On the evening of the 26th September we were off again in the direction of Cambrai, and after a cold and tedious train journey we arrived at Quéant about 1.30 a.m. on the 27th. The guides, who had been sent on in advance, seemed to have got lost, for they did not meet us at Quéant Station, and a certain amount of confusion ensued in consequence, before it was decided in which direction was situated a certain map location given us by Brigade Headquarters as our billetting area.

The rain poured down in buckets, and everyone was drenched to the skin by the time we reached our destination; however, the cooks got busy and a hot meal was served, soon after which we received orders to move forward. It should be mentioned here that Major D. Carmichael, D.S.O., M.C., second in command of the 58th Battalion, and one of the outstanding officers of the 9th Brigade, was transferred to us as Officer Commanding just after leaving “Y” huts.

The roads were packed with transport and guns coming up from every direction, and we picked our way by overland routes to Inchy, and from there to our new area, east of the Canal du Nord.

The kitchens were unable to move with us, and we[81] bivouacked in shell holes that night with no covering except waterproof sheets, and no hot dinner. About 3 a.m. the next morning the kitchens arrived, and the men gathered round them in small groups to try and get warm. It is surprising how good a thick bacon sandwich is with a ration of rum, about 5 o’clock in the morning!

About 7 a.m. the battalion moved forward, according to plan, closely following the 58th Battalion, through Bourlon Wood, which had been captured only a few hours previously by the 4th Division, and by 10 a.m. we were assembled behind a railway embankment to the east of Bourlon, and in full view of the city of Cambrai. Up to this time we had encountered nothing more than scattered shell fire, and we had had no casualties.

From our embankment we watched some tanks coming out of action, and at 6.30 p.m. we received verbal instructions that the 58th Battalion would attack the Marcoing Line, and that the 116th Battalion, passing through the 58th, would attack and capture the Village of St. Olle, which is a small suburb of Cambrai.

Zero hour was set for 7 p.m., and in consequence there was no time to discuss any plan of operation beyond the fact that “A” Company (Capt. Preston) and “B” Company (Capt. Orr) would lead the attack. By the time we had reached our positions it was dark.

The attack by the 58th was successful, and we moved through their lines in the direction of St. Olle. Judging by the machine gun fire the village was strongly held,[82] and as no reconnaissance of the ground could be made, and only a very general direction maintained, it was decided that we would not proceed with the attack until daylight. Battalion Headquarters was established, and rations were brought forward and distributed to the companies under the very nose of the Bosch, who could have wiped us out if he had only known; and so darkness has sometimes its advantages also. During the night it was possible to make some preparation, and at 6 a.m. the next morning “A” and “B” Companies, with “C” Company (Capt. Williams) and “D” Company (Capt. Patterson) in support, resumed the attack.

The leading platoons had scarcely started when they were caught between cross belts of machine gun fire, coming from a small trench in front of St. Olle and Petit Fontaine on the right, and after an hour’s fighting they had hardly made any headway at all, and had lost practically the whole of their effectives. News of this disaster was brought by Lieutenant Smith of “B” Company, who rolled over the parapet of the trench just outside Battalion Headquarters in an exhausted condition. From all he said, it appeared that “A” and “B” Companies had been annihilated; that Captain Preston and Lieutenant Palmer were both wounded and prisoners, and that Lieutenant Norton had been killed. This information was corroborated by Private Stankewicz, who had been taken prisoner with Captain Preston, but who later escaped to our lines.

Under these distressing conditions it seemed almost[83] as if our gallant unit would fail, for the first time, to win its objective. A battery of our Field Artillery were in action about one thousand yards directly to our rear and a messenger was despatched at once to explain the situation to the Battery Commander, and, if possible, obtain his............