That rare gift which in the every-day affairs of life is called tact and in statecraft is known as diplomacy was possessed by Abraham Lincoln to a degree that was remarkable for a man of his meagre education and limited experience. Before his nomination to the Presidency his fame and activity had been almost exclusively provincial, and in a province which had not yet grown out of the formative period; but he was a profound student of human nature, and possessed a quality called sagacity, which is the nearest approach to wisdom and is a gift of nature. This knowledge and quality were developed during his political life. A successful politician must be a diplomatist and a statesman. The English language lacks terms to describe men of Lincoln's attainments. The French, Spaniards, and Germans have definitions for different grades of politicians, while the English are limited to that single word, and apply it to every person who participates in political affairs, from a ward-worker in the slums of the cities to an occupant of the Executive chair of the nation. William McKinley, like Abraham Lincoln, was a consummate politician and at the same time a statesman and a diplomatist. The dictionary definition of the latter is "a man who has dexterity or skill in managing negotiations of any kind;" and diplomacy, by the same authority, is "artful management with a view of securing advantages."
According to this definition, Lincoln, as a diplomatist, was unsurpassed in his generation either at home or abroad, as the history of the foreign relations of our government during his administration will show. He343 guided the foreign policy of the United States from 1861 to 1865 as closely as he directed its military campaigns until 1864, when he yielded the responsibility to General Grant; and, although the public gave the credit to Seward, the members of the Cabinet, the foreign committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and others intimately associated with that branch of the administration recognized his genius in all the larger attributes of diplomacy. The untrained lawyer from the prairies without hesitation assumed the responsibility of conducting the foreign policy of the government in the most critical period of its existence, and revised the diplomatic correspondence of his Secretary of State, who had the reputation of being one of the most subtle and far-sighted statesmen of his age. But the developments showed that Lincoln alone had a complete grasp of a situation unprecedented in our history.
He was a diplomatist by nature, and developed the talent early. When a boy, he was selected as umpire at wrestling-matches, cock-fights, horse- and foot-races, and other rude sports of the neighborhood because his associates had confidence in his judgment and honesty. Because he had tact, in addition to those qualities, he was the peacemaker and court of appeals in quarrels; the referee in disputes; the arbiter in controversies concerning literature, theology, woodcraft, and morals. His decisions were rarely, if ever, questioned. He had a rule for evading difficulties which was expressed in a homely remark to Mr. Seward, who jokingly remarked at a Cabinet meeting one day,—
"Mr. President, I hear that you turned out for a colored woman on a muddy crossing the other day."
"I don't remember," answered Lincoln, musingly; "but I think it very likely, for I have always made it a rule that if people won't turn out for me I will for them. If I didn't there would be a collision."
And he always avoided collisions. It was not because344 he lacked courage or confidence. Obstinacy is often mistaken for courage, and, as one of Lincoln's advisers remarked, "Political graveyards are filled with buried ambitions and crushed hopes because of that mistake, which Mr. Lincoln never made." He never allowed an antagonist to fathom his thoughts or to see the line along which he was working. He gave way in matters of small importance to secure a firmer position to fight a more important battle. He overcame obstacles and escaped entanglements by the exercise of this faculty called diplomacy, without surrendering a principle or making an important concession.
General Fry, who was Provost-Marshal of the War Department and received daily instructions from the President in regard to the draft for troops, which was one of the most embarrassing and perplexing questions that arose during the war, illustrates this peculiar trait by an anecdote. He says,—
"Upon one occasion the Governor of a State came to my office bristling with complaints in relation to the number of troops required from his State, the details for drafting the men, and the plan of compulsory service in general. I found it impossible to satisfy his demands, and accompanied him to the Secretary of War's office, whence, after a stormy interview with Stanton, he went alone to press his ultimatum upon the highest authority. After I had waited anxiously for some hours, expecting important orders or decisions from the President, or at least a summons to the White House for explanation, the Governor returned, and said, with a pleasant smile, that he was going home by the next train, and merely dropped in en route to say good-by. Neither the business he came upon nor his interview with the President was alluded to.
"As soon as I could see Lincoln, I said, 'Mr. President, I am very anxious to learn how you disposed of Governor ——. He went to your office from the War345 Department in a towering rage. I suppose you found it necessary to make large concessions to him, as he returned from you entirely satisfied.'
"'Oh, no,' he replied, 'I did not concede anything. You know how that Illinois farmer managed the big log that lay in the middle of his field? To the inquiries of his neighbors, one Sunday, he announced that he had got rid of the big log. "Got rid of it!" said they, "how did you do it? It was too big to haul out, too knotty to split, and too wet and soggy to burn; what did you do?" "Well, now, boys," replied the farmer, "if you won't divulge the secret, I'll tell you how I got rid of it. I ploughed around it." Now,' said Lincoln, 'don't tell anybody, but that's the way I got rid of Governor ——. I ploughed around him, but it took me three mortal hours to do it, and I was afraid every moment he'd see what I was at.'"
Those who were associated with Lincoln noticed the rapid development of his diplomatic talent. In meeting emergencies he constantly surprised them by the manifestation of a capacity to grapple with hidden and unknown difficulties that could have been possessed only by so strong and deep a nature. His secretaries testify that he could receive any kind of tidings without emotion or variation in face and manner. "He never seemed to hear anything with reference to itself," one of them described it, "but solely with a quick forward grasping for the consequences; for what must be done next. The announcement of a defeat or disaster did not bring to him the blow only, but rather the consideration of a counter-stroke. With a calm, sublime reliance upon God and the everlasting principles of right, he was able to conduct the nation through the most tremendous civil war ever waged and never committed a serious mistake."
Lincoln was pre-eminently a Democrat because he believed in a government of the people by the people346 for the people. His early training, his contact with "the plain people," as he loved to call them, his knowledge of their prejudices and preferences, their habits of thought and methods of judgment, enabled him to judge accurately of public opinion, and his deep sympathy with them gave him confidence that whatever met their approval was right and just. That explains his loyal obedience to the will of the majority, his refusal to adopt radical measures, and his strength of purpose when he believed that his plans would be approved by them. His critics asserted that his procrastination with McClellan, his postponement of the emancipation of the slaves, and his apparent reluctance to act upon measures which were considered necessary to the salvation of the country were signs of weakness and cowardice; but no man ever showed greater courage when he felt that he was right.
When Lincoln came to Washington he had no experience in diplomacy or statesmanship; as an attorney, he had dealt only with local and State statutes; as a legislator, his experience was limited to provincial affairs; his only knowledge of the operations of the general government was acquired during the two years he was in Congress and from books that he read. He had never argued a case before the Supreme Court, he had never studied international law, he knew nothing of the organization of armies, and he was unfamiliar with the relations between the Chief Executive and his Cabinet; but we have seen in Chapter V. how promptly, firmly, and conclusively, and at the same time with what tact and diplomacy, he rebuked Seward's suggestion that he should surrender the prerogatives of his office to the Secretary of State, how positive yet how gentle was his treatment of Frémont, and how thorough his knowledge of the laws of nations is disclosed by his correspondence concerning the movement of troops through Maryland and Virginia, regarding the suspension of the writ of347 habeas corpus, the arrest of Vallandigham, and especially in connection with the Emancipation Proclamation.
President Lincoln made it a rule never to deny or explain any charge against himself, nor to reply to an attack, except when the fortunes of his country seemed to be involved; and when he did make a reply it was always complete and satisfactory.
Almost the very moment that he crossed the threshold of the White House Lincoln was confronted with the gravest diplomatic problem of his experience, and its solution required not only knowledge of precedent but skill in argument. The claim of the Confederacy to be recognized as a nation by the powers of Europe had practically been waived by President Buchanan when he admitted that the Federal government had no authority to keep a State in the union if it desired to secede. This admission had been confirmed by the apparent acquiescence in the withdrawal of South Carolina and other States; by the organization of the Confederacy at Montgomery without interference or protest; by the failure to reinforce Fort Sumter; and by Buchanan's practical abdication of executive power when, in his message of January 8, 1861, he threw the entire responsibility of the situation upon Congress.
All through these rapid and radical changes the foreign powers received no official explanation or information from the Department of State at Washington, and were left to draw their own inferences from the news which appeared in the public press, until February 28, when Jeremiah S. Black, for a few weeks Secretary of State, issued a circular instructing our representatives at foreign capitals that the government of the United States had not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction anywhere within its territory and did not intend to do so. In the same circular he gave instructions that a recognition of the Confederacy must not be allowed.348 Upon assuming the duties of Secretary of State, Mr. Seward hastily confirmed these instructions and expressed the confidence of the President in the speedy suppression of the Rebellion and the restoration of the unity and harmony of the nation. From France and England came non-committal and unsatisfactory replies, and before Mr. Adams, who had been appointed minister to England, could arrive in London, an unfriendly ministry issued a proclamation of neutrality practically recognizing the Confederate States as an independent government and conceding it the privileges of a belligerent power. Thus, before it had a single ship afloat, its fleets were tendered the hospitality of the British ports on terms of equality with the fleets of the United States. France at once imitated this precipitate action, which was prompted by the desire of the British manufacturers to secure free trade and cheap cotton. The Emperor of the French was actuated by confidence that a division of the American union would aid in the advancement of his plans to erect an empire in Mexico.
Exasperated by the injustice of this action, Mr. Seward wrote Mr. Adams a despatch which would have imperilled our relations with Great Britain had it been delivered in its original form. Fortunately, the President had enjoined the Secretary of State not to send anything of importance without first submitting it to him; hence Lincoln was able to modify what Mr. Seward's inflammable temper had suggested and at the same time add to the force and the dignity of the despatch. A comparison of the text of the original with the final copy as sent to the American legation at London demonstrates the superiority of Lincoln's judgment as well as his mastery of the language of diplomacy. It is remarkable that a mind untrained to consider the consequences of international discourtesy and a hand unaccustomed to frame the phrases of diplomacy should have been so apt and so skilful in removing the sting349 from the indignant paragraphs of an experienced statesman without diminishing their tone, or force, or dignity.
If the letter, as it came from the hands of Mr. Seward, had been delivered at the British Foreign Office according to instructions, Mr. Adams would have burned his bridges behind him. He would have placed himself in the attitude of breaking off intercourse, and thus made it impossible for him to use any further influence or even to ascertain the disposition and intention of the British government. The only thing left for him would have been to close the legation and return to the United States. Lincoln's modifications left him free to manage a delicate situation as circumstances and his own judgment indicated. He was not only left within the range of personal and diplomatic courtesy, but by Lincoln's clever phrasing the burden of proof was thrown upon the British government.
This skilful use of terms until that time unfamiliar to Lincoln has always excited the admiration of philologists and diplomatists because of the nice sense he displayed of the shades of meaning and the effect of adding emphasis and improving the courtesy of expression at the same time. The comprehensive knowledge of the situation and the appreciation of the results which might follow seem almost supernatural in a man who had been only three months in office, was entirely without experience in diplomacy, had never before prepared a diplomatic note, and whose mind was perplexed about home affairs. The highest authorities have pronounced it the work of a master, as showing a freedom of knowledge of and insight into foreign affairs, a skill in shaping phrases, a delicate sense of propriety, an appreciation of the methods of diplomatic dealings, and a penetration which entitled the President to the highest honors of statesmanship.
And thus was a misunderstanding and perhaps a war with England avoided by a simple change in terms and350 phrases. We can only conjecture what might have happened; but, had Seward's despatch been sent as originally written, it would probably have resulted in the formal recognition and the success of the Southern Confederacy.
During the first term of General Grant's administration, Mr. Fish, then Secretary of State, brought the original manuscript to a Cabinet meeting, and it excited so much interest that Mr. Boutwell proposed to have twelve fac-similes made by the photographer of the Treasury Department. Twelve copies were taken and the negative then destroyed.
It was not long before the government was again involved in a complication with Great Britain owing to the zeal of Captain Charles Wilkes, of the gunboat "San Jacinto," who overhauled the British mail steamer "Trent" and took from the passenger cabin ex-Senators J. M. Mason and John Slidell, who had been accredited by the Confederate government as envoys to the European courts, and had managed to elude the blockade and sail from Havana. The British government, people, and press regarded the act as a violation of international law and an outrage upon the British flag, and preparations for war were begun, while Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, was instructed to close his legation and return to England unless the prisoners were released and a satisfactory apology offered within seven days.
If it had not been for the kindly sympathy of Queen Victoria, President Lincoln would not have been allowed to apologize; but with her own hand she modified the instructions to Lord Lyons and gave our government an opportunity to withdraw from an untenable position. The situation was exceedingly embarrassing and critical, because the action of Captain Wilkes was not only applauded by the public, but it was officially approved by the Secretary of the Navy, and the House of Representatives351 unanimously passed a resolution commending him for his brave and patriotic conduct.
While the President and his Cabinet no doubt admired Captain Wilkes for the qualities he had displayed, they were placed in a serious dilemma because of the energetic and peremptory demands of the British government. The President took the matter into his own hands, and the most experienced diplomatist or the most skilful lawyer could not have prepared a clearer, stronger, more dignified, or courteous despatch than he wrote for Mr. Seward's signature, suggesting that the matter be submitted to friendly arbitration.
"The President is unwilling to believe," he wrote, "that Her Majesty's government will press for a categorical answer upon what appears to him to be only a partial record in the making up of which he has been allowed no part. He is reluctant to volunteer his view of the case, with no assurance that Her Majesty's government will consent to hear him; yet this much he directs me to say, that this government has intended no affront to the British flag or to the British nation; nor has it intended to force into discussion an embarrassing question; all of which is evident by the fact hereby asserted, that the act complained of was done by the officer without orders from, or expectation of, the government. But, being done, it was no longer left to us to consider whether we might not, to avoid a controversy, waive an unimportant though a strict right; because we, too, as well as Great Britain, have a people justly jealous of their rights, and in whose presence our government could undo the act complained of only upon a fair showing that it was wrong, or at least very questionable. The United States government and people are still willing to make reparation upon such showing.
"Accordingly, I am instructed by the President to inquire whether Her Majesty's government will hear the United States upon the matter in question. The352 President desires, among other things, to bring into view, and have considered, the existing rebellion in the United States; the position Great Britain has assumed, including Her Majesty's proclamation in relation thereto; the relation the persons whose seizure is the subject of complaint bore to the United States, and the object of their voyage at the time they were seized; the knowledge which the master of the 'Trent' had of their relation to the United States, and of the object of their voyage, at the time he received them on board for the voyage; the place of the seizure; and the precedents and respective positions assumed in analogous cases between Great Britain and the United States.
"Upon a submission containing the foregoing facts, with those set forth in the before-mentioned despatch to your lordship, together with all other facts which either party may deem material, I am instructed to say the government of the United States will, if agreed to by Her Majesty's government, go to such friendly arbitration as is usual among nations, and will abide the award."
This despatch was not sent; nor was it ever submitted to the Cabinet. Before the opportunity arrived the President was convinced of the danger of temporizing. Eight thousand troops were despatched from London to Canada, a British fleet was ordered to American waters, and the export of arms and ammunition from Great Britain was forbidden. The President's cool judgment and common sense also taught him that the position of our government was untenable, and, with his keen perceptions as a lawyer, he saw how the United States could honorably withdraw and at the same time use the incident to its own advantage and get the better of the controversy.
"We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals," he said. "We fought Great Britain for insisting by theory and practice on the right353 to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has done. If Great Britain shall now protest against the act and demand their release, we must give them up and apologize for the act as a violation of our own doctrines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for sixty years."
Mr. Seward prepared a long and remarkable presentation of the case of the United States which is considered one of the ablest of his many state papers. He admitted that Captain Wilkes had done wrong and had exceeded his instructions, but asserted that "this government has neither meditated, nor practised, nor approved any deliberate wrong in the transaction to which they have called its attention, and, on the contrary, that what has happened has been simply an inadvertency, consisting in the departure by the naval officer, free from any wrongful motive, from a rule uncertainly established, and probably by the several parties concerned either imperfectly understood or entirely unknown. For this error the British government has a right to expect the same reparation that we, as an independent state, should expect from Great Britain or any other friendly nation in a similar case.... If I decide this case in favor of my own government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself.... The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort Warren, in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated."
Thus, through Lincoln's penetration and judgment, a great international peril was not only averted, but Great Britain was forced to relinquish her own contentions and adopt the American doctrine respecting this class of neutral rights.
354 There were frequent matters of controversy between the British Foreign Office and the Department of State at Washington during the four years of war because of the systematic violation of the neutrality laws by English subjects, and they were aggravated by the unconcealed sympathy of the British people with the Confederate States. Our government was ably represented in London by Charles Francis Adams, in whom Lincoln had great confidence, and his voluminous instructions from time to time, although prepared by Secretary Seward, were always carefully revised by the President. Altogether, the diplomatic correspondence during that period, both in matters of controversy and particularly concerning offers of mediation in our affairs made by the European powers, shows a diplomatic penetration and skill which excite the admiration of students.
Among other perplexing questions with which he was compelled to deal was the invasion of Mexico and the attempt to establish an empire at the city of the Montezumas. The President took the most positive and determined ground in support of the Monroe doctrine—more advanced than had been attempted at that time. He expressed an unqualified disapproval of the French invasion; and, although he was not in a position to intervene with force, lost no opportunity of making known to the other powers of Europe, and through our minister in Paris to the Emperor of France himself, that the movement to erect a monarchy on American soil was repugnant to the United States. To strengthen his position he suggested that Governor Dennison, who was to be chairman of the Baltimore Convention in 1864, give a strong endorsement of the Monroe doctrine in his opening speech, and that the Convention adopt a resolution declaring that the people of the United States would not permit the overthrow of a republican government or the establishment of a monarchy upon the Western continent.
355 Early in 1865 Lincoln and Secretary Seward received three peace commissioners from the Confederacy—Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell,—who wanted the President to recognize the Southern Confederacy as a foreign government. Mr. Hunter urged this very strongly, declaring that the recognition of Jefferson Davis's official authority to make a treaty was an indispensable step to peace, and referred to the correspondence between King Charles I. and his Parliament as a trustworthy precedent. When Mr. Hunter made this point, Lincoln looked up quickly and remarked,—
"Upon questions of history I must refer you to Mr. Seward, for he is posted on such things and I do not profess to be; but it is my distinct recollection that, as a result of that correspondence, Charles lost his head."
One of the most remarkable examples of Lincoln's tact and diplomacy is found in his treatment of a Cabinet crisis in December, 1862, when the danger of a permanent division of the Republican party into two hostile factions seemed imminent and unavoidable. As the reader has already learned from this narrative, the Cabinet was never harmonious or united. It was divided by personal jealousies and rivalries as well as by differences concerning matters of policy from the day of the inauguration. Gradually Mr. Seward became the leader of the conservative and Mr. Chase of the radical element of the Republican party, and while both conducted the business of their departments with patriotism, ability, and skill, they were not only mutually hostile, but suspected each other's motives. From a very early day Mr. Chase became an outspoken candidate for the Presidential nomination against Lincoln, and his criticism, as we have learned in Chapter V., included his fellow-members of the Cabinet. Mr. Seward, on the other hand, was loyal to the President, but had given great offence to the radical element of his party by some of356 his published despatches and private utterances, particularly one diplomatic note in which he had included the antislavery men with the secessionists a............