THE ARMY IN NORTH AFRICA—1867–96
Turn now from the southern portion of the Dark Continent to the northern. The researches of recent explorers, such as Mr. Stanley and others, had opened up the previously unknown interior to a much greater extent than had been effected before their exertions.
Southern Africa, as far as its white immigrant population was concerned, was extending its political limits northward. The Congo Free State was attempting to bring European civilisation down towards the equator. The ideas of “Hinterland,” a preposterous notion, had been advanced. All nations were bent on pushing from the sea towards the rediscovered Mountains of the Moon. All Europe was burning to get authority over some portion of the African coast-line, and every State, whether it had colonising power or not, burned to claim as much ground behind the surf-clad beach as it could get. But before this earth-hunger assumed the proportions it did, there had been trouble in the north-eastern portion of Africa, though this case was rather one of national honour and prestige than desire for the extension of our “sphere of influence.”
A serious war-cloud had arisen in Abyssinia, the forerunner of the many disturbances which by degrees have since led to the opening up of the heart of Africa to commerce. Abyssinia had seemed a promising field for our trade, and Consul Cameron was despatched there to represent the British Government and protect as far as possible the missionaries who followed and preceded him. But Theodoros, the Negus, or emperor, was a man of violent passions, and375 both tyrannical and a drunkard. He fancied himself insulted because the British Government took no notice of a letter he had addressed to the Queen. He told Consul Cameron that she “can give you orders to visit my enemies, but she cannot return a civil answer to my letter to her.” So he quarrelled with his visitors, and threw them into prison. To save their lives, if possible, and avenge the insult to the nation through our representative, an expedition was fitted out under the command of Sir Robert Napier. It was about 10,000 strong, and well equipped. It was largely composed of Indian troops, stiffened by the 3rd Dragoons, and the 4th, 26th, 33rd and 45th Regiments of the line, with artillery and Engineers.
The general plan of the campaign was simple; it was to release the prisoners, defeat the emperor if he would fight, and destroy his capital of Magdala. The difficulties were regarded as mainly physical. The country was “a broken Libyan highland. Abyssinia is what a vaster Switzerland would be, if transported to the tropics, and if bordered by blazing deserts on each flank of its cool rocky peaks.” The climate was reported good, the people warlike; their weapons were firearms, with shields and swords, or lances. They had no field artillery, but some heavy guns were reported to be at Magdala. The landing was effected at Zoola, where two companies of the 33rd were the first to get on shore, and pushed on to garrison the first dep?t or post at Senafé, on the borders of the territory of King Kassa of Tigre, who readily agreed not to oppose, but to some extent assist, the invading army.
Hard as the advanced party of Engineers and Pioneers worked at improving the road, the advance was slow and laborious. “We have scaled,” says Henty, “mountains and descended precipices; we have traversed along the face of deep ravines, where a false step was death; we are familiar with smooth, slippery rock and with loose boulders; and after this expedition it can hardly be said that any country is impracticable for a determined army to advance. I hear, however, that between us and Magdala there are perpendicular376 precipices running like walls for miles, places which could scarcely be scaled by experienced cragsmen, much less by loaded mules.” When within twenty-five miles in a direct line from Magdala, and when the place was clearly visible, they had to make a detour of sixty miles to avoid these obstacles. But the valley of the Bachelo was reached, and descending 3800 feet on one side by a fair road, the stream was forded, and the ascent of the opposite side of the enormous ravine was begun. On reaching the first level, fire was opened from the hill fortress, and a serious sortie was made by a large irregular mass of infantry and cavalry. The army was almost taken at a disadvantage. The nature of the country had tended to lengthen the column, and there were but few troops up to the front; but the Naval Brigade rocket-battery came into action, with the 4th, some Engineers, two companies of the 10th Native Infantry and a squadron of the 3rd Native Cavalry had to bear the first brunt of the first battle. It was enough, however, and the fighting did not last long under the breechloading fire of the 4th, the first time the Snider had been used in actual war. This disposed of one of the two bodies into which the enemy had been divided; the other made for the baggage defended by some of the 4th and the Punjaubees, supported by the steel mountain battery of Colonel Penn, known therefore as the “Steel Pens,” and the Abyssinian rush was checked by shell fire at 300 yards, and the deadly fire of the breechloading rifle. The enemy fell back badly beaten, while our own loss was only 30 men wounded and none killed. Of about 5000 men who had rushed boldly to the attack of the head of the British column, the bulk were destroyed or dispersed, and the ground was covered with dead and wounded. The expenditure of ammunition was serious. In one hour nearly ninety rounds per man had been discharged.
The next day came the “Easter Monday Review,” as the soldiers termed it, and the storm of Theodore’s stronghold. Scaling ladders were improvised from the bamboo dhooly-poles, and the handles of the pioneers’ axes. But they were not needed. The guns and rockets opened on the devoted377 fortress, and the storming column, formed of the 33rd, with Major Pritchard and the Engineers in front, the 45th in support, and the remainder in reserve, pushed up the narrow path to the entrance. Here, while efforts were made to break open the gate (for the powder required for the purpose had been forgotten), some of the 33rd managed to scramble up the side of the path, turned the flank of the defenders of the barrier, and when a second gate at the top of a steep flight of steps was destroyed, the place was taken. The loss had been most slight, but the vengeance taken on a bloodthirsty tyrant was complete. Theodore himself committed suicide, his fortress was burned and destroyed, his queen died in our camp at Senafé, and Prince Alamayu, his son, was taken to England. There he eventually became a cadet at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst; and, dying of pneumonia in 1880, was buried, by royal command, just outside the Royal Chapel of St. George at Windsor.
With further researches and interest in Africa, and the greater enterprise resulting from them, came the desire for more possessions which would afford valuable outlets for our trade.
The finding of the sources of the Nile, the discovery of the Great Lakes, the possibility of valuable gold-fields, the comparative healthiness of the African uplands in the interior, all emphasised again the future value of the great water way which drained those inland seas, and terminated in the Egyptian Delta. It is to some extent now, and might be one day fully made, the natural highway to the heart of the Dark Continent. Directly or indirectly, politically or instinctively, possibly both, the value of Egypt as the doorway to Ethiopia became prominent. Probably no statesman really saw it at first. But “there is a Providence that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will,” and the road to Central Africa from this side seems to be only opened by the sword.
So dismissing the Eastern littoral and Zanzibar, where the question of the penetration of the interior is far more a question of railways, so as to get over the fever belt, than378 one of soldiers, the land of Egypt became a serious factor in the awakening of Africa; as it was a serious factor in Mediterranean politics when Pharaoh was king. But the employment of the British army in Egypt in 1884 rose from what most people would call a mere accident. It is possible that nothing is seriously “accidental.” But while British interference in Egypt in the first years of the century was due entirely to our war with France, our present interference seems to have come from an instinctive feeling as to the importance of securing, and teaching Egypt to improve, the one natural highway to the uplands of the centre of Africa.
Theoretical as this may be, the practical fact of our second interference in the land of Egypt, by landing there, arose from a very simple cause. The Khedive of Egypt, Prince Tewfik, had made as his Minister of War a turbulent and somewhat imperious soldier who aimed certainly at a species of military dictatorship, if not at the supreme power. Beloved by the Egyptian soldiery, and possessing some military knowledge, he posed as a patriot, with the cry of “Egypt for the Egyptians.” Between Mehemet Ali and Arabi there is but one difference. The former succeeded, the latter failed. Nevertheless, such conduct, with such a people, tended in the direction of anarchy. Anarchy might at any time endanger the security of the Suez Canal, in which Great Britain had an important pecuniary interest, and which was, moreover, her shortest and best route to her Eastern possessions. Both France and England claimed to have vital interests in the Nile Valley, and at first there was an apparent accord between the two nations, to the extent that a combined naval demonstration was made at Alexandria. In this, however, the English ironclads very largely preponderated.
Riots and massacres on shore at once broke out. The native press was bitterly hostile to England. Nor was it likely to be otherwise. No self-respecting nation brooks foreign interference. Neither of the Powers most interested would have admitted for a second of time such interference379 at home; and Egypt being too weak to offer a formidable resistance, only added bitterness to the native feeling of impotency. Doubtless, only the most energetic sections of the people were seriously in earnest. The vast mass of the people, the Fellahin, were certainly more anxious about their daily bread than political freedom. But so it is, and has been everywhere, in such popular revolts against foreign domination. The heaven-born leaders lead, by their very force of character; the mass follows. Whether such revolutions are for the best, according to outside opinion, has nothing to do with the matter, except only as regards the extent to which political revolt affects foreign interests, which are mainly selfish.
All this the Egyptian leaders may have felt; and, admitting the inherent corruption of all Eastern governments, and even the ambition of those who seek to raise the storm, and not reap but guide the whirlwind, there is nothing extraordinary in the effort made by those who brought on the war against foreign interference to take the government of their own country out of the hands of stranger powers.
Be all this as it may, it was decided by Europe, nominally, to coerce the Egyptians; euphuistically, to help the Khedive against an armed and threatening insurrection. The bombardment of Alexandria was decided on; but the French warships steamed out to sea, and refused to co-operate. The heavy fire of the ships soon silenced the shore batteries, and then the seamen and marines were landed to save what was left of the town from pillage. These were soon reinforced by battalions of infantry from Malta.
Preparations were at once made for the despatch of considerable reinforcements from home, and an Indian contingent, among which were the Seaforth Highlanders and the 1st Manchester Regiment, was prepared for despatch from India to the seat of war. Arabi made no effort to oppose the military occupation of Alexandria, but contented himself with strongly fortifying the position at Kafr ed Dowr, the neck of land between Lakes Mareotis and Aboukir Bay.380 Some desultory skirmishes then took place on the neutral ground between the city and the enemy’s lines.
The main expedition, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, embarked in August 1884 for the front. It consisted of the First Division under General Willis, composed of the 2nd Battalion Grenadier, the 2nd Coldstream, and the 1st Scots Guards, and the (18th) 2nd Royal Irish, the (84th) York and Lancaster, and (87th) Royal Irish Fusilier Regiments, and the (50th) 1st West Kent, with two squadrons of the 19th Hussars, the (46th) Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, and two batteries of artillery, with details. The Second Division, commanded by Sir Edward Hamley, was formed of the 42nd, 75th, 79th, and 74th (or the Royal, Gordon, and Cameron Highlanders, with the Highland Light Infantry), and the (35th) Sussex, (88th) Stafford, (49th) Berkshire, and (53rd) Shropshire Light Infantry, with two squadrons of the 10th Hussars, the 3-60th, and two batteries of artillery, etc., as divisional troops. The Cavalry Brigade contained three squadrons of the Household Cavalry, and the 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards, with Horse Artillery, etc., under Sir Drury Lowe. The Corps-Artillery under General Goodenough had one battery of horse and three of field artillery. Engineers and train were added in requisite proportion. An ironclad train was also used during the operations outside Alexandria.
It was soon evident, however, that the frontal attack on the enemy’s fortified position would be costly and, even if successful, ineffective, as driving the Egyptian army back on the capital, which it was necessary to seize. It was therefore decided to effect a change of base; and, while deceiving the enemy by openly proclaiming that the army was to be transferred to Aboukir Bay, to tranship the bulk of the force to Ismailia, and move thence across the desert by the Sweet-water Canal on Cairo. The several points on the Suez Canal were therefore suddenly and rapidly seized by the fleet; the Seaforth Highlanders, from India, advancing from Suez, seized Chalouffe, on the fresh water Canal; and the bulk of the troops sailed for Ismailia. In so381 doing, Sir Garnet, with a caution that in the conduct of so delicate an operation was entirely justifiable, left Sir Edward Hamley, who took command of Alexandria, in ignorance of what his real plan was, until after the fleet had sailed. The controversy as to whether this was right or not has, however, been warm and embittered.
The landing was rapidly accomplished, and after a brief delay the mounted troops, with the York and Lancaster Regiment and the Royal Marine Light Infantry, were pushed forward to Magfar and Tel el Maskhuta, where a sharp skirmish took place with a force of all arms about 7000 strong, and two batteries. Another took place the next day near Mahsameh, and Tel el Maskhuta was occupied, with an advanced post at Kassassin lock; behind these the army strung out along the line of the Sweet-water Canal, as a forward movement in force was not possible until sufficient stores had been collected in dep?ts well ahead, and this, under the conditions of the ground, was necessarily a slow operation.
While in this position the first “affair” of Kassassin was fought, in which were engaged the Royal Marine Artillery, the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, and the York and Lancaster Regiment, with a few cavalry and artillery; and one peculiarity was a Krupp gun taken from the canal and mounted on a truck, and worked by a detachment of Royal Marine Artillery under Captain Tucker. The Royal Marine Light Infantry arrived during the fight, and late in the evening the Household Cavalry and 7th Dragoon Guards came up from Mahsameh and charged the Egyptian left.
As stores were pushed to the front, so the First Division became concentrated between Maskhuta and Kassassin; and on the 29th August, the Highland Brigade, under Alison, was, with Sir Edward Hamley, ordered to Ismailia, leaving Sir Evelyn Wood with his brigade at Alexandria, to watch the Kafr ed Dowr lines until the conclusion of hostilities.
Early in September reinforcements were despatched382 to strengthen Alexandria and protect the direct line of communications from Ismailia. Here matters were still at a standstill, owing to the unavoidable difficulties of transport; and frequent reconnaissances, involving an occasional skirmish, were made towards Tel el Kebir, where the enemy were now known to be in strength and heavily entrenched. That this point was that in which a decisive battle for the possession of the Delta might have to be fought, had been recognised before the expedition left England. On the 9th, Arabi made his last offensive effort on both sides of the canal, bringing on the second battle of Kassassin; and on this occasion the troops he brought from Tel el Kebir were reinforced by a force of five battalions from Salahieh to the north; but the fighting was not severe and the loss on both sides insignificant, while in retiring, the Egyptians abandoned three guns, two of which were taken by the Royal Marine Light Infantry.
The army was now concentrated within striking distance of the first objective, the defeat of the Egyptian army under Arabi. Repeated reconnaissances had shown that in front of the village of Tel el Kebir was a long line of entrenchments, the right resting on the canal, the left, some four miles out en l’air in the desert. The desert, absolutely treeless, and without marked undulations, afforded absolutely no cover, and to cross the fire-swept approach against entrenched troops would have caused serious loss. Sir Garnet, therefore, decided on making a night march to get within charging distance, and thus inaugurated on a large scale the system of night attacks, which, as a distinguished soldier long since remarked, will, if properly prepared for and organised by a nation, cause it to win the next great war.
The ground favoured the operation, but the distance was not inconsiderable, and the danger of that unreasoning panic which sometimes seizes the best troops was always present. At anyrate, any man?uvring in the dark or the early dawn was out of the question. The army must383 march in the order in which it was going to fight, and therefore each battalion had one half in first and the other half in second line, either marching in line formation or in line of companies in column of fours at deploying interval, from which lines could speedily and readily be formed. Extended order was not required for the rush into the entrenchments which the general planned. It was not to be a fire-action, but a shock-battle such as the Peninsula saw.
Formation of the Line of Battle at Tel-el-Kebir, 13th Septr 1882.
Willis’s First Division was on the right, to it having been added the battalion of Royal Marine Light Infantry, the Guards being in second line, and the Cavalry and Horse Artillery on the right to sweep round the enemy’s flank and threaten his retreat. In the centre was Goodenough’s Artillery, acting both as a link to the two divisions, and yet separating them. If panic in one wing did occur, this might prevent its spreading to the other. On the left, the Highland Brigade was in first line, and Sir Edward Hamley’s Division, the other brigade of which was with Wood at Alexandria, was completed by a weak brigade under Ashburnham, made of the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry and the King’s Royal Rifles. In reserve were the Royal Marine Artillery and 19th Hussars; with the reserve ammunition was one company of the West Kent; on the railway, the armoured train with a 40-pounder worked by bluejackets; the West Kent guarded the stores at Kassassin; and along the line of communication to Ismailia were other troops. The army started at 1.30 a.m. on the early morning of the 13th September; the Indian Contingent, the Seaforths leading, moving off on the other bank of the canal an hour later, so as not to alarm the inhabitants of the small hamlet on that side, and so give Arabi earlier warning than need be of the impending attack. The total strength was about 11,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 60 guns. Halting for a few minutes at about 1000 yards from the enemy, the lines advanced, with the right, however, rather thrown back, and then suddenly a storm of fire ran along the long line of parapet,384 and when about 300 yards from it, with a wild cheer, the Highland Brigade began the storm. There was much stubborn fighting while it lasted, but in half an hour the enemy were beaten, and flying in hot haste and great disorder towards Zagazig, pursued by the cavalry and the Indian Brigade. The battle had cost 9 officers and 48 men killed, with 27 officers and 385 men wounded or missing.
Pushing on rapidly with the 4th Dragoon Guards and the Indian cavalry, Sir Drury Lowe seized Cairo, and Arabi surrendered. This practically ended the war, and on the very date fixed by Sir Garnet, before he left England, for its probable conclusion.
The isolated garrisons at Tanta and elsewhere were disarmed, and when on the 17th it was found that the works at Kafr ed Dowr were deserted, they were occupied by the Berkshire and Shropshire Regiments of Sir Evelyn Wood’s brigade, which had been further strengthened by the Manchester and Derbyshire Regiments. So the army returned home, leaving, besides artillery and the 7th Dragoon Guards and the 19th Hussars, the (35th) Sussex, (38th) Stafford, (42nd) Black Watch, (49th) Berkshire, (53rd) Shropshire, the 3rd King’s Royal Rifles, the (74th) Highland Light Infantry, (75th) Gordons, and (79th) Camerons as a garrison for Cairo, and the 2nd (18th) Royal Irish, the (46th) Duke of Cornwall’s, and a wing of the (50th) West Kent, to hold Alexandria.
For the war a medal with clasp for Tel el Kebir was granted by the British Government and a bronze star by the Khedive; while numerous Turkish and Egyptian orders were distributed. Sir Garnet Wolseley was made a peer, and the names, “Egypt, 1882–84,” ............