Command.—Of all the matters concerning the employment of horse artillery which came under discussion during the campaign, none was more important than the vexed question of command.
The cavalry brigadier is naturally eager to have a battery attached to him permanently, and considered as part of his brigade. Apart from the conviction that a battery always on hand and under his own orders will be of more value to him than one over which he has no direct control, there is the feeling that the battery rounds off his command, and makes it, in effect, a miniature army, complete with all modern conveniences. If the powers that be would only throw in a couple of armoured cars and a private aeroplane, the cavalry brigadier would be the happiest man on earth!
Most R.H.A. battery commanders will agree with the brigadiers. Attached to a brigade, the battery commander is freer and more independent, and gets, perhaps, more of the 'fun of the fair' and less of the drudgery than he does when acting as a divisional unit.
In spite of these opinions, however, the hard facts of this campaign go to prove that our guns invariably rendered more efficient aid to the cavalry they were supporting when employed under the orders of the divisional commander than when attached to brigades. The divisional commander must always know more[Pg 304] of the fortunes of the battle than any of his brigadiers, and is thus generally in the better position to decide where artillery support is most needed. Moreover, if each battery is attached to a brigade, and acting under the orders of a brigadier, each brigade can only receive the support of one battery. But there are occasions, in most engagements, when one brigade needs all the artillery support available, while another, in reserve, or not yet heavily engaged, requires none. If the control of the artillery is left to one individual, fire can be concentrated quickly in support of those brigades or regiments that are most in need of it, and no gun is ever idle. There were one or two lamentable instances, in the 1917 operations, of a brigade remaining in reserve all day with its attached battery sleeping peacefully beside it.
The actions of Summeil in the 1917 operations and of Kaukab in 1918 may be taken as fair illustrations of the employment of artillery as a divisional unit. That of Jisr Benat Yakub in 1918 was an example of the principle of attaching each battery to a brigade.
With the small, three-brigade cavalry division of the present day the former arrangement will practically always yield better results than the latter. Direct artillery liaison should, of course, be maintained between the divisional artillery commander and each brigade, if it is at all possible to do so.
Reserves.—There were, in the early days of the campaign, indications of an idea on the part of some commanders that a certain proportion of the artillery should be held in reserve, in the same way as a brigade or regiment. This idea probably arose from the fact that one of the essential differences between artillery and other arms had been overlooked. When once a brigade or regiment has been committed to an attack, in a moving battle, and is in contact with[Pg 305] the enemy, it can seldom be easily withdrawn in order to be transferred to another part of the field. Guns, on the other hand, do not come into direct contact with the enemy—at least the gunners try their best to avoid doing so! They can, therefore, as a rule, be withdrawn without difficulty, if their services are required elsewhere. All guns in action may thus, in a sense, be said to be in reserve, since they can readily be moved to another part of the field if required. Except, therefore, for the purposes of conserving ammunition, guns should rarely be unemployed during the progress of an action.
Artillery with Advance and Rearguards.—At the beginning of the campaign, most divisional commanders, when moving with one brigade as advance guard, allotted one battery to it. As the operations progressed, however, the view that a larger force of artillery might profitably accompany the advance guard began to gain ground. The experience of the whole campaign points to the conclusion that, in view of the small number of guns available in a cavalry division, two of the three batteries should normally accompany the advance guard brigade. The practice may be open to the objections that it makes the advance guard column unduly long, and that some risk is involved in leaving the main body so short of artillery. Both these objections appear, however, to be outweighed by the advantages of having a large proportion of the artillery in front. Whether the enemy's resistance is stubborn or feeble, artillery fire can assist in breaking it, and the greater the number of guns available, the quicker will that object be achieved, and the less delay will there be to the advance of the main body.
The battery or batteries with the advance guard[Pg 306] should, of course, march as far forward as is compatible with safety. Guns must always take longer than cavalry to move a given distance, and, if they are well to the front, no time will be lost in getting them into the only formation in which they are of any use, i.e. in action.
The divisional artillery commander should accompany the vanguard commander. When contact is established with the enemy, he is then on the spot, and able to make a personal reconnaissance at once, and decide, subject to the orders of the advance guard commander, how his guns can best and most quickly assist the cavalry. No time will then be lost in getting the guns into action. In the final series of operations, the enemy was in too demoralised a state for his action to form a very reliable guide in future wars, but it was found that vigorous artillery fire, delivered immediately after the first contact of our cavalry with his rearguards, invariably exercised a powerfully adverse effect on his morale. The little action of Kaukab well exemplifies this fact.
The above remarks as to artillery with the advance guard apply with equal force, mutatis mutandis, to the artillery of a rearguard during a retirement.
Escorts.—The campaign afforded few opportunities on our side to test the efficacy of artillery escorts. The action at Huj, however, i............