The War of 1870–71 was opened by a campaign of thirty days, complete in itself, and the author must plead the dramatic unity of the great event as a reason for treating it in a separate form. Although the foundation of those ulterior successes which enabled the Germans to proclaim the King of Prussia Emperor in Germany, and to do so in the palace of Louis XIV., yet, from an historical point of view, the astonishing series of battles and marches which ended in the Investment of Metz, and the Capitulation of Sedan may be regarded as standing apart, because they carried with them the Downfall of the Second Empire. The Campaign of Sedan, in this respect, is the supplement of the Campaign of Waterloo; but, of course, there is no resemblance between Napoleon III. and Napoleon I., nor in the political and military conditions and results of the two catastrophes.

The materials at the disposal of any author who ventures to narrate the campaign are abundant and yet incomplete. The History of the War prepared by the German Staff is minute even to weariness, but it must always stand as the authentic foundation of every narrative. Unreadable to the general public, it is invaluable to the soldier-student, and to all who wish to know what the German Army is like, and how it wages war. It need scarcely be said that the Staff narrative is the basis of this book, which is an endeavour to present its essence in a succinct and readable form. Unhappily, the French accounts are wanting in precision, so that it is difficult to comprehend how they fought their battles, and impossible to ascertain accurately what was their numerical strength at any moment. The deficiency is serious, because it mars the completeness of the story, and frustrates every attempt to do them full justice. For, if the Army, as an Army, was wasted by incapable commanders, the soldiers fought well and did nothing to derogate from their old renown. They had to encounter better commanders, more numerous and better soldiers, and they were beaten, but they were not disgraced. The whole lesson of the war is lost, if the fact is ignored that the German Army, from top to bottom, was superior in every way to that of Napoleon III., as well as more numerous; and that what made it superior was the spirit of Duty, using the word in its highest sense, which animated the host, from the King, who was its shining exemplar, to the private who was proud to rival his King.

The contrast, which this war exhibited, between the French and German methods of making and using an Army is so violent, that it becomes painful, and imparts an air of one-sidedness to the narrative. But the facts must be stated, although the bare statement suggests partiality in the narrator. I have, nevertheless, tried to be impartial, and in doing my best, I have found it impossible to read the abounding evidence of Imperial neglect, rashness and indecision, without feeling pity for the soldiers and the nation which had to bear the penalties. The French Army has been remodelled and increased enormously; the secular quarrel between Germany and France is still open; and some day it may be seen whether the Republicans, out of the same materials, have been able to create an Army such as the Imperialists failed to produce. Whether they have succeeded or not, it may be fervently hoped that the deep impression which the examples of thoroughness, revealed by the wars of 1866 and 1870, made on our own country will never be effaced; and that the public will insist that our small Army, in every part, shall be as good as that which crossed the French frontier in 1870, and triumphed in the Campaign of Sedan.

KENSINGTON, April 6th, 1887.