As regards the business world the position at this time[1] was a singularly difficult one. Within a few days of the outbreak of war, orders from all parts of the globe were forthcoming, on so vast a scale that the ordinary means of coping with them were wholly inadequate. It was not possible to walk out of the War Office and buy what was wanted in the shops. In a very brief period the whole industrial system of the United Kingdom was congested with orders.

In Lord Kitchener's former experience of military and civil administration the difficulty had usually been to get the money he needed, in order to carry out his reforms and undertakings. But here was a case where he could have all the money he chose to ask for; it was the commodities themselves which could not be had either for money or love.

ORGANISATION OF RESOURCES

When war broke out the industries of France and Belgium were paralysed—the former temporarily, the latter permanently. We could buy nothing in France; France, on the other hand, was buying eagerly in England. And so was Russia, not herself as yet a great industrial producer. And so were Belgium, {359} Servia, Italy, Roumania, Greece, Japan—indeed the whole world, more or less—belligerents and neutrals alike—except the two Powers with which we were at war. All these competitors were in the field against the War Office, running up prices, and making the fortunes of enterprising middlemen, who flocked to the feast, like vultures from all corners of the sky. The industrial situation, therefore, needed the sternest regulation, and needed it at once. For it was essential to secure our own requirements, and to make certain that our Allies secured theirs, at a fair price and in advance of all other purchasers.

Moreover, it was obviously necessary to look an immense way ahead, especially as regards munitions of war; to aid with loans, and encourage with orders, firms able and willing to make what was required. It was essential that makers of arms and supplies should be stimulated to undertake vast increases of their staff and plant. Before the battle of the Marne was ended it was known, only too well, that every nation in Europe—with the single exception of Germany—had grossly underestimated the expenditure of artillery ammunition under conditions of modern warfare. It was of the most immediate urgency to concert with our Allies, and with our manufacturers, in order to set this trouble right. It was as necessary for the Allies to organise their resources as it was for them to organise their armies. The second, indeed, was impossible without the first, as Germany well knew, and in her own case had already practised.

Finally, there was the problem—half industrial, half political—of labour; its hours, conditions, and remuneration. Without the utmost vigilance and {360} sympathy, without a constant inspiration of duty, without political leadership which appealed to the imagination and heart of the people, there were bound to be endless troubles and confusion; there were bound to be disputes, quarrels, stoppages, and strikes.

The prices of certain munitions and materials were almost anything the makers liked to name. Money was flying about, and everybody was aware of it. Human nature was sorely tempted. The future was anxious and uncertain. People dependent for a living on their own exertions, were beset with a dangerous inclination to hold out their pitchers, in the hopes of catching some portion of the golden shower while it lasted. The idea that workmen were, on the average, any greedier than their masters is only held by persons who have little knowledge of the facts. Cost of living had risen rapidly; this might have been foreseen from the beginning, as well as the dangers which it contained.

In such circumstances as these the baser appetites of mankind are always apt to break loose and gain the upper hand, unless there is a firm leadership of the nation. That is where the statesman should come in, exercising a sagacious control upon the whole organisation of industry; impressing on masters the need for patience and sympathy; on their men the need for moderation; on all the need for sacrifices.

During the months of February, March, and April 1915 there was a loud outcry, led by a member of the Government, deploring the lack of munitions of war, and attributing the deficiency to a want of industry and energy on the part of a {361} section of the working classes. Their frequent abstentions were condemned, and drunkenness was alleged to have been, in many cases, a contributory cause.

MINISTERIAL INCONSISTENCIES

Then Mr. Asquith came forward and astonished the world by denying stoutly that there was, or ever had been, any deficiency in munitions of war.[2] He assured the country that so long ago as September he had "appointed a commit............