IV. THE SECOND PHASE

The flotillas and light cruiser squadrons were now regrouped—some ahead, some alongside of the battle-cruiser and battleship squadrons, and the whole steered to the northward, keeping approximately parallel to and well ahead of the German line. From the time when Scheer came into action at 4:57 until six o’clock, Sir David Beatty kept the range at about 14,000 yards. Both sides must have had some anxious moments during this critical hour. Sir David Beatty knew what Admiral Scheer did not—for the weather was too thick for the Zeppelins to give him the much-needed information—that he was falling back on Sir John Jellicoe, when of course overwhelming force could be brought to bear. His business was to keep Admiral Scheer in play, while exposing his ships, especially his battle-cruisers, as little as possible, consistent with their maintaining an efficient attack upon the enemy. Sir David was criticized for exposing his ships imprudently. Is this criticism well founded? Von Hipper’s battle-cruisers were at the head of the German line, but one had certainly fallen out of action by five o’clock, and one more was to leave the line in the course of this holding action. The battle-cruisers, however, did not affect the situation, for the German Fleet’s speed was that of the pre-Dreadnoughts in the rear, and this308 could not have exceeded 18 knots and was probably less. But the slowest ship in Sir David Beatty’s squadron could make at least 24. Nothing, therefore, could have been simpler than to have taken the whole force out of reach of Scheer’s guns whenever he chose. Had there at any stage been the remotest chance of the lightly armoured battle-cruisers being exposed to smothering fire from the German battleships, the danger could have been averted by the expedient of putting on more speed. Beatty’s main preoccupation, however, was not this. It was undoubtedly the fear that Scheer might retreat before the Grand Fleet could get up. He had, therefore, first to act as if he were a promising target, next to be ready with a counter-stroke if the Germans showed any sign of flight. How did he meet the first necessity of the position?

By keeping the range at 14,000 yards, at which the heavier projectile guns of the British artillery would have a distinct advantage over the German batteries, and by keeping so far ahead that it was impossible for Admiral Scheer to bring the fire of concentrated broadsides to bear, not only was an absolute inequality of gunnery conditions avoided, but it is probable that, so far as tactical disposition went, Sir David Beatty, as throughout the action, had so handled his ships as to be actually superior in fighting power over the forces he was engaging. I say “so far as tactical disposition was concerned,” advisedly, because a new element came into action at this point which favoured first one and then the other, and was ultimately to make long-range gunfire altogether nugatory.
(LARGER)
The second phase; Beatty engages the combined German Fleet, and draws it toward the Grand Fleet

Already between a quarter past four and half past, light mists had been driving down, and even before a quarter to five the outlines of Von Hipper’s squadron309 were becoming vague and shadowy to the British gun-layers. Between half-past five and six these conditions got very much worse. It handicapped the fire-control severely, and already they were beginning to feel, what the Commander-in-Chief says was a characteristic of the whole period during which the Grand Fleet was intermittently in action, viz., the extreme difficulty of using rangefinders in the shifting and indifferent light. How local and variable the mist was may be judged from the fact that the British line was not only free from mist, but was outlined sharply against the setting sun—thus giving a great advantage to the German rangefinders. It was this that largely neutralized the advantage which Sir David Beatty had so skilfully derived from the superior speed of his ships. No ships were lost on the British side during this part of the action. But it can hardly be doubted that had the conditions of visibility been the same for both sides, the head of the German line would have suffered more severely than it did from the Fifth Battle Squadron’s 15-inch guns. But, as we have seen, one of the battle-cruisers had to haul out severely damaged, and certain others showed unmistakable evidence of having suffered severely.

In this phase of the action, as in the first, the British destroyers made attacks on the German line, and it is believed that one ship, seen to be hopelessly on fire and emitting huge clouds of smoke and steam, owed her injuries to a torpedo fired by Moresby.

What was Admiral Scheer’s idea in following up the British squadron as he did? He knew that he had not the speed which would enable him to catch it. It was almost impossible—for he was now the pursuing squadron—to hope for any success from a destroyer attack. There311 was a risk that he might be caught and forced to engage by the Grand Fleet. There are, it seems, two explanations of his action. In the first place, he knew that Von Hipper had already sunk two of the British vessels. It was worth a considerable effort to try and get more, and in face of these losses Sir David Beatty’s movements may have looked so extremely like flight as to make him think that he had, to this extent, the upper hand, and that the British Admiral would be unlikely to risk his force again by seeking a close action. Apart from the risk of the Grand Fleet being out, then, there seemed to be everything to gain and nothing to lose by carrying on the chase.

But is it quite certain that his action was altogether voluntary? What would Sir David Beatty’s action have been had Scheer attempted to renounce the fight? There can be no hesitation in answering this question, for we only have to look at what............