Of The Meat-Juice Incident

I said in my statement to the Court, regarding this meat juice, that: “On Thursday night, the 9th, after Nurse Gore had given my husband beef juice, I went and sat on the bed by the side of him. He complained to me of feeling very sick, very weak, and very depressed, and again implored me to give him a powder, which he had referred to early in the evening and which I had then declined to give him. I was overwrought, terribly anxious, miserably unhappy, and his evident distress utterly unnerved me. He told me the powder would not harm him, and that I could put it in his food. I then consented. My lord, I had not one true or honest friend in the house. I had no one to consult and no one to advise me. I was deposed from my position as mistress in my own house and from the position of attending on my own husband, notwithstanding that he was so ill. Notwithstanding the evidence of nurses and servants, I may say that he wished to have me with him. [This desire was corroborated by the testimony of Nurse Callery.] He missed me whenever I was not with him. Whenever I went out of the room he asked for me, and for four days before he died I was not allowed to give him even a piece of ice without its being taken from my hand. When I found the powder I took it into the inner room, and in[367] pushing through the door I upset the bottle, and, in order to make up the quantity of fluid spilled, I added a considerable quantity of water. On returning to the room I found my husband asleep, and I placed the bottle on the table by the window. When he awoke he had a choking sensation in his throat and vomiting. After that he appeared a little better. As he did not ask for the powder again, and as I was not anxious to give it to him, I removed the bottle from the small table, where it would attract his attention, to the top of the washstand, where he could not see it. There I left it until I believe Mr. Michael Maybrick took possession of it. Until a few minutes before Mr. Bryning made the terrible charge against me, no one in that house had informed me of the fact that a death certificate had been refused, or that a post-mortem examination had taken place, or that there was any reason to suppose that my husband died from other than natural causes. It was only when Mrs. Briggs alluded to the presence of arsenic in the meat juice that I was made aware of the [supposed] nature of the powder my husband had asked me to give him. I then attempted to make an explanation to Mrs. Briggs, such as I am now making to your lordship, when a policeman interrupted the conversation and put a stop to it.”

Some time after my conviction there was found among my effects a prescription for a face wash containing arsenic (the existence of which Justice Stephen in his summing up flouted as an invention of mine to cover an intent to poison). This, together with the fact that on analysis no[368] trace of “fiber” was discovered in the body or in any of the things containing poison found in the house, should remove the “fly-paper incident” from all serious consideration in its bearing on the case (although it was the source of all “suspicions” before death).

LEONIDAS D. YARRELL,
Of Hayden & Yarrell, American counsel of Mrs. Maybrick.

There remain only as “circumstantial evidence of guilt” what has come to be known as the “motive,” and the Valentine’s meat-juice incident. The “motive,” however regarded, was surely no incentive to murder, as inasmuch if I wanted to be free there was sufficient evidence in my possession (in the nature of infidelity and cruelty) to secure a divorce, and it was with regard to steps in that direction that I had already taken that I made confession to my husband after our reconciliation, and to which I referred as to the “wrong” I had done him, because of the publicity and ruin to his business it involved. The “motive,” which was introduced into the case in the form of a letter written by me on the 8th of[369] May, in which I said that my husband was “sick unto death,” was made much of by the prosecution, and it led Justice Stephen to say, in his summing-up, “that I could not have known that my husband was dying (except I knew something others did not suspect), inasmuch as the doctors, from the diagnosis, did not consider the case at all serious.” The justice either did not or would not understand (though it was testified to) that the phrase, “sick unto death,” is an American colloquialism, especially of the South, and commonly employed with reference to any illness at all serious. Aside from the fact that all in attendance (save and except the doctors per their medical testimony) did regard it as serious—a witness for the prosecution, Mrs. Briggs, testified that she regarded him on that day as “dangerously ill,” and Mr. Michael Maybrick said that when he saw his brother on the evening of the same day “he was shocked by his appearance”—I may say here that the phrase “sick unto death,” in[370] connection with other causes for apprehension, was prompted by the fact that my husband had told me that very morning that “he thought he was going to die”; and that this was his feeling is conclusively shown by the evidence of Dr. Humphreys at the inquest, when he testified that he had remarked to Mr. Michael Maybrick on this same Wednesday, the 8th of May: “I am not satisfied with your brother, and I will tell you why [not because the symptoms seemed serious to him, it will be observed]. Your brother tells me he is going to die.”

That I regarded the case as really serious is surely further supported by the fact that, notwithstanding the easy-going attitude of Dr. Humphreys, I had persisted in urging a consultation, which accordingly took place on the 7th. As to what the attending physicians knew or did not know about the medical aspects of the case, I confidently refer the reader to their own remarkable testimony.

There then remains for serious consideration only what is known as the “Valentine meat-juice incident.” Of this I know no more now than is included in my statement at the trial—namely, that at my husband’s urgent, piteous request I placed a powder (which by his direction I took from a pocket in his vest, hanging in the adjoining room, which room until his sickness had been his private bedroom, he having been removed to mine as being larger and more airy) in a bottle of meat juice, no part of the contents of which were given him, and hence at the very most there could only have legally arisen from this act a charge of “intent to poison.”

I do not assume that I can solve a problem that has puzzled so many able minds, but I trust I shall make clear that the prosecution can not acquit itself of the inference of “cooking” up a case against me with reference to this meat-juice incident:

1. At the inquest, only a few days after[372] the occurrence, Nurse Gore testified, “I could and did see clearly what Mrs. Maybrick did with the bottle,” though she failed to tell what she saw; and it is remarkable she was not further questioned on this point. At the magisterial inquiry and trial, per contra, she testified that “she [I] pushed the door to conceal (note the animus) her [my] movements”; but on cross-examination she so far corrected herself as to say: “Mrs. Maybrick did not shut the dressing-room door.”

2. When I returned with the bottle to the sick-room, she testified that I placed it on the table in a “surreptitious manner,” though this action, according to her own testimony, happened while ............