Venezuelan boundary embroglio, which nearly precipitated a conflict between the two countries.

But whatever be Mr. Bryce\'s precise ideas, the fact remains that he has viewed with but little favour any treaty of trade and commerce which our diplomatic representatives abroad may have suggested where the interests of the United States of America were likely to suffer. The Foreign Office, holding this distinguished diplomat—as indeed they may justly do—in high esteem, have consulted him upon most matters of trade, commerce, and finance affecting the smaller Latin-American Republics. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, have deemed it expedient to refer matters to Washington, with the result that not only have our private negotiations with these small independent States become the common knowledge of our American trade rivals, but those representatives who negotiated the treaties have been rendered ridiculous and contemptible, while our manufacturers at home have been deprived of the benefits attaching to the most favoured nation\'s agreements, such as the United States has itself acquired in other directions, without having previously consulted Downing Street or, indeed, caring one rap whether it was agreeable or not. To the Foreign Office, therefore, the commercial and trading communities of Great Britain owe a deep debt of gratitude!

For Mr. James Bryce as an individual it is impossible to feel anything but esteem and regard, since he ranks as one of the most distinguished and illustrious scholars of the day. The author of such monumental works as "The Holy Roman Empire," "The American Commonwealth,"[125] "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," and "Studies in Contemporary Biography," must always rank as a man of great ability and intellect. But, unfortunately, Mr. Bryce has graduated in a school of diplomacy which has clouded his horizon and diminished his chances of attaining any independent and untrammelled view of Britain\'s commercial needs and the Empire\'s industrial obstructions abroad. As Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1886, and as President of the Board of Trade in 1894, Mr. Bryce was encumbered with all the machinery of permanent officialdom, and was unable to see anything of this country\'s foreign trade matters except through the narrow and often perverted views of his subordinates.

I am very much afraid that this has interfered with some of his subsequent policy; but of later years he has put himself to the trouble—let us hope that it was also a pleasure—of seeing something of Latin-America, and how British trade has to fight its way there, an experience which might have been of great benefit to Mr. Bryce, and of incalculable advantage to British trade in Latin-America, if it had taken place, say, some five or six years previously.

As a writer upon academical and historical subjects probably Mr. Bryce has few equals, and still fewer superiors; but when discussing British interests and making treaties for promoting British trade in competition with American manufacturers, a child might do better for our side than Mr. Bryce could have, or at least has, done. It is easy to understand why he should be so extremely popular with our friends the North Americans, and why his presence as our Ambassador should prove so welcome and so gratifying to the acute authorities at Washington. A malleable[126] diplomat who sees so closely eye to eye with them in arranging or defeating commercial treaties which could in any way be regarded as likely to injure or to delay United States interests, is naturally a most desirable acquisition; Mr. Bryce has satisfactorily answered to these requirements, and, indeed, must have frequently astounded his American friends by his complacency and conciliatory attitude when discussing British interests.

In Mr. Philander Knox, Mr. James Bryce has had one of the very cleverest, and I may add, least impressible, of American statesmen to deal with, and it will remain to be seen in the future how much Mr. Knox got out of Mr. Bryce, and how much or how little Mr. Bryce squeezed out of Mr. Knox. "He who sups with the devil needs a long spoon," and it will be interesting to learn, as we shall do no doubt ere long in connection with the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, the exact length of Mr. Bryce\'s "little concave vessel," as the Dictionary describes it.

Mr. Bryce, who is a profound Latin scholar, will not have failed to have noted Cicero\'s observations in his "De Officiis": "Sed tamen difficile dictu est, quantopere conciliat animos hominum comitas affabilitasque sermonis"; or, let us put it: "It is difficult to tell how much men\'s minds are conciliated by a kind manner and a gentle speech," and in both such attributes the courteous and amiable Secretary of State at Washington excels.

In March of 1908 the representatives of the Governments of Salvador and the United States signed, at the capital of the first-named Republic, a convention determining the status of the citizens of either country who renew their residence in the country of their[127] origin. This convention is found of great utility to the United States citizens, more so even than to those of Salvador. There is no such convention in force between this Republic and Great Britain.

In the previous year (1907) the Government of Salvador determined to establish a permanent Legation at Washington, "so that the friendly relations now existing between the two Governments may be continued on a more intimate basis, and in order that the good counsel of the United States may be more readily sought and obtained."

As far back as 1850 the American Minister of the day, Mr. E. G. Squier—who, by-the-by, was a former husband of the well-known American newspaper-owner, Mrs. Frank Leslie—negotiated a treaty with Don Agustin Moráles, Plenipotentiary of Salvador, which subsequently received the requisite ratification on both sides, has since been renewed, and is in full force and effect. It secured to the citizens of the United States all the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizens of Salvador in commerce, navigation, mining, and in respect of holding and transferring property in that State. It guaranteed to the American citizens resident in the country full protection and enjoyment of religious freedom, and, in short, every other right and privilege which has been conceded in any treaty negotiated between the United States and any other nation in the world.

Owing to the extraordinary energy and unmistakable ability displayed by Mr. Charles H. Sherrill, the late popular and able United States Minister at Buenos Aires, contract after contract which should—or at least might—have gone to British manufacturers, have been secured for America. I need only mention two[128] instances: one for the building of the three Dreadnoughts which are now being constructed in United States yards; and the other an order for fifty locomotives for the Government railways, which might—and, again, probably would—have gone to British shops. While the United States Minister did his level best for his countrymen, and for which he deserves every credit and congratulation, and while his efforts on their behalf were smiled upon with approval by the American Secretary of State, the British Minister, locked up behind his customary reserve and official dignity, neither could nor would move a finger to help British manufacturers in their struggle against this serious competition.

It seems, indeed, strange that where American, German, French, Italian, and Belgian diplomats consider it by no means beneath their dignity, or as at all outside their sphere, to personally influence trade orders for their countrymen, the usual type of British diplomat raises his hands in horror at the mere suggestion of a Legation condescending to re............