Salvador versus Honduras and Nicaragua—Attitude of the President—Proclamation to the people—Generals Rivas and Alfaro—Invasion of Salvador—Ignominious retreat of enemy—Conciliatory conduct of General Figueroa—Character of Salvadorean people—Treachery of Zelaya.

There is no question that but for the prompt and conciliatory action of General Figueroa the events which took place in the last months of 1907 might well have involved the whole of the States of Central America in a long, serious, and sanguinary conflict. As it was, sufficient provocation was given to Salvador, whose territory was invaded, and many of whose citizens were either injured or robbed. In this month, the invaders who came from Honduras were largely composed of Honduraneans, Nicaraguans, Salvadorean revolutionists, and American filibusters, who actually seized the port of Acajutla, and taking forcible possession of engines and cars belonging to the Salvador Railway Company, reached as far as the city of Sonsonate. The invading forces were led by Generals Manuel Rivas and Prudencio Alfaro, the latter being General Santos Zelaya\'s candidate for the Presidency of Salvador.

It was at this time that General Figueroa issued a fervent and eloquent appeal to the loyalty of his troops and his countrymen. In exhorting them to deeds of valour, he declared that he himself would[62] lead his army in defence of the national honour even to death, and his previous military experience would certainly have enabled him to have carried them to success. General Figueroa\'s "Proclamation to the Salvadorean People" is worth quotation in these pages, and I therefore give it in full as follows:

    "Compatriots: General J. Santos Zelaya, in violation of the faith imposed in international agreements, has broken his solemn obligations contracted through the intervention of the Governments of the United States and Mexico. At daybreak this morning he surprised the small military force at Acajutla, and has landed Nicaraguan forces with the object of conquest. Before this brutal offence which the Nicaraguan Government has committed against us, we should all, as one man, gather round the flag of our country and defend it, letting our blood flow rather than allow it to be stained by the adventurers who, in an evil hour, seek to defile it. The national honour, the deeds of our forefathers, the future of our children, and the lofty legends of our people, cry to us to arise and punish the insolence of the Nicaraguan President, and to preserve, not only our military glory and our interests, which recent events in Honduras have shown to be in danger, but the respect that our heroic army has inspired whenever it has been called upon in defence of our country.

    "Soldiers: Do not permit the consummation of this insolent attempt in the annals of an enlightened people which would fill us with shame and opprobrium, rendering us unworthy to preserve intact the sacred treasure of our autonomy, the honour of our victorious banner and our sovereignty. Before permitting the arms of an audacious adventurer to violate the soil of our beloved country, whose safeguard is entrusted to the national army and to your undoubted patriotism, prefer yes, a thousand times, death with honour on the battle-field, where I will accompany you even to death.

    "I have full confidence in your loyalty and in your military honour, and I therefore place in your hands the sacred trust of the national defence.
 
    "Free and heroic peoples never retreat before the enemy, for they carry in their hearts the conscience of doing their duties and confidence in the right, which assist all worthy and independent peoples to repel aggression against their autonomy.

    "Salvadoreans: In this movement be assured that I shall save, untarnished, the honour of the country and the security of your homes, which are now threatened by the mercenary soldiery of the Nicaraguan ruler.

    "Your chief and friend,
    "F. Figueroa.

    "San Salvador,
              "June 11, 1907."

It is satisfactory to know that the Presidential call to arms, in addition to the strong personal influence which General Figueroa wielded, shortly afterwards put an end to the trouble that had threatened at one time to assume the most serious aspects, and to have involved the whole of the five States in a fierce struggle. Now that the threatening cloud has been dispersed—it may be hoped for all time—it is possible to smile at some of the incidents which have been related in connection with the embroilment. It is, for instance, related that the invasion of Salvadorean territory, the first step of which took place in the month of June, 1907, failed of achievement principally on account of a personal dispute which broke out between the two Revolutionary Generals, Rivas and Alfaro.

It is alleged that the former, on reaching the town of Sonsonate, after landing successfully at Acajutla, proceeded to the National Bank in that town, where he overawed the cashier (not a very brilliant achievement, since he was only a boy) and raised what is known as "a forced loan," departing heroically with the sum[64] of $20,000 in silver, and nobly handing over to the bewildered and trembling bank official a receipt for that amount signed by himself as the "General of the new Salvadorean Army." On learning what his brother-commander had done, Alfaro, it is said, strongly objected to raising—"stealing," he described it—money in this manner; and so emphatic was his language, and so indomitable his decision to have none of it, that General Rivas refused on his part any longer to act with him, and the two leaders parted there and then, Rivas proceeding on his way to the Capital at the head of his following, and Alfaro marching with his to Santa Ana.

Before leaving one another, it was arranged, however, that the Republic of Salvador should be divided in half, General Rivas to rule the Eastern zone, with headquarters at San Salvador, and General Alfaro to rule the Western zone, with headquarters at Sonsonate. To this proposition General Alfaro also strongly objected at first, but consented reluctantly later; and while the two future victors were quarrelling as to what they would do with the territory which was not yet theirs, a messenger arrived hot-haste from the Capital with the unpleasant tidings that General Figueroa was coming in person with a train-load of troops to Sonsonate.

Thereupon followed a hasty and most undignified retreat to Acajutla, and an eyewitness has left a humorous description of how the brave invaders, in their desire to get out as soon as possible, precipitated themselves into small boats, barges, and lighters, or any kind of thing that floated, making their way to the gunboat Momotombo, up the sides of which they scrambled helter-skelter, glad enough to be safely off[65] Salvadorean territory and once more on their way to the refuge of the Nicaraguan port of Corinto.

The gunboat was obliged, as all vessels are, to anchor a half-mile from the Acajutla pier, men, arms, and ammunition having to be conveyed over that distance in any kind of boat of which they could command the use.

At an early period of the invasion it is certain that General Figueroa had the situation well in hand. He was always popular with the army, and he likewise possessed the complete confidence of the Salvadorean people, who felt that in his strong hands the safety of the Republic lay. Moreover, by his excellent system of organizing the Intelligence Department of his army, and the care with which he had selected his officers, General Figueroa was always in complete possession of the plans and actions of the opposing force; and even when these latter fatuously supposed that he knew nothing, and was doing nothing, to check their advance, General Figueroa was laying his plans with consummate ability, and, as we now know, he ultimately executed them with complete success.

Dr. Alfaro, who for the nonce had become a "General," was never an opponent worth much consideration; while General Rivas only displayed any marked ability when conspiring and organizing foreign troops, destined to be led to battle, when led at all, by others than himself. The only man who had any chance of making serious difficulty, and who might have fostered formidable trouble, was Barahona, of whose actions and intentions the President was always fully aware, and who at the psychological moment consigned him to the security of a prison. And there he kept him until the worst trouble was over.
 
The conciliatory measures which were adopted at the beginning by General Figueroa and his Government were adhered to throughout the upheaval, and it is only right that impartial history should record the dignified and sane proceedings which characterized the attitude of the Republic of Salvador at this period. The views which General Figueroa entertained and acted upon throughout are clearly reflected in an official communication addressed to a well-known American, the then Consul-General for Salvador in the United States. General Figueroa said:

    "Untiring enemies of the peace and repose of our people have once more endeavoured to create disturbances; for some time past my Government has received notices of what was transpiring, and of the progress of the conspiracy, together with considerable data. This Government did not, however, act hastily, assuming, rather, an expectative attitude, but nevertheless following closely the trend of affairs, until the moment had arrived when active work was to be begun.

    "This Government early received advices from various parts of the country, notifying it of suspicious movements on the part of the enemies of the Republic. It was also noted that many of these left the Capital two or three days before for other towns, and all of them were closely followed. The Government was prepared for all emergencies; barracks were ready, and the proper orders given to crush any movements on their part. Consequently, when numbers of these conspirators formed in groups around such towns as Sonsonate and Ahuachapán, many were captured. The Government is now in possession of the persons of most of the authors of the conspiracy, and the guilty ones are being proceeded against legally. Fortunately, the trouble has not interfered with the progress of the country, nor with the gathering of the coffee crop which is now in progress; while the Government has received assurances of sympathy and support from the great majority of law-abiding citizens throughout the country."
 
In this reference to the trifling effect occasioned to the coffee crop by the political disturbances, the President was a little premature. The subsequent depression which was experienced in commercial circles generally was undoubtedly occasioned by these disturbances, although the consequence only proved transient.

All travellers, foreigners and natives alike, who happened to be in Central America at this time, were well aware of the provocative part which President Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua was playing; for many years he had been acting as the evil genius of this Republic, and his misgovernment and brutalities to his own people met with general condemnation.

There can be no question that the revolution which was started in Salvador, but which was so promptly and effectually suppressed, was promoted by Zelaya, who, rightly or wrongly, imagined that at the psychological moment he would meet with support, not alone from Honduras, but from the United States, either directly or indirectly.

There is sufficient evidence on record to prove that Dr. Prudencio Alfaro, who, since the death of General Regalado during the war with Guatemala in 1906, had attained some slight popularity in Salvador, was the instrument through whom General Zelaya hoped, and indeed endeavoured, to carry out his plans. The conquest of Salvador was only one of them, since, as I have mentioned in another part of this volume, it was the ambition of Santos Zelaya to reconstitute a Federation of the five Central American States, and then to elect himself first President.

It was with the financial and physical assistance of Zelaya that Dr. Alfaro engaged the Nicaraguan[68] gunboat to convey him and other conspirators from Corinto to Acajutla in order to spy out the land, and to industriously lay the seeds of revolution. It was nothing to Zelaya that he should allow one of the Government gunboats to be employed in making warfare against a friendly power, with which he had signed a treaty of peace only a very few weeks before, or to supply from the national treasury the funds for letting loose a horde of armed ruffians upon a neighbour\'s territory.

I have been shown documentary proofs of the arrangements upon which Zelaya had been employed for many months previous, and which provided for the invasion of Salvador at four different points. From time to time changes were made in the personnel of the Nicaraguan commanders, but the names upon the lists which were shown to me were not in all cases the same as those of the men who actually took part in the abortive invasion.

I remember, for instance, observing the name of General Salvador Toledo, who had previously been deputed to command the invading army which was to enter Salvador from Honduras, near the Guatemalan frontier; and also that of General Estrada, who had been nominated to strike at the enemy with the Northern forces at the proper time. This General Estrada had been in command of the Honduranean forces between Puerto Cortes and the Salvadorean line, and he it was who numbered among his followers all the scum of the population, mostly consisting of ex-prisoners and exiles, who were willing enough to fight against their own country\'s soldiers, side by side with Honduraneans.

Another name which was on the officers\' list was[69] that of General Cierra, who was to have entered the Republic of Salvador from the south, with the intention of capturing the port of La Unión, and of meeting the forces of Generals Cristales and Presa. According to the calculations which were then made, it was believed that General Cierra had only 3,000 men with him.

General Figueroa at this time wisely declared the City of Salvador "in a state of siege," which is the equivalent of suspension of political guarantees, to enable summary action to be taken against political offenders or even suspects; a condition afterwards extended to the whole country; and his instructions to the Governors of the several Departments no doubt saved the Central Government from considerable embarrassment as the result of the rising. Those who led the insurrection had counted upon receiving support from the public, which, however, they did not realize, and the lack of this made the capture of the leaders by the Government troops a matter of comparative facility. Secondly, much of the inconvenience which would have followed a general disturbance of the affairs of the country at that time, and which would have caused both the Government and the people losses upon coffee shipments, was spared them, but not altogether obviated.

As we have seen, it was altogether a clumsy attack which had been planned, and had better local knowledge prevailed it would have been ascertained that the prestige of the existing Government stood too high, and the personal popularity of General Figueroa was too great, to have ever endowed this rising with any great chances of success.

In this connection I think I may well quote an[70] extract from an official statement which was made in El Diario de Salvador, one of the most powerful papers in the Republic, of which I attach the following translation:

    "In our edition of yesterday we published the decree of the Supreme Executive power declaring the Republic to be in a state of siege. According to the terms of this decree, the Government has been obliged to take extreme measures, owing to the attempt of its enemies to create a revolutionary movement calculated to cause a radical change in this Government.

    "Fortunately for the Administration, the plot was discovered in time, and repressive measures were at once adopted which rendered the movement impossible of consummation. But, if it is certain that the internal peace has not been disturbed, such is not the case with the credit of the country. Furthermore, the fact that the attempt was made at the time for harvesting coffee aggravated the situation somewhat for the moment, and threatened to interfere with the gathering of this important crop on which much of the prosperity of the country depends; but the action of the Chief Executive in issuing orders to the Governors of the several Departments has reduced this evil to a minimum.

    "In his instructions to the Governors, the Minister of the Interior provided in part that, notwithstanding the state of siege, the greatest latitude must be given persons and workmen who were not actually under suspicion, but insisted on the strict guarding of public order. Men in the discharge of their duties, however, were allowed to pass toward the Capital of the country without the necessity of presenting passports. This referred particularly to merchants, managers of plantations, and day labourers.

    "As will be seen," continued the journal referred to, "the circular does not mention the municipal elections which are soon to take place throughout the interior, but the President of the Republic has authorized us to make known his desires that these elections be held with perfect freedom, and be unhampered by the decree of the Executive."

quarters

Colonel\'s Quarters, School of Sergeants.
Officers

Officers\' Club Room, School of Sergeants.
 
The extract which I am quoting continues as follows:

    "Whatever reasons the enemies of the Government may set forth in justification of their conduct, it cannot be doubted that the country has resisted the movement grandly, and has caused the failure of another attempt, which adds one more to the number which have aided to discredit the country abroad, and characterized our land as one of convulsive nations, incapable of making reasonable use of their Governments, such as we now enjoy. We must not lose sight of the fact that the eyes of Europe are upon us, thanks to the important r?le which Salvador is destined to play in uniting the civilizations of the East with the West."

It cannot be too emphatically pointed out that the Salvadoreans are not naturally a rebellious or warlike people, and, except when compelled to take up arms in their own defence or in favour of a righteous cause, they ask nothing better than to be permitted to devote themselves to the congenial and profitable occupation of cultivating the bounteous land which is theirs by inheritance. In the troubles which afflicted the country in the years 1907-08, the whole cause was the incitement which was offered to them by their turbulent and troublesome neighbours the Nicaraguans and the Honduraneans. As I have shown very conclusively, it was the long-established policy of Santos Zelaya to foster an outbreak in Salvador which should broaden into a revolution, in the course of which Salvadorean troops would be compelled innocently to commit some overt act which would give Honduras or Nicaragua a cause for the initiation of a movement against the Republic. This, it was hoped, would ultimately result in the election to the Presidency of Salvador of Dr. Prudencio Alfaro, who was always a creature of Santos Zelaya, and who for[72] many months was his guest at Managua, where he formed all his plans, for the execution of which President Zelaya was ready to pay. As we have seen, the agitators did not wait for the casus belli on the part of Salvador, but most unwarrantably invaded that country and committed certain outrages, only, however, to have to execute a most humiliating retreat before any beneficial results could possibly have accrued to them. Had it come to an actual encounter or series of encounters between the allied forces of Honduras and Nicaragua on the one hand and the Salvadoreans on the other, there can be no question that the latter would in the long-run have emerged victorious; out of a population of 1,100,000, the Salvadoreans can claim a fighting force of at least 100,000. The Salvadoreans are the best and most plucky fighters in South or Central America, as has been proved upon several occasions, displaying great intelligence on the battle-field and in the conduct of their campaigns. At the memorable battle of Jutiapa, fought between the Salvadorean troops and the Guatemalans in the previous year (1906), and in spite of the fact that the latter numbered over 40,000 as against little more than half that force arrayed on the side of Salvador, the former gave an extremely good account of themselves, and showed that the excellent military training which they had received had not been thrown away.

The invasion of Salvadorean territory in the month of June, 1907, by the Nicaraguans was a direct and unprovoked violation of the Treaty of Peace and Amity of Amapala, only signed on the previous April 23, and ratified on May 8, by which the Governments of the two countries agreed to submit their[73] grievances to the Presidents of the United States and Mexico for arbitration. The news was first received through the telegram sent by President Figueroa, dated June 11, 1907, and addressed to Dr. Manuel Delgado, the Salvadorean Minister at Washington. In this despatch, General Figueroa says:

    "This morning the revolutionists bombarded and captured the port of Acajutla. The forces were commanded by General Manuel Rivas, and came from Corinto in the warship Momotombo, armed by the President of Nicaragua. It is in this manner that President Zelaya complies with the terms of the Treaty of Amapala, which was the result of the intervention of the American Government."

The gunboat mentioned was one of six warships which Nicaragua at that date possessed, and which composed the whole of the Nicaraguan "Navy." The vessel was capable of transporting 1,000 troops, and the facility with which these landed and seized the port of Acajutla is explained by the fact that the Salvadoreans were entirely unsuspicious and unprepared for such an outrageous act upon the part of the treacherous Zelaya, with whom they had every reason to consider themselves at peace. The civilized world has denounced the Nicaraguans\' act of aggression, and unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that President Zelaya had committed a grave violation of international ethics in opening hostilities against Salvador without having made a preliminary declaration of war or giving any reasons for such an action.