“Cavalry has more need of artillery than infantry, because it cannot reply to fire, but can fight only with the steel.”—Napoleon.

Of close co-operation by the horse artillery in the charges of cavalry against infantry there is practically little or no trace in the battles of 1870. The training of cavalry and horse artillery and the organization of the cavalry division had not proceeded on these lines, as is evident from the fact that there is no mention of it in books such as Von Schmidt before that war, or in Prince Kraft’s Letters on Cavalry after it. The latter writer shows that the tendency was to deprive the cavalry division of its horse artillery when a battle took place, and put it with the corps artillery. It was claimed that by so doing the horse artillery were practically of double use.

    The batteries remain as a rule with the corps artillery. If the cavalry division is sent forward, they are attached to it. If a battle takes place during which the cavalry division is held in reserve, then the horse artillery becomes again a part of the corps artillery and considerably augments its fire. The horse artillery of the Guards corps was thus employed in 1870.

    109 For a cavalry division which takes part in a great battle does not require any horse artillery. It is held at first in reserve.

    If it is called upon to attack it is obliged to make use of an opportunity of charging broken troops of the enemy. There is thus no need to break up its enemy with artillery fire, and there is, besides, no time to do so.

Compare with the above the 1907 amendments to the German Exerzier Reglement für die Kavallerie 1895, No. 375:

    In a general engagement the batteries and machine guns told off to the cavalry will remain with them, because they are indispensable to the cavalry in the fulfilment of their special duties during, and particularly after, the battle.

    The cavalry leader must, however, judge whether the general position does not rather demand the employment of his batteries in co-operation with the rest of the artillery. The horse artillery and machine guns will be of the greatest use in a general engagement when the cavalry are operating against the enemy’s flanks and rear. Their sudden appearance from a flank or from the rear is certain to produce a strong moral effect on the enemy.

There could scarcely be a greater volte face than is indicated by these two extracts.

Further, what we read of the use of masses of cavalry at the present date, in both the German and French man?uvres, leads us to the conclusion that their cavalry and horse artillery will be kept together in a general engagement and used for the sledge-hammer blow on both shaken and unshaken infantry.

110 The reader should study some of the instances given in Colonel Maude’s book, Cavalry: Its Past and Future, chaps. xi. and xii., of the charges by cavalry on infantry in the 1870 war, and picture to himself what would have been the results if these charges had been preluded by even five minutes’ gun fire of one battery of modern horse artillery, say 350 accurately placed shells, containing in all 83,600 projectiles.

A conclusion early arrived at in the consideration of the r?le of the three arms on the modern battlefield is that no artillery and infantry force, however strong, can afford to enter upon a battle unless their flanks are protected by natural obstacles or by masses of cavalry. But battles, except where we adopt the defensive, are not fought where natural obstacles cover our flank. Therefore, we must have sufficient cavalry if only to neutralize the enemy’s cavalry, otherwise they will work round our flank and attack our reserves, and, if they are accompanied by horse artillery, whilst our horse and field artillery is already engaged in the great battle, they possess a marked advantage over us.

The latest instance of the need of cavalry and horse artillery is furnished by Captain Spaits, who himself went through the retreat with the Russians after Mukden, in his book, With Cossacks through Manchuria.

He “and many others who realized the panic-stricken frame of mind of the masses of men who were pouring back without arms and without111 discipline” are of opinion that a “couple of good cavalry divisions, energetically led and provided with artillery and machine guns, could have turned the retreat into a complete annihilation of the army.”

The above inference is obvious when one considers the impression made on the flying troops by a few hundred indifferent horsemen.55

Having, it is hoped, to the reader’s satisfaction, demonstrated that cavalry with horse artillery have a great r?le on the battlefield against infantry, if (i.) the conditions are favourable, (ii.) the attack is à propos, and (iii.) properly supported by horse artillery and machine-gun fire, we turn to the form which the attack against infantry should take. Cavalry Training indicates that it should be made in a succession of lines; and it may be added that it is of the highest importance that these attacks should not be made without sufficient preliminary reconnaissance on the part of the cavalry leader accompanied by the commander of his artillery, and that subsequently the action of the infantry should be decided upon in conjunction with the infantry commander in that portion of the field.

That the infantry should not stand open-mouthed, but should press in at the right moment, is of the highest importance. As far as the troops are concerned, the formation is a simple one; but there are two points which demand forethought and arrangement. The first is the best position for112 the supporting fire; the second is the rallying-point. In these circumstances it appears best to have in one’s mind an ideal, as a guide, and endeavour in the actual fight to approximate to it—and we may turn to the memoirs of Napoleon for the solution. He says: “A flanking battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely is capable of deciding victory in itself.”

The ideal then appears to be: “A,” when the fire effect is delivered ............