ALL punishments or penal remedies for crime, except capitalpunishment, may be considered from two points of view:

　　First, as they regard Society; secondly, as they regard theoffender.

　　Where capital punishment is resorted to, the sole end in viewis the protection of Society. The malefactor being put todeath, there can be no thought of his amendment. And so faras this particular criminal is concerned, Society ishenceforth in safety.

　　But (looking to the individual), as equal security could beobtained by his imprisonment for life, the extreme measure ofputting him to death needs justification. This is found inthe assumption that death being the severest of allpunishments now permissible, no other penalty is soefficacious in preventing the crime or crimes for which it isinflicted. Is the assumption borne out by facts, or byinference?

　　For facts we naturally turn to statistics. Switzerlandabolished capital punishment in 1874; but cases ofpremeditated murder having largely increased during the nextfive years, it was restored by Federal legislation in 1879.

　　Still there is nothing conclusive to be inferred from thisfact. We must seek for guidance elsewhere.

　　Reverting to the above assumption, we must ask: First, Isthe death punishment the severest of all evils, and to whatextent does the fear of it act as a preventive? Secondly, Isit true that no other punishment would serve as powerfully inpreventing murder by intimidation?

　　Is punishment by death the most dreaded of all evils? 'Thisassertion,' says Bentham, 'is true with respect to themajority of mankind; it is not true with respect to thegreatest criminals.' It is pretty certain that a malefactorsteeped in crime, living in extreme want, misery andapprehension, must, if he reflects at all, contemplate aviolent end as an imminent possibility. He has no betterfuture before him, and may easily come to look upon deathwith brutal insensibility and defiance. The indifferenceexhibited by the garrotted man getting up to adjust his chairis probably common amongst criminals of his type.

　　Again, take such a crime as that of the Cuban's: the passionwhich leads to it is the fiercest and most ungovernable whichman is subject to. Sexual jealousy also is one of the mostfrequent causes of murder. So violent is this passion thatthe victim of it is often quite prepared to sacrifice liferather than forego indulgence, or allow another to supplanthim; both men and women will gloat over the murder of arival, and gladly accept death as its penalty, rather thansurvive the possession of the desired object by another.

　　Further, in addition to those who yield to fits of passion,there is a class whose criminal promptings are hereditary: alarge number of unfortunates of whom it may almost be saidthat they were destined to commit crimes. 'It is unhappily afact,' says Mr. Francis Galton ('Inquiries into HumanFaculty'), 'that fairly distinct types of criminals breedingtrue to their kind have become established.' And he givesextraordinary examples, which fully bear out his affirmation.

　　We may safely say that, in a very large number of cases, theworst crimes are perpetrated by beings for whom the deathpenalty has no preventive terrors.

　　But it is otherwise with the majority. Death itself, apartfrom punitive aspects, is a greater evil to those for whomlife has greater attractions. Besides this, the permanentdisgrace of capital punishment, the lasting injury to thecriminal's family and to all who are dear to him, must be farmore cogent incentives to self-control than the mere fear ofceasing to live.

　　With the criminal and most degraded class - with those whoare actuated by violent passions and hereditary taints, theclass by which most murders are committed - the deathpunishment would seem to be useless as an intimidation or anexample.

　　With the majority it is more than probable that it exercisesa strong and beneficial influence. As no mere socialdistinction can eradicate innate instincts, there must be alarge proportion of the majority, the better-to-do, who areboth occasionally and habitually subject to criminalpropensities, and who shall say how many of these arerestrained from the worst of crimes by fear of capitalpunishment and its consequences?

　　On these grounds, if they be not fallacious, the retention ofcapital punishment may be justified.

　　Secondly. Is the assumption tenable that no other penaltymakes so strong an impression or is so pre-eminentlyexemplary? Bentham thus answers the question: 'It appearsto me that the contemplation of perpetual imprisonment,accompanied with hard labour and occasional solitaryconfinement, would produce a deeper impression on the mindsof persons in whom it is more eminently desirable that thatimpression should be produced than even death itself. . . .

　　All that renders death less formidable to them renderslaborious restraint proportionably more irksome.' There isdoubtless a certain measure of truth in these remarks. ButBentham is here speaking of the degraded class; and is itlikely that such would re............