There was a long pause after the battle of Sadoolapore. The country between Heylah and the Sikh position, fifteen miles distant, was covered with dense jungle, and a great number of native wood-cutters were employed in cutting roads through it. Skirmishes often took place between the Sikh regular cavalry and our patrols. On the 18th of December Sher Singh moved ten thousand men to Dingee. As this movement threatened the Wuzeerabad ford, a force was despatched there to bar the passage, which if effected would have placed Sher Singh between the British force and Lahore. The Sikhs retired again, and nothing was done until the 10th of January, when the British force concentrated at Lussoore. It was known that considerable reinforcements had joined Sher Singh, among these being two troops of horse-artillery from Peshawur. These batteries had been disciplined by a British officer, and had been presented to Chuttur Singh by the Resident at Lahore, to enable him to repel the attacks of the Afghans. They were in all respects exactly similar to those used in the Company's service, and were a most valuable addition to Sher Singh's strength.
During the six weeks that had elapsed since the battle, Percy had been kept busily employed; at one time buying provisions, at another questioning villagers as to routes and the obstacles to be encountered, and gathering as much information as possible as to the Sikh position at Russool. The descriptions he obtained were vague in the extreme, but all united in describing the country as excessively difficult, being covered with jungle and abounding in deep nullahs.
"This will be a different business altogether, Groves, from our former attacks on the Sikh positions," said Mr. Fullarton.
"I should think much easier, sir. There we had to go right across the open with fifty or sixty cannon and ten or twelve thousand infantry all blazing away at us, and to storm a place difficult to climb, and where we were exposed to their fire while they were sheltered. Fighting in the jungle we have just as good a chance as they have."
"Except, Groves, that they will know every foot of the ground, and we shall know nothing of it, which makes all the difference in the world."
"It does make a difference, no doubt, Mr. Fullarton; but you see we turned them out of the jungle at Moodkee quickly enough."
"That is true; but there our cavalry got round behind them. No doubt that shook their resistance very much; nothing alarms undisciplined troops so much as the belief that their retreat is cut off. With highly disciplined troops it is just the contrary; when they know they must either conquer or be destroyed, they will fight more obstinately than on any other occasion. To-morrow morning we move forward to Dingee, and I expect that we shall fight on the following day, for it is not more than eight miles from there."
At Dingee a Pathan deserter from the Sikh camp came in, and from him further particulars than had before been learned were obtained.
The camp, he said, was round the village of Russool, a mile from the river. In front of it was a ravine some hundreds of feet deep and almost impassable. Upon the ground on the other side of this ravine the Sikhs had erected a long line of intrenchments, to reach which they had to cross the ravine from their camp on a narrow wooden footbridge thrown over it. At a council of war held on the evening of the arrival of the army at Dingee, it was determined that an attempt should be made to outflank the Sikh intrenchments, to attack Russool on the Sikh left, and so to intercept their retreat to the river. This successful, all their guns, magazines, and stores would be captured, although doubtless the infantry would escape through the jungle.
The next morning the troops were put in motion; for a time they marched without difficulty, as the jungle had been cut for them, but after that their movements were slow. Several Pathan deserters came in as they advanced, and gave information as to the route and position. After a march of some miles a halt was made. The troops ate some of the food carried in their haversacks, and an allowance of grog was served out. The direction of the line of march, which had hitherto been direct upon the heights of Russool, where the Sikh camp was plainly visible, was now changed, and sweeping round they reached a long bare hill in front of the village of Chillianwalla, turning out some Sikhs who were stationed in a small intrenchment there. Lord Gough's intention was to encamp for the night at this spot, where plenty of water was obtainable, so that the troops could rest and prepare for the fight in the morning, when the whole day would be available for the operations.
The ground was marked out for the different regiments to occupy, and the men were in the act of falling out, when a large body of men were seen some distance in the front, and several guns opened fire. The Sikhs had left their intrenchments, and were drawn up in the jungle. Battery after battery opened fire, and the British artillery at once responded, while the troops fell into their ranks again. Lord Gough issued orders for the battle to begin. He has been blamed by many for so doing, but it is difficult to see how it could have been avoided. The Sikh army was at hand in full force; it was out of the question to retreat, equally out of the question to remain passive under the fire of the enemy. Inaction or retreat would equally have been interpreted as evidence of fear, and would have vastly encouraged the enemy. The troops, although tired by their march through the jungle under the sun, had not had a long day's work. That the dispositions for battle were hurried, incomplete, and faulty is undeniable, but that it should have taken place was under the circumstances inevitable.
The din of the cannonade was prodigious, echoed as it was by the surrounding hills. The Sikh batteries were almost invisible, and the British artillerymen directed their fire solely at the flashes and smoke rising from the jungle. The position of the infantry was equally hidden, and it was only by the sparkle of the sun on bayonet and spearhead that any indication of its line was obtainable. But having determined upon attacking, it was necessary that some plan of operation should be decided upon, some specific object of attack assigned to each of the commanding officers of divisions and brigades. No such orders were given, and without any instructions whatever beyond the order to advance and capture the enemy's guns, the British force, numbering some eighteen thousand, of whom but a small proportion were white troops—there being but four regiments of English infantry and three of cavalry—moved forward to attack a force estimated at forty thousand, with sixty-two guns, entirely hidden in a jungle, and in an exceedingly broken and difficult ground.
The two infantry divisions of Major-general Gilbert and Brigadier-general Colin Campbell advanced boldly to the attack, and plunging into the jungle were at once engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle with the Sikhs. The cavalry on the right flank, consisting of the 9th Royal Lancers, the 14th Dragoons, and two regiments of native cavalry, were ordered to advance. They were commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Pope, an officer of the native cavalry. He was unfortunately in such infirm health that he could not mount his horse without assistance, and had no experience whatever of the command of a brigade of cavalry. The result was that owing partly to the difficulty of keeping a straight line in the jungle, the force not only overlapped the troops of horse-artillery placed between them and Gilbert's division, but got in front of Gilbert's infantry. The guns were therefore unable to afford them any assistance.
Moving forwards at a walk, the cavalry found themselves opposed both by infantry and cavalry. Colonel Pope was wounded severely in the head. The troops, being without orders, faced about in different directions as fresh opponents appeared, and presently came to a halt. The Sikh cavalry boldly skirmished up to them, and then, under the belief that the order had been given to retreat, the cavalry turned and galloped back, hotly pursued by the Sikhs. In their retreat they rode right over the batteries of horse-artillery, disorganizing the gunners and carrying off the horses in their rush; while the Sikhs, of whom there were but a handful, following hard in the rear of the flying troopers, cut down the artillerymen, captured six guns, and continued their pursuit until close to Lord Gough and the head-quarter staff. Then a couple of guns, judiciously placed, opened upon them, and they fell back, checked by the appearance of a couple of squadrons of the Lancers, which had been rallied by their officers.
Had the cavalry, when they first came in contact with the enemy, received the orders to charge, the result would probably have been altogether different. Indeed the colonel of one of the cavalry regiments requested permission from Pope to charge, but it was refused. The men who fled thus precipitately had shown an almost reckless valour at Ramnuggar, and would, under other circumstances, have distinguished themselves equally here; but cavalry at a walk are the most defenceless of troops, and broken up as they were by the jungle, unable to see what was going on on either side, exposed to a fire from hidden foes, and feeling that they were badly handled, it is not surprising that when they came to a halt they were liable to turn and go about with alacrity at the first sound of retreating hoofs at any portion of the line.
While this was happening a battery of horse-artillery, with some squadrons of cavalry from three of the regiments engaged, had most gallantly repulsed the attack of a large body of the enemy's horse on our extreme left. Godby's brigade of infantry, which had been deprived of a chance of taking part in the battle of Sadoolapore, were the first of the infantry to come in contact with the enemy. Its advance was assisted by a well-directed fire of a horse-artillery battery which prepared the way. It plunged into the jungle with a cheer, and dashing forward through every obstacle and driving its defenders before it, came upon an open space, the opposite side of which was thickly lined by the enemy. Our troops dashed across this under a tremendous fire of musket and artillery, fired a volley, and hurled themselves upon the Sikhs, who broke and fled. Pursuit was impossible; the jungle was so thick that none could see ten yards ahead. Orders were given to collect the wounded—an imperative duty, for the Sikhs murdered every man left behind.
Suddenly, as they were engaged in the work, a tremendous fire opened upon them from the rear. A large body of Sikhs had worked their way through the jungle and cut them off, while a strong body of their cavalry issued into the open space and charged down upon them. As quick as thought the horse-artillery swept their guns round, loaded with grape, and poured in their fire, creating terrible havoc among the Sikh horse, and sending them flying back into the jungle. The infantry faced about and retired steadily, but were pressed by a crowd of the enemy. Then General Gilbert, who was with the brigade, gave the word, and the second battalion of the Bengal Europeans turned and went at them with a cheer. The Sikhs fought desperately each for himself, but they were swept backward and bayoneted in great numbers. Three of their guns were taken and spiked, and another captured by one of the native regiments of the brigade.
The left brigade of Gilbert's division was even more severely treated. The fighting was desperate; the 29th captured and spiked several guns in the Sikh intrenchment, but could carry off only five of them for want of horses. As it still pushed forward the brigade was swept with grape and musketry. The 56th Native Infantry suffered terribly, losing its colonel, seven other officers, and three hundred and twenty-two men killed and wounded. The 30th Native Infantry suffered as heavily, losing eleven officers and two hundred and eighty-five men killed and wounded. Both the native regiments lost their colours. The brigade was at length unable to withstand the attack directed against it, and fell back.
Pennycuick's brigade of Colin Campbell's division were as roughly handled; they had, through some blunder or other, advanced unsupported by artillery, and orders were given by their commander that they were not to fire but to charge the enemy's guns. The 24th, the European regiment of the brigade, the strongest battalion of the force, advanced in magnificent order under a terrific fire of musketry and artillery, drove all opposition before them, and captured the guns opposed to them. They had commenced spiking them, when some of the Bunnoo regiments, lying concealed in the brushwood on rising ground behind the guns, opened a tremendous fire of musketry. The troops were thrown into some confusion by this sudden attack, and fell back, and as they did so they were literally mown down by the enemy's fire. General Pennycuick fell dead; his son, a young ensign, stood across his father's body and defended it until he fell dead beside it. Colonel Brooks was also killed. Eleven other officers fell, and ten were wounded either among the guns or in the retreat that followed. The Sikh cavalry pressed hard on the retiring soldiers, while their musketry and artillery swept their ranks, and upwards of five hundred men were killed and wounded. The regiment was in fact almost annihilated. The position this brigade attacked was afterwards found to have been the strongest along the Sikh line. The two native regiments of the brigade had advanced in line with the 24th, but suffered far less severely in the retreat, the efforts of the Sikhs being concentrated against the white regiment.
The other brigade of the division, at whose head Colin Campbell had placed himself, was more fortunate. The 61st Foot repulsed several desperate attacks, and pouring in heavy volleys swept the Sikhs before it. Wheeling round it fought its way along, and retook the guns from which the 24th had been driven. The capture of the guns was, however, but of little avail, for as soon as they were abandoned the Sikhs managed to draw the spikes, and in a few minutes they were again in action. Two native regiments fought worthily by the side of the 61st.
The cavalry on the extreme left, under General Thackwell, did good work by checking a very large body of Sikh horsemen, a squadron of the 3d Dragoons charging and riding right through them; then gathering again with a desperate effort they cut their way back to their friends, two officers and thirty-six men having been killed or wounded in this brilliant charge.
Night was now approaching. A portion of the jungle had been for the moment cleared, but beyond this the Sikhs still swarmed, and during the battle large bodies had worked round and had only been prevented by the fire of the guns from falling on the rear. Nothing more could be done; some of the officers advised that the force should fall back to the village of Chillianwalla, in order to obtain water and to afford protection to the baggage Lord Gough at first refused to do so, on the ground that any wounded left behind would be massacred. The troops, especially the Sepoys, were, however, so distressed by thirst, that the wounded were as far as possible collected, and the force concentrated round Chillianwalla.
Had the enemy attacked at night the consequence would have been terrible, for the regiments were broken up and separated, and the confusion was absolute; but at eight o'clock the rain came down in torrents, and this and the fact that their own loss had been severe, especially among the gunners, checked the ardour of the Sikhs, and probably saved the British force. In the morning the enemy were seen encamped on an eminence three miles distant. The cavalry scoured the field of battle to collect any wounded that had been left, and bring in the captured guns. Twelve small cannon, however, were the only trophies of the fight. The rolls were called, and the loss ascertained: it consisted of eighty-nine officers, two thousand three hundred and fifty-seven men killed and wounded—an enormous loss in proportion to the number of men engaged. Six guns were lost, together with the ammunition that had accompanied several of the corps into the fight.
It was so far a drawn battle that the armies at night occupied the same positions they had held at the commencement of the battle, but the advantage was all with the Sikhs, for the fighting strength of the four English regiments that had formed the backbone of the force was lessened by half; while the Sikhs had proved to their delight that British troops were not always invincible, and that occasionally they were even subject to panic. The result ............