SOULT’S TROUBLES IN ANDALUSIA. JULY-SEPTEMBER 1811

After his departure from the Guadiana on June 28th, Soult found himself plunged into a new series of troubles, which were to continue all through the summer and autumn. Just as he was about to set out for Seville with two cavalry regiments as escort, following in the wake of Godinot’s and Conroux’s infantry, he received the unwelcome news that Blake, of whose march he had been aware since the 24th, had crossed the lower Guadiana near Mertola on June 23[613], and had invaded the Condado de Niebla with nearly 12,000 men. If Blake had struck straight at Seville there can be little doubt that he would have taken it, for General Daricau, the governor, hastened, on the first news of the approach of an enemy, to shut himself up in the fortified Cartuja Convent, with his scanty garrison of convalescents, drafts, and Juramentados. He had not the least hope of maintaining the large and turbulent city under control. But no one appeared to molest him, except some cavalry, who were easily driven off by cannon-shot. Blake, apparently disliking to present himself in the open plain of the Guadalquivir, had not marched on Seville, but sat down on June 30 to besiege the castle of Niebla, the capital of the region which he had invaded. It was the only French garrison left in western Andalusia, and was held by a battalion of 600 ‘Swiss’ in King Joseph’s service—a miscellaneous corps formed of deserters of all races from the Spanish and British armies, under a Colonel Fritzhardt. Blake lay for five days before the mediaeval castle with the division of Zayas, while Ballasteros, with the rest of the army, took a position to cover him against French troops coming[p. 476] from Estremadura, who (as was rightly suspected) were not long in appearing. The siege failed because Blake had brought no artillery with him—on account of the bad mountain roads he had sent his guns round from Mertola by Ayamonte, and they had not come up. An attempt to take the castle by escalade failed, and the Spanish general was sitting helplessly before its walls on July 2nd, when the news came that the French were upon him. Soult, hearing on his way southward of Blake’s raid, had turned both Conroux and Godinot against the invaders, and had continued his own route to Seville with no more than the cavalry and one infantry regiment. While Godinot marched on Niebla by Cala and Aracena, Conroux tried to cut in between Blake and the sea by a circuitous route by Fregenal, through the worst of the mountains, aiming at the ports of Huelva and Moguer. It was hoped that the Spaniards might be caught between the two divisions—but the quarry was too shy. Blake departed at the first alarm, and embarked at Ayamonte with Zayas’s division; Ballasteros, marching away into the hills which he knew so well, evaded Conroux, and passed for a time northward into the Sierra de Aroche. The cavalry under Penne Villemur did not abscond by water, but returned along the Portuguese frontier to Estremadura, where it joined the skeleton army of Casta?os, which still consisted of no more than six or eight battalions under Morillo and Carlos de Espa?a, some 3,000 or 4,000 men at most. Wellington had sent it back to Villa Vi?osa during the operations around the Caya, declining to use it in the fighting-line till it should be reorganized. Blake, whose embarkation at Ayamonte on July 8th had been accompanied by circumstances of disgraceful panic[614], returned to Cadiz with 7,000 men. Ballasteros followed him thither six weeks later, having descended from the hills and embarked at the mouth of the Guadiana at the end of August.

Blake’s Niebla expedition had been conducted with the greatest timidity and incompetence. Yet it had served Welling[p. 477]ton’s purpose much as he had intended, since it drew off 11,000 French troops into a remote corner of Andalusia for some weeks. It is true that Soult’s original withdrawal from the Guadiana was not caused by this diversion, but it had forced him to send away on a wild-goose chase troops urgently needed elsewhere. For if Conroux and Godinot had not marched to Niebla and Ayamonte, they would have gone straight to Granada, to reinforce the 4th Corps, which was, throughout the month of July, in considerable danger from the Murcians. It was not till August had begun that Soult was able to come to its aid, with the divisions which had been distracted to the far west by Blake’s expedition.

Of Freire’s Army of Murcia we have heard nothing since the unhappy rout of Baza (November 3, 1810). After that shock it had kept quiet for many a day, and only dared to move when, in April 1811, Soult began to make heavy requisitions on the 4th Corps, in order to form the army that marched for Albuera. Further drafts had been called westward in the end of May, so that Leval, who succeeded Sebastiani as commander of the corps about this time, was left with numbers quite inadequate to hold down the broad kingdoms of Jaen and Granada. This, of course, gave Freire the chance of accomplishing something useful: and, leaving the frontiers of Murcia, he began to press forward against the French posts. He had at this time a force of three infantry divisions, under La Cuadra, Sanz, and Creagh, and two weak cavalry divisions under Osorio and Ladrón. The whole amounted, after making deductions for the garrison of Cartagena (2,000 men) to nearly 12,000 bayonets and 1,500 sabres[615]. In May Freire began to push forward cautiously, with his cavalry and two divisions on the high-road Lorca-Baza-Granada, and a smaller force, consisting of La Cuadra’s division, on the side road which leads, by Huescar and Pozoalcon, to the valley of the upper Guadalquivir and the kingdom of Jaen. His progress was so slow that the French were able to withdraw at their leisure before him, without any loss. Leval was so weak that he made no attempt to stand, and evacuated in succession the coast lands about Almeria, as far as Motril, the highlands east[p. 478] of Granada, including the towns of Baza and Guadix, and the upper valley of the Guadalquivir. La Cuadra’s advanced posts penetrated as far as Ubeda, and bickered with the garrisons of Baeza, Linares, and Jaen. Officers sent out from the main column raised the mountaineers of the Sierra Nevada, and bands of insurgents began to cut the communications between Granada and Malaga. At the head of these irregulars was the turbulent Conde de Montijo, of whom we last heard when he got into trouble for conspiring against the supreme Junta[616]. He is now found more usefully employed, giving trouble to the enemy instead of to his own Government.

Cautious though Freire had been, his advance had shaken the hold of the 4th Corps on eastern Andalusia. Leval reported to Soult that, with the 3,000 or 4,000 troops whom he had concentrated at Granada, he was quite helpless, and was wellnigh blockaded on every side. It was only with difficulty that he could keep in touch with the Polish division, which lay in and about Malaga, or with the garrisons of Jaen and Cordova on the other side. He could only collect a force sufficient to attack Freire by abandoning all his outlying posts, and permission to do so had not been granted him. He must be reinforced, or allowed to concentrate his scattered troops and strike at the enemy’s main body.

A few days later the state of affairs in eastern Andalusia became still more threatening. Blake, after embarking at Ayamonte on July 8th, had two days later returned to Cadiz with the two Albuera divisions of Zayas and Lardizabal. He stayed only a fortnight in the island city, and got leave from the Regency to join the Army of Murcia. In order that he might dispose of all the forces in that direction, he asked and obtained the control of the Valencian army also, and was made Captain-General of that province as well as of Murcia and Aragon. Blake landed at Almeria on July 31st with the same troops that he had brought back from the west—about 7,000 foot and 500 horse. From thence he led them to join Freire’s army near Baza, and left them there, while he himself (taking Zayas and some other officers with him) made a hasty visit to Valencia, to receive[p. 479] over the command from the Marquis del Palacio[617], and to see what measures were necessary with regard to the threatening movements of Suchet on the side of Aragon.

The two divisions under Lardizabal and Joseph O’Donnell (vice Zayas) had joined Freire on August 3rd, and a force of 15,000 infantry and nearly 2,000 horse was thus concentrated near Baza. But Freire, being now only the interim commander, refused to take any responsibility, and remained apathetically watching the small French force in Granada, which was (for the moment) absolutely at his mercy. He posted the army in a very strong position near Gor, twelve miles in front of Baza and forty miles from Granada. It was covered in front by the ravine of one of the tributaries of the Guardal river, and could only be turn............