The problem of the origin and nature of ?sthetic feeling is a definite psychological problem to be solved only by introspection careful and prolonged. We must take simple cases and closely scrutinize them to discover the distinctive quality, we must seek the cognitive, feeling, will elements, we must note its kinship to other psychoses, we must endeavour to analyse and determine whether it be simple or complex. Analysis, indeed, as chemical analysis, e.g., is a reducing the manifold to a comparatively few elements, from which by composition an indefinite number of substances are formed. But in psychological study we must proceed without any bias from physical investigation. We cannot reduce mind to the mechanical development of a few simples as we survey the development of matter chemically. If mind be essentially self-activity, will effort, then conjunction of psychoses is due to a conjoining activity, and is not mere aggregation. So in case of fear we found a great complexity of conditions, yet fear in itself seems an unanalyzable emotion wave. In taking up ?sthetic psychosis we attempt an unbiassed introspective study.

The ?sthetic psychosis has been by many evolutionists connected with sexual appetite and emotion. The evidence for this is that among animals the brilliant-hued, and, as we term them, beautiful mates are chosen in pairing time. Also graceful movements and melodious 296tones are then employed. In mankind the ?sthetic feeling, as every one may recall in his own case, arose, and became prominent when near or in the teens. The rude boy and the hoyden girl then dress and adorn themselves, and a glamour of beauty is thrown about one who was once an entirely indifferent object. All the surroundings, artificial and natural, of the beloved object are looked upon and thought about in a new way of feeling, an air of attractiveness and beauty envelops all. The period of life of strongest sexuality, from twenty to forty, is also the period of strongest ?sthetic emotion. Further, sexuality is notedly strong among those who professionally cultivate the ?sthetic psychosis, as artists, musicians, and poets: indeed, many of the very greatest of these have been so carried away by the tender passion as to transgress the conventions and laws on sexual matters. In cases of precocious sexuality a feeling for the beautiful makes itself apparent; while with those who slowly mature, the ?sthetic feeling is similarly delayed. But does not the infant who holds out a rose to you and cries “pretty,” have a feeling for beauty? And it is surely unaffected by sexuality. What may be in the mind of a child speaking thus is hard to make out, but the activity is probably largely mimetic merely, and the term “pretty” is probably used substantively rather than qualitatively; it is the name of thing rather than quality. We certainly cannot assert of a child that because it uses certain words it attaches to those words the proper meanings. This is evident from the fact that a child taught to say “pretty” will bring you any and every object and use the word, or if it learns to take merely a class of objects, as rose, it does this at dictation. The child is, however, obviously attracted by some objects rather than others, but it would be hasty to say that it perceives their beauty, when it is quite sufficient to regard them as conspicuous only, and striking. But we have to touch on sensing later; and we 297only add to the evidence of connection of feeling for beauty with sexual feeling, that with the old and with eunuchs the ?sthetic sense is but slight or tends to vanish. Thus positively and negatively there seems to be evidence that feeling for beauty originates in connection with sexual passion, either that the object of the passion is always regarded as beautiful, or that a feeling for beauty excites the passion. A girl adorns herself to attract lovers, knowing that to admire beauty is the first step to love. This close connection is recognised in common consciousness in that “lovely” is synonymous with beautiful, thus a “lovely” landscape or picture is a beautiful one.

That there is a close association of sexual with ?sthetic psychosis is then obvious in the case of the human being, but yet it would be quite hasty to conclude that a sweet note or a pure colour may not be ?sthetically appreciated by children before they have the first stirring toward sexuality, but still it is very easy—as I have before noted in the case of the child who cries “pretty!”—to mistake the quality of their interest.

But when we come to interpret the psychoses of the lower animals in connection with sexuality we may still more easily slip into a doubtful automorphism. Thus to say with Darwin, “When we behold a male bird elaborately displaying ... before the female, ... it is impossible to doubt that she admires the beauty of her male partner” (Descent of Man, p. 92), or more strongly still with Grant Allen, “Every crow must think its own mate beautiful” (Mind, v. 448), we too easily take for granted that these birds would feel like ourselves in corresponding circumstances. We can find a more simple explanation. That crows often maltreat those who are off colour, e.g., white, plainly does not require us to suppose that they regard white as ugly, black as beautiful, any more than we should judge that students in some Society who wear a 298black badge would be ?sthetically moved when they look with disfavour upon students who may wear a white badge. Animals are clannish, and as a rule, suffer none but those who have the customary marks to associate with them, and especially to propagate. Hence when the peacock displays himself to his mate he simply shows to her that he has most conspicuously the proper marks, and she sees that he is the proper mate. These are signs of a tempting mate, just as here is tempting food, a very red ripe berry, but the coloration no more in the one case than the other awakens feeling for beauty. The hen bird probably appreciates a red feather as a red berry merely as being signs of the completely satisfying. Sexual selection, like nutriment selection, is a discrimination according to certain characters as prompted by appetite. The expanded and vari-coloured tail of a peacock is then a mere sexual characteristic which does not imply feeling for beauty in its appreciation as significant of sex. A small foot, long hair, and other sexual characters in woman, which are attractive to men, in like manner arouse emotion which is far from ?sthetic. We may take a perfectly unsexual ?sthetic pleasure in long raven tresses just as we do in an ebony table, but this is obviously rather late achievement.

In fact are not ?sthetic and sexual feelings mutually exclusive? So far as nude art is “suggestive,” so far is the feeling of its beauty lost, hence sculpture is not tinted. And so in the presence of the nude model the artist can have merely ?sthetic emotion, whereas his visitor is apt to have emotions of another sort. We do, indeed, say that the lover dwells upon his mistress’ “beauties,” but beauties here mean attractions, and to the devoted lover all parts are attractive, even moles and freckles which to the ?sthetic eye are ugly.

From the evidence in hand we judge then that it is certainly not necessary to call in the feeling of the beautiful 299as the motive in the origin and development of sexual characters in animals and plants. Just as there is a cry of fear or a tone of anger there is a vocal expression of sexual feeling and emotion which has its use and is recognised as such, but whose ?sthetic quality is no more a matter of immediate apprehension than in other utilities. At least the safest interpretation that we can now make for all the lower grades of sexuality is that sex characters are not primarily determined by the feeling for beauty, but are simply immediate signs of sex to awaken the sexual response and secure the best mate. How is it that sexuality is so prominent in expression among some species and so little among others?—compare peacocks and blue jays—is a question on which we have no light. We are also in ignorance how the particular sexual character was evolved and not some other, for example, why is not the peacock’s tail red? Grant Allen’s suggestion that food selection has influenced sex selection may be true, but it would require a very wide and thorough investigation. Do brilliant-hued birds prefer brilliant-hued foods? How is the coloration of the scarlet tanager related to the coloration of its food? However, if the colouring of foods and mates were the same, it would in some cases lead to disadvantageous confusion, and on general principles we should expect such distinct elements as nutrition and sex to develop on very different lines. The cue for colour may be learned first with reference to food, but it may be carried on as sexually significant on very distinct lines. Still to distinguish a food or a mate by colour is equally non-?sthetic in itself. At least we think it improbable that ?sthetic psychosis arises as incentive to or reflex of sexuality in any of the lower psychic stages.

A theory of the origin of ?sthetic psychosis which has been pressed by some, as by Herbert Spencer, is that it arises as reflex from spontaneous outflow of energy, or more particularly in connection with play impulse. A 300horse turned loose in pasture may gambol, running, sniffing, looking around, all which denoting a free outflow of energy through lines of least resistance, the customary channels of activity. But we cannot seriously think that in this sensing and muscular activity there is implied any real ?sthetic psychosis, and indeed it seems quite emotionless. The emotion of fear or similar feelings aroused the original activities, but this present galloping, etc., is automatic, and such immediate pleasure as may result from this free activity is scarcely of the ?sthetic order. The whole is of a distinctly lower order than the original activity and much below ?sthetic quality. If we recall our own state of mind in youthful “letting off steam” and in plays, we do not find ?sthetic pleasure. There is, however, a pleasure of relief and also positively a pleasure from such spontaneous outflow; but the outburst of pent-up energy automatically spent along lines of race action is a mere echo, dies out at once, and as degenerate form is not a starting point for origin of any new psychosis. Play as simulation of feeling and action is also removed from ?sthetic activity, as in a dog playing at fear and running, or at anger and chasing. He gets a more or less modified fear or anger, but there does not seem to be any tendency to ?sthetic psychosis. Mere imitation is more or less exact and skilful, but emotion therein and thereat is plainly not the glow of ?sthetic emotion, but is reflex of sense of power and intelligence as qualities. Mimicry as mere outlet of energy as with monkeys is plainly not aesthetic; here is merely an automatic outflow of force into suggested activity. When a savage as mimetic achievement carves the figure of man as handle to a knife, he accomplishes art, but not fine art. He has no more ?sthetic feeling than a boy or man whittling out a ship, it being merely an exact and skilful counterfeit of a real thing. Imitation for the sake of imitation or to deceive is a teleologic pleasure distinct from ?sthetic. Successful imitation is often said, indeed, to be 301“beautifully done,” but this means no more than well done. Even a well-baked cake is popularly spoken of as beautifully done.

We observe that superfluous energy rushes out along customary or habitual lines of activity, and so with perfect ease and economy. Activity which is easy and free is in itself pleasant, and this pleasantness in sensing and derived psychosis is ?sthetic feeling. Where sensing is mere escape valve of force, though facility is absolute, there is, as just pointed out, no ?sthetic quality, the whole tending to the merely mechanical. Owing to the fact that in nature curved lines predominate and so ocular adjustment is to them, my eye follows a curved line easier than a straight one, hence when spontaneous energy outflows in sensing activity of least resistance it will be toward curves. But spontaneous activity of this kind is, as we have explained, not ?sthetic. The law of economy in a vent is, greatest force, least effect, the contrary of the usual formula for economy which is, least force, greatest effect. Where energy is expensive the latter rule is to be applied. Thus in directed and effortful sensing activity economy means the ratio of efficiency, the ratio of the amount of painful effort to desired result. But this is merely a saving of pain and not a real pleasure psychosis. When I, in using a microscope see clearly with less and less effort the objects of my study, I may take pleasure in the economical and facile accomplishment, but this pleasure is one of satisfaction in power and skill, and so not at all ?sthetic. Again, a dyer has great skill and easy appreciation with respect to colour, but the ?sthetic side of colour is not thereby specially felt by him. Mere habitual and easy colour sensitiveness is not then thereby ?sthetic. We must, indeed, sense a colour before we can feel its beauty, but the feeling of beauty is not directly involved in any stage of the sensing evolution from the earliest and most painful effort with bare appreciation to the spontaneous 302and effortless sensing at the moment of great surplus of sensing energy.

Another way of accounting for ?sthetic psychosis is by association. Pleasant sights, for instance, are those with which we associate pleasure, and “pleasant” means to many, beautiful. But a traveller, thirsty in a desert land, declares that he saw no more pleasant sight than a mud hole, but this pleasure, as he himself would aver, was far from ?sthetic. Whatever we have associated pleasure with, we regard with pleasure, but only as we have associated ?sthetic pleasure with it do we regard it with ?sthetic pleasure. Thus mere association or revival no more gives us the derivation of ?sthetic than any other emotion. Any pleasure or pain may be associated with any sensation or perception, and thereby re-occur with these, but the mere revival obviously does not alter the nature of the psychosis or give any new psychosis. It is not what is recalled, but how we feel about it that constitutes ?sthetic emotion. So also when the beautiful is defined by H. R. Marshall as “the permanently pleasurable in revival,” we get no insight into the origin, nature, and development of the ?sthetic psychosis; this purely objective description gives no psychological analysis. But we may question the accuracy of the description. A thing of beauty is no............