The inhabitants of both these countries are mainly Yusafzais—Tarkanri or Tarklanri Yusafzais in Bajaur, and Akozai Yusafzais in Dir. Bajaur is bounded on the north by Dir, and on the east by Dir and Swat, on the south-east and south by the Utman Khel country, on the south again for a short distance by the Mohmands, and on the west by Afghanistan. It is an extremely mountainous country, watered by the Rud River, and including within its area the valleys of the Rud, of Babukarra, Watelai and Chaharmung.
The Bajauris or Tarkanris are Sarbani Pathans of the Khakhai Khel branch and representatives of the ancient Gandhari, with whom they returned from Kabul in the fifteenth century to the Peshawar Valley, and a hundred years later subjugated and dispossessed the Gujars, then in occupation of Bajaur. “In 1504,” we are reminded by Oliver, “the Emperor Baber acquired the sovereignty of Kabul and Ghazni, and in the following year made an extensive frontier tour, coming by the Khyber Pass to Peshawar, going 156along the whole border, and returning by the Sakhi Sarwar Pass and the Bori Valley to Ghazni. At this period the Pathan settlers are described as pretty well established in Laghman, Peshawar, Swat and Bajaur; though some of the original occupants still struggled for independence under their hereditary chiefs. During the next twenty-five years the Mogul Baber undertook many forays—for most of them could not be called anything else—to punish the hill Pathans, or to protect his own subjects, dispersing the men, carrying off the women and cattle; but, as a rule, the tribes were even then fully able to hold their own. Guided by the Dilazaks, he marched against Bajaur, carried the fortress of the original Sultan by escalade, using the new matchlocks, which greatly astonished the enemy, the net result being to extend the power of the Tarklanris.”
The Tarkanris have three main divisions:
1.
Ismailzai.
2.
Isozai.
3.
Mamunds,
and of the different valleys into which Bajaur is split up, the Maidan Valley is occupied by the Ismailzai, the Baraul and Jandol Valleys by the Isozai, and the valleys of Babukarra, Chaharmung and Watelai by the Mamunds, who also own a good deal of land across the border in Afghanistan. Some six or seven alien tribes also live among the Bajauris—chiefly in the Jandol and Maidan Valleys. Originally Jandol belonged to Bajaur, but it has within recent years come under the political control of Dir, whose ruler, 157however, has little or no authority over the people of the Jandol Valley.
The Valleys of Bajaur
The Maidan Valley is about ten miles long, rich and fertile and well cultivated, watered by the Maidan or Kunai River. The Jandol Valley, whose northern and southern boundaries are the Janbatai Range and the Rud River, has a total area of some 144 square miles, being about fourteen miles long, with a breadth ranging from six to ten miles, and is also rich and well cultivated. The Baraul Valley is divided into an upper and a lower, the upper including the Janbatai district, and good crops are raised here, and iron of excellent quality is exported. The Babukarra Valley is about fifteen miles long, with an average width of five or six miles; the range of the Hindu Raj divides it from Asmar on the north, on the east the Takwara spur separates it from Jandol, on the west is the Mamund or Watelai Valley, while to the south, on the right bank of the Bajaur River, is the country of the Utman Khel. The Chaharmung Valley lies between the Mamund country on the north-east and the Kamangara Valley on the south-west. The Watelai Valley, occupied by the Mamunds, the most important section of the Tarkanris or Bajauris, lies between the valleys of Chaharmung and Babukarra; it is about thirteen miles in length, with a maximum breadth of ten miles, and is well cultivated, but has no main river of any importance running through it, and the bed of the valley is much cut up by deep nullahs. The Mamunds are probably the most warlike of the Tarkanris, and can put 15812,000 men in the field, all well armed as frontier tribesmen go.
The position of the Khan of Nawagai requires some explanation. He is the hereditary chief of a branch of the Salarzai sub-division of the Mamunds, and also of all the Tarkanris, but his authority has of late years very greatly diminished, although he is still by no means without influence, even far beyond the borders of his own Khanate. His actual territory is an irregular tract of country on the left bank of the Rud River, together with the district of Surkamar; part of his country was encroached upon some years ago by the Mohmands, and he has never been sufficiently powerful to regain permanent possession of it.
The country known as Dir comprises roughly the whole area drained by the Panjkora River and its affluents, as far south as its junction with the Rud River of Bajaur. The Upper Panjkora Valley is known as the Panjkora Kohistan, and is divided into two parts called Bashkar and Sheringal. The principal subsidiary valleys of Dir are the Kashkar or Dir, the Baraul and the Maidan on the west, and the Ushiri and Talash Valleys on the east. The northern limit of Dir is the crest of the mountain range which divides it from Chitral and Yasin; the Durand line is the boundary on the west; on the east it is bounded by Kohistan, and on the south by the valley of Upper Swat and by Bajaur. From the mass of mountains to the north three giant spurs or ranges run down towards the south. The easternmost of these, forming the watershed between the Swat and the Indus 159Rivers, runs first due south and then west to the Malakand. The central forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Swat. The westernmost range is a continuation of the Hindu Raj, runs south-westerly, and forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Rud Rivers on the one side and the Kunar on the other. The most important pass which crosses it is the Lowari or Laorai (10,250 feet), open for convoys from April to November; it carries the main road from India to Chitral.
Description of Dir
The four sections of the Malizai sub-division of the Khwazozai-Akozais resident in Dir are:
1.
Painda Khel.
2.
Sultan Khel.
3.
Nusrudin Khel.
4.
Ausa Khel.
On the Panjkora River, commencing from the north, in the Kashkar Valley, in which the village of Dir is situated, is the Akhund Khel sub-section of the Painda Khel Malizais, to which the Khan of Dir belongs. Below these again, on the left bank of the river, are more of the Painda Khel, and on the right bank the Sultan Khel; and, still further down, the Sultan Khel, Nusrudin Khel and Ausa Khel on both banks of the river.
The route to Chitral from the Swat Valley leads through this country. Leaving the Swat River at Chakdara, the road turns abruptly to the west and enters the Uch Valley, passing by the Katgola Pass (3000 feet) into the Talash Valley, where, as Bellew tells us and as later travellers have confirmed, there are extensive ruins of massive fortifications on the south side of the valley and nine or ten miles from 160the Panjkora, covering the hills for a distance of several miles. From here the ascent is very steep to the summit of the Kamrani Pass, to the north-east of which, in a valley, lies Mundah, the stronghold of Mian Gul Jan, the quarrelsome younger brother of the Khan of Dir. The descent from the kotal to Sado or Khungai is very steep. Turning to the right from Sado, the road passes up the Panjkora Valley, the river being crossed on the fourth march from Sado at Chutiatun, whence, a few miles further along the right bank of the Dir stream, Dir itself is reached. “Here,” writes Enriquez, “situated on a low hill is the stronghold of the Khan. The fort has three towers, each surmounted with a loop-holed fighting top.... The vale of Dir is well cultivated and numbers of chenars are scattered about it, so that its greenness is refreshing after the wearying aridity of the Panjkora. The little town of Dir occupies a steep khud abreast of the fort. Its crazy huts are built one above the other, so that the roof of one forms the promenade or front garden of the one above.” Then on up the Dir Valley, via Mirga, to the Lowari Pass and Chitral. An alternative route, branching off from Sado, runs westward for some way and then, turning northward again, ascends the bed of the Jandol River to the Janbatai Pass (7212 feet); after crossing this the road leads along the Baraul Valley to Chutiatun and Dir, where it joins the first mentioned road.
The people of Dir and Bajaur are all Sunni Muhammadans, intensely bigoted, but superstitious rather 161than religious. Their country is very much priest-ridden, and the people are unusually susceptible to the influence of the mullahs, who are able to excite them to fanaticism more easily and to a greater degree than among other Pathans. The fighting men in Dir and Bajaur number probably not less than 80,000; they, and more particularly the men of Dir, have a very strong sense of discipline; and in the event of a general fanatical rising the combination of tribes which could be formed would be by no means one to be despised, since they would probably receive material assistance, if not indeed open and active help, from Swat, from the Utman Khels, and very possibly from the men of Buner.
OPERATIONS.
 
Umra Khan of Jandol
It will be convenient here to give some account of Umra Khan of Jandol, whose usurpations were responsible for the formation of the Chitral Relief Expedition, the operations of which, in the countries of Dir and Bajaur, are about to be described.
Umra Khan was a younger son of the Khan of Jandol, and a grandson of the Chief of Bajaur who took up arms against us during the Ambela campaign. He quarrelled with his father and was expelled from the country; but returning in 1878 he killed his elder brother, and later, as the result of a year’s successful fighting, he made himself master of Jandol, and eventually brought under his control a tract of country extending from the Dir-Chitral border in the north to the Swat River in the south, and including 162the whole of Dir, the greater part of Bajaur and a portion of Swat. In 1891 and 1892 the Kabul Government undertook certain operations, which were not particularly successful, to check Umra Khan’s aggressions, and up to the latter year he seems to have been friendly inclined towards the British. In 1892, however, when he was being somewhat pressed, both by the Afghans from without and by rebels within his kingdom, an appeal which he made to the Government of India for assistance in the form of arms and ammunition was refused; and in 1893, as a result of the Durand Mission to Kabul, the territory of Asmar, which he had coveted and seized, and whence he had been driven, was handed over to Afghanistan. All this gave great offence to Umra Khan, and it was shortly after these events that he mixed himself in Chitral affairs—described in their proper place—leading to the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force in 1895 and the resultant operations in Dir and Bajaur.
Detail of the Force
Chitral Relief Expedition, 1895.—It had been intended to mobilise the First Division as being nearest to the scene of operations; but some of the units of which it was composed were then on service in Waziristan, while the nature of the country to be operated in precluded the employment of others. The force was ultimately composed as hereunder detailed, was placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir R. Low, K.C.B., and its base was fixed at Nowshera.
163FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Kinloch, C.B.
 
1st Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment.
 
1st Battalion King’s Royal Rifles.
 
15th Sikhs.
 
37th Dogras.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Waterfield.
 
2nd Battalion K.O.S. Borderers.
 
1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.
 
4th Sikhs.
 
Guides Infantry.
THIRD BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O.
 
1st Battalion The Buffs.
 
2nd Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
 
25th Punjab Infantry.[70]
 
2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
 
11th Bengal Lancers.
 
Guides Cavalry.
 
13th Bengal Infantry.[71]
 
23rd Pioneers.
 
15th Field Battery R.A.
 
No. 8 M.B. Royal Artillery.
 
4 guns, No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery.
 
No. 1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 
No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 
No. 6 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
164RESERVE BRIGADE.
Major-General Channer, V.C., C.B.
 
No. 7 Bengal Mountain Battery.[72]
 
3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade.
 
26th Punjab Infantry.[73]
 
2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas.
 
2nd Battalion 3rd Gurkhas.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION TROOPS.
 
1st Battalion East Lancashire Regiment.
 
29th Punjab Infantry.[74]
 
30th Punjab Infantry.[75]
 
No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery.
MOVEABLE COLUMN (ABBOTTABAD).
 
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
 
2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas.
 
2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
Railway concentration commenced on the 26th March, and in seven days the force was concentrated at Hoti Mardan and Nowshera. A proclamation was published to the tribes through whose territory it would be necessary for the force to pass, announcing that the quarrel of the British Government was only with Umra Khan of Jandol, and stating that there was no intention of permanently occupying the tribal country, or of interfering with the independence of its inhabitants. In reply, the Sam Ranizais consented to our passage through their territory, while some of 165the headmen in Lower Swat tried to adopt an attitude of armed neutrality, and the Upper Swatis failed to combine against us. The Khan of Nawagai promised to do his best to keep Bajaur quiet, and the maliks among the Bunerwals, Utman Khels and Mohmands seemed anxious to keep their people out of the quarrel.
The Malakand Pass
On the 1st April the First Brigade moved to Lundkwar, the Second and Third to Jalala, the General intending to advance into Swat by the Shakot and Malakand Passes. During this day, however, the report of the friendly or neutral intentions of the border tribes was seriously discounted by the receipt of information that large bodies of tribesmen were holding not only these two passes, but also the Morah, which, by reason of its propinquity to Buner, there had been no intention of using. It appearing that of the three the Malakand was the least strongly occupied, Sir Robert Low decided to force the Malakand, making a feint with his cavalry towards the Shakot. He therefore concentrated all three brigades at Dargai, at the southern foot of the Malakand, early on the morning of the 2nd April.
Leaving Dargai, the track took for some way a north-easterly direction up the gradually narrowing valley; it then turned north-west and, leaving the bed of the valley, zigzagged up to the crest, whence two paths led into the Swat Valley. The kotal itself is some 2850 feet above sea-level, but on the left of the position precipitous hills rise to a height of over 400 feet, while on the right the crest of the range slopes steeply up to three tall peaks. The whole of 166the ridge, with the heights on either flank, formed a position not less than two miles long and was held in strength.
The Second Brigade was sent forward early on the 3rd to force the pass, it being the intention of the general commanding that the position once taken, the First Brigade, which alone was entirely supplied with mule transport, should then be pushed on to the Swat River. Of the Second Brigade, the 4th Sikhs and Guides Infantry ascended parallel spurs on the west of the valley, intending to turn the position from this flank; while the remaining battalions, covered by the fire of three mountain batteries, advanced directly upon the Pass. The infantry on the flank were, however, very stubbornly opposed, while the actual ascent was most difficult, and the general commanding the Second Brigade, seeing that the advance would be greatly delayed, sent forward his remaining battalions to the frontal attack, which the First Brigade was now called upon to support. The infantry, during their advance, captured sangar after sangar, and moving forward very steadily, the position was finally carried, after some five hours’ fighting, at the point of the bayonet, the 4th Sikhs and Guides running in on the enemy’s right at the same time. Two regiments of the First Brigade pressed the pursuit of the retreating enemy as far as Khar, where they bivouacked; the 4th Sikhs occupied the vicinity of the crest; and the remainder of the Second Brigade withdrew to Dargai.
It was estimated that we had been opposed by about 12,000 men, of whom probably a third possessed 167firearms; their losses, mainly by reason of their holding the position to the last, were heavy; our casualties were 11 killed and 51 wounded.
During the advance, our troops fortunately came upon the remains of an old disused Buddhist road, well built and skilfully aligned, and which two days’ work rendered fit for camel transport, thus greatly facilitating the passage of supplies.
Advance into Swat
Early on the afternoon of the 4th, the First Brigade advanced into the Swat Valley, the Second Brigade taking its place on the Malakand, and the Third remaining at Dargai. The leading brigade was opposed, and even attacked, with great boldness, by large numbers of tribesmen falling back from the Shakot and Morah Passes, but these lost severely from the fire of our infantry and the sabres of the Guides Cavalry, who made a fine charge over bad ground.
The First Brigade halted at Khar, where that of General Waterfield joined it, and whence reconnaissances moved up the Swat Valley. Opportunity was further taken of the halt to open communications with the headmen of many of the neighbouring villages, and also with the former Khan of Dir, whom Umra Khan had dispossessed of his country; and by these measures our troops were assured an unopposed passage through the Baraul and Dir Valleys, and of the neutrality of some of the more powerful of the clans of Upper Swat and Bajaur.
On the 6th, it being reported that a large body of Umra Khan’s personal followers, under command of his brother, had occupied Chakdara and the fort and 168village of Ramora, about two miles further up the Swat River, five squadrons of cavalry, supported by other arms from the Second Brigade, were ordered to cross the Swat River early next morning and reconnoitre towards Uch, opportunity being at the same time taken to destroy the fort at Ramora. These parties, and another sent out to search for a suitable site for a bridge over the Swat River, were opposed by some 4500 men who lost very severely, especially at the hands of the cavalry, who pursued as far as the Katgola Pass, about 7? miles distant. Chakdara was then occupied and a bridge constructed.
It was now determined that the First Brigade should remain in occupation of the Swat Valley, and it accordingly handed over all its mule transport to the two other brigades—the Second taking up the lead and crossing the Swat River, while the Third advanced to Khar; and on the same day, the 8th, the cavalry reconnoitred the Talash Valley as far as Shamshikhan, and the Adinzai Valley up to the foot of the Laram Pass, which was reported impracticable for transport. On the 9th the cavalry reconnoitred up to Sado on the Panjkora River, which can be approached by two roads, that to the west by the Shigu Kas being just passable, while that by the Kamrani Pass (3300 feet) was unfit for transport. Next day the advanced troops reached Sado, and the cavalry reconnoitred for some distance up the Rud River, being fired on near Kotkai by a small body of the enemy; the Second Brigade marched to Gumbat and p............