FIRST PART

It is related that its owner tried as an experiment to find out what was the smallest amount on which a horse could work. When he had reduced the animal to one straw per diem, the experiment ceased, as the horse died.

The reader, constantly bearing in mind the above anecdote (since, if great generals have overlooked in the past the moral of the tale, there is no reason why others should not do so in future), may proceed to the subject of this chapter, but not without the recurrent thought, that, however dashing the conception of the use of cavalry in a campaign, this one point must be foremost. What will the cavalry horses live on? Horses cannot live on nothing. Few survive if put for a prolonged period on ?-grain rations and no hay or grazing, if such is followed by work.

How far motor vehicles carrying supplies have changed the aspect of affairs in regard to this question is at present a moot point. Undoubtedly the effect87 of the domination of the air by man has materially affected the question of obtaining information.

The principle, “that an army should place in its front the whole of its available cavalry forces from the very beginning of a campaign,” to some extent arises from the desirability of an undisturbed concentration for one’s own army, and also the advantage of checking that of the enemy.

Next in order will be the desire of the commander-in-chief of the army to have definite information of the enemy’s movements whilst at the same time his own movements are covered. This will enable him to direct the movements of his army, whilst still at a distance from the enemy’s advanced guards, and effect concentration for battle neither too soon nor too late (since both of these contingencies entail grave inconveniences), but at the right moment.

But when it comes to practical politics, it is plain, and must be regarded as a principle, that a cavalry brigade, division or corps cannot be relied upon to perform efficiently the duties of policeman and detective at one and the same time. The duty of the latter would carry the former away from his beat.

The French cavalry in 1870, though they possessed what Ardant du Picq describes as the true “Casse cou”47 readiness to charge (and by the bye, that is a portion of the cavalry spirit), almost entirely lacked skilled direction by the higher leaders. This fault88 was no doubt due, in some degree, to the three arms training each in separate water-tight compartments, and not on a large and comprehensive scale in peace, precisely as Langlois says of us in reference to our army’s work in South Africa: “The English took no steps in peace to create and strengthen any union between the arms, and evil overtook them.”

Direction by the higher leaders will always be lacking, where those leaders, in peace time, are unable to divorce themselves from the surroundings and prejudices of their own particular arm, whatever it may be, and to enter whole-heartedly and unreservedly into the spirit of the Napoleonic maxim (No. 47): “Infantry, cavalry, and artillery are nothing without each other.”

Be that as it may, after the 1870–71 war the French cavalry had a moving spirit in General Galliffet, and he was well supported by some of the cleverest French military writers. They dissected French and German cavalry action in 1870–71 (and that of cavalry in other wars), laying bare the mistakes and failures of the cavalry of both armies. They saw what was wanted, higher direction and co-ordination of the work of cavalry, so that the two functions of cavalry, information and security (prior to its r?le on the battlefield), might be realized to their full extent. Their deduction from the campaigns of the Napoleonic period was, that that great leader and organizer had discerned the impossibility of co-ordinating these duties; that in his earlier campaigns there were two great units of war,89 the cavalry of army corps and a corps of reserve cavalry;48 the latter was composed of numerous light cavalry, acting about a day in front of the columns of the main body. Again, that in 1812, corresponding with the formation of groups of armies, the corps of cavalry was created to act independently, in advance of the general movement of the armies, making a third great unit. They arrived at the conclusion that war brings into play three great units, each of which requires its special cavalry.

1. In front of armies under the generalissimo an independent cavalry, in one or more bodies, to insure liberty of offensive action to the generalissimo.

2. In each army a division of cavalry to ensure to it the liberty of defensive action by giving time to concentrate and take up favourable positions.

3. In each army corps a regiment or half-regiment to ensure tranquillity and freedom from surprise.

Nor did they fail to bring to notice that Napoleon’s system was to find a cavalry leader, and let him organize his cavalry to help the plan of campaign, and not to waste his cavalry in a sort of insurance policy.

The essence of cavalry is offence, “offensive résolue, offensive quand même offensive à outrance, qui fut le plus souvent la seule règle de tactique,” not defence and shepherding infantry divisions;49 this90 latter work does not demand the most highly trained cavalry.

By these steps gradually the principle, which is clearly stated in our F.S. Regulations, was arrived at, viz.:

    The main force of cavalry will usually be organized in one or more cavalry divisions, and retained as the instrument of strategical reconnaissance under the immediate orders of the commander-in-chief.—Part II., British F.S.R., 1909, p. 25.

At the present date the French, German, and Austrian organization is practically identical in this respect. All recognize that “we must fight to reconnoitre, and fight to screen.”50

The r?le of cavalry, as defined at p. 182 of the French Service de la Cavalerie, 1909, is as follows:

    1. The Cavalry of Exploration (answering to our own independent cavalry), the personal agent of the generalissimo, is sent where he wishes, in quest of the news he desires. This news the leader of this cavalry must send in good time; his independence is limited to the means he employs to get news. The cavalry of exploration may also be sent on special missions against the columns or convoys of the enemy, and ought, whilst observing its instructions and carrying out its important r?le, to seize any opportunity of destroying the enemy’s cavalry.

    91 Cavalry is the arm, above all, of surprise, and consequently may often obtain the greatest results by a sudden attack on the wings or rear of the adversary.

    2. The Cavalry of the Army Corps (answering to our protective cavalry) and the divisional cavalry find out and inform their commander what is happening in the zone allotted to them.

    They must keep off the enemy’s cavalry, guard the columns against surprise, cover their deployment, and seek every opportunity of intervening with effect in the combat.

    3. The Divisional Cavalry may, in the combat, be the only troops on whom the divisional general can depend for safety from surprise: their commander must, accordingly, not only seek opportunities to use the bulk of his troops opportunely in the combat, but also give information and guard the division against surprise on its flanks and rear.

What use, then, does the generalissimo make of his independent cavalry? He sends it forward to tear the veil from his adversary’s armies; whilst thus engaged it may, in fact almost certainly will, meet the enemy’s independent cavalry similarly employed, when, with a view to carrying out its orders, it will probably be compelled to fight—to fight for information.

Let us suppose it successful and the squadrons of the enemy’s independent cavalry dispersed, unable to face their adversary. Our independent cavalry push on to the enemy and meet the screen of cavalry, the service of security which covers his army. This again they must tear aside, and lay bare the heads of the enemy’s infantry columns. Even then their mission is not complete; they must direct their energies against the92 flanks of the enemy’s columns and demoralize them. It is plain, then, that on the successful action of the independent cavalry great issues may depend.

With regard to the movement of these forces, whenever cavalry are moving in the direction of an enemy (whether they are the independent cavalry or the protective cavalry), it is obvious that they will endeavour to pass quickly through ground which is for any reason unfavourable to them and advantageous to the enemy for attack, whilst they will dwell in positions which present obvious advantages to them. The result is, that from large forces of cavalry down to the smallest unit there is a tendency to move forward in bounds.

The protective cavalry will further be influenced by the desire to forestall the enemy in gaining positions for the infantry columns following them, and in taking up for the night a line of outposts on some natural obstacle, which will give them some security whilst they are halted.

It is quite a debatable question whether the evolution of cavalry into three classes as at present is not largely due to the arming of cavalry with a good rifle, and to rendering them consequently able to protect themselves, and able to turn out small parties of the enemy who hold defiles, railway stations, etc., against them. The new German Cavalry Regulations, para. 391, state: “Thus cavalry, owing to its great adaptability, is capable of independent action in practically every eventuality of the battlefield.”

93 In any case horse artillery, machine guns, and the rifle have added enormously to the defensive power of cavalry; when, therefore, the protective cavalry are thrown back on the infantry, by the enterprise of the enemy’s independent squadrons, the latter may lightly, and without warning, find themselves attacking infantry in position, by mistake for dismounted cavalry, and consequently suffer very severely. Not only that, but the mixed detachments of all arms likely to be met with at this juncture, possess a power and length of resistance, which our ............