In studying any state of consciousness we first inquire what constitutes its dominant factor; if this is sense of object, we call it a cognition; if effortful action, it is a volition; if the marked feature is pleasure-pain, we term it a feeling. Finding that the consciousness is a feeling, we would next inquire whether the pleasure-pain is mainly determined in its colouring by direct presentation, and so is a sensation, or whether this dominant colouring comes indirectly through representation, and is thus what we term an emotion. For example, the distinction between “I feel a pain in my shoulder,” and “I feel pained at your conduct” illustrates the most radical division of feeling. If emotion is founded on an appreciation of the experienceable, which has developed under natural selection, we must look upon the emotional power in general and upon the various emotions in particular as merely advantageous psychoses which are as clearly determined by general evolutionary laws as the merely physical organs like heart, lungs, wings, horns, etc. It is clearly desirable that the organism should look before, should anticipate experience and so direct its way; but bare anticipation has no value in itself unless it powerfully stimulates will through emotion. All conscious life above the most primitive is eminently and increasingly anticipatory, and so becomes more and more infused with emotional powers. Among the earliest developed of these 128in the struggle for existence are fear and anger. The fear group, embracing large numbers of allied forms, simple and complex, has been discussed in a general way in the preceding pages, and we now come to some consideration of the correlative anger group.

The rationale of the evolution of anger is not far to seek. We have seen that fear is the spring of defensive action, and it is obvious that anger is the stimulant to offensive action. Fear is regressive, anger aggressive. Fear is contractile, anger expansive. Fear is the emotion of the pursued, of the prey; anger the emotion of the pursuer, of the predacious. Emotion in the service of life evidently has two great psychic ramifications from this point, and the whole world of emotion-beings, which compose the greater mass of organisms, is hence divided in two great divisions, a fear class and an anger class. Likewise in relation to opposing natural forces as to neighbouring competing and destroying organisms, the same distinction is to be made according as the animal either combats or flees. Shyness or fierceness, timidity or irascibility, these are characters which divide the animate world into two grand antagonistic groups. Zoology has recognised this psychic differentiation as a marked and essential feature in its nomenclature, thus lepus timidus. In fact, the most important part of evolution is the psychical; in this, indeed, lies the whole significance and value of the organism. The attainment of more and more advantageous psychic qualities is the main trend of evolution, for psychic power as distinct from main force, like that of the elements, is far and away of the most value in the struggle for existence, and ultimately, as in man, it achieves the subduing all lower powers, natural, vegetable and brute, to its own ends. It is psychical quality, moreover, which determines physical, and not vice versa. Thus it is not the possession of claws, fangs, etc., that makes an animal fierce, but it is fierceness which 129develops and maintains these weapons of offence. Thus it is, though thus far practically overlooked by scientists, that psychic development, especially on the emotional side, is of the utmost importance as the prime factor and motive in organic processes. The central core of life is emotional capacity, and this in its evolution determines the whole external morphological trend of evolution of organisms which is so closely followed by the science of to-day. But the science of the future is comparative psychology, which, when once placed on a secure basis of interpretation, will determine the real and inner law of evolution as a psychic movement incarnating itself in a succession of animate forms. But a sure method of knowing a psychic fact as such when it occurs, and what, how, and why it is, is yet to be discovered and applied, and extra-human and even extra-ego consciousness is a field, so far, for little else than hypothesis. If this remark be turned against us, we say that our work is mainly a deductive interpretation of the course of psychic evolution from the general standpoint of natural selection, reinforced and illustrated by introspective investigation, and merely using the most obvious facts of comparative psychology in a very general and provisional way. We do not profess to show where, how, and when mind originated, or what particular powers any certain organisms possess, but we do endeavour to show how the principle of utility may be made a key to the study of a very perplexing region of mental life—the emotions. We proffer then merely a very general sketch of the history of emotion as a life factor, hoping that it may, at least in its general scope, be of service to future explorers. In taking up this subject of anger we do then thus reiterate the position we occupy and the method we follow.

Anger like fear certainly originated at some critical point in some individuals life as an advantageous variation of essential value. A vital issue at some early point 130in the history of life determined the genesis of this new psychic mode and function as a stimulant of aggressive will action. Very likely it was in competition of organisms for food that some favoured individual first attained the power of getting mad and violently attacking its fellows, and so obtaining sustenance. However this may be, certain it is that a direct attack is often more self-conservative than attempts at escape when injury threatens; it is a greater advantage to destroy pain-giver than to shun it. Fear enables organisms to avoid loss, but it does not accomplish positive gain, as anger does through overcoming hindrance. Anger is often also more economical for the forces of the organism, and thus, in general, predacious animals are longer-lived than even those of their prey who may attain a full length of life. Even in the face of great odds a direct attack is often more serviceable than attempt at escape. Anger is certainly the primitive motive force of all offensive action, though of course we cannot say that the animal got mad because it saw the serviceability. Psychic evolution, at least as far as new powers are concerned, never comes by teleologic foresight, and, indeed, cannot by the nature of the case. The animal did not definitely set out to get angry because it foresaw the value, yet in the earliest angers there must have been effort, a certain nisus which marked the new form as a real attainment, a marked achievement. That the provoking occasion gives rise now to anger inevitably and naturally, that anger comes upon us and overcomes us is true enough, but in its earliest phases anger must have been, like other just evolving factors, supported only by powerful will effort. The oftener the early psychism got mad, the easier it got mad. Facility came only by practice, and a large variety of occasions, besides the simple critical and original one, were gradually utilized by the anger faculty. But in its original form and occasion anger was, no doubt, akin to 131that we see when an extremely timid animal at the last extremity will turn in anger and fiercely fight for its life. Such an attempt, sometimes successful, marks an origin of a new mode of conscious emotion which may never return to the individual again during all its future life for lack of occasion. If often returning and often improved, a definite new habit of emotion is established, and from being a fearful animal it may at length become dominantly irascible, and so belong to a totally distinct psychic genus.

By the evolution of anger then, as in contradistinction to fear, two grand divisions of animate existence were set apart, two great psychical orders as fundamentally distinct and important for evolutionary psychics, as invertebrate and vertebrate for biology. The rise of the back-boned animal is not more important for physiological morphology than the evolution of anger for psychical morphology, and, indeed, as we have before remarked, the psychical growth is ever the broadest and deepest fact in evolution. By the acquirement and predominance of the anger stimulus certain animals became differentiated as a distinct class from their fearful neighbours, and they then by this new impulse gradually attained instruments of offence, and also by increase of size became physically distinct forms. Henceforth the animate world becomes divided in a more and more marked way into pursuers and pursued. By mutual interaction fear is increased on one side as anger increases on the other, and the division into timid and fierce, predacious and prey, becomes more and more established and marked.

We take it then that it was a most momentous day in the progress of mind when anger was first achieved, and some individual actually got mad. If the exact date and the particular individual were ascertainable a memorial day set apart for all time would not be too great an honour. In the struggle of existence, other things being equal, the 132most irascible is the most successful, faring the best, securing the best mate, and having the best and most numerous progeny. Susceptibility to anger becomes a necessity to a large class of organisms, and those who will not get angry and fight for their interests are surely trampled on or pushed aside to become starveling or outcast.

Is now this primitive anger an absolutely new power, a de novo evolution, or is it possible to study its rise as a gradual differentiation from some other factor? Must we not view psychical evolution like all evolution as coming under the law of continuity? How then explain the sudden rise of apparently new and distinct forms like anger or fear? Anger as a response to the demands of life seems from the very first to be as distinctly and peculiarly anger as at any time in its development. The peculiar quality which makes anger anger, does not seem to appear as a gradual differentiation from other elements as slowly emerging from previous modes, but we can only judge that it bursts suddenly upon the field as a new and unique creation, which does not find its explanation in pre-existent forms and cannot be traced as a gradual evolution from them. On the other hand, while it does not at first sight seem possible to regard anger as being from the first other than a radically new power and activity determined, indeed, by the struggle for existence, but wholly unexplained in its essence and formation as a consciousness related to and differentiated from other consciousnesses, yet we must acknowledge our profound ignorance of the real morphology of mind and what is the real nature of mental differentiation. Here the problem is altogether more difficult than in biology, where the appearance of new forms like wings can be readily traced as slow modifications of previous members, the physical possibility and rationale of which is easily seen to be inherent in the physical constitution of the body and its circumambient matter, the air. However, in the present state of our 133psychical knowledge it is quite impossible to attain any similarly clear conception as to the formation of new psychical forms. We may see why they should be called into being by the necessities of animate life, we can perceive their functional importance from the first, but to trace their morphological development as gradually assuming their peculiar qualities as modifications of already existing activities, and as inherently possible in the psychical constitution of things, this is clearly beyond us at present. We can conceive that the earliest anger was weak and rather ineffective as compared with the fully developed anger of later life, but we cannot see that it was any the less anger, any the less purely and wholly sui generis than the very latest and strongest form. Has it ever in its earlier stages that hybrid and mixed character which marks it as a modification of existent factors? It is certainly not a modified fear, to which it is, indeed, a polar opposite.

But we may perhaps regard anger, and fear as well, as modified from previous general emotion. We may, indeed, consider it likely that some general emotional phase preceded the special emotions, just as a general indefinite pain and pleasure preceded definite pains and pleasures. It may be considered as probable that emotion first appeared as a purely undifferentiated disturbance sequent on sense of the experienceable pain, this general emotion being neither fear nor anger, but the basis from which both develop. The psychic agitation we term emotional very likely began in a purely general form, yet it is hard to understand how peculiar forms develop therefrom. We are too far from such inchoate experience to readily come to any appreciation of its method or mode. We may be disturbed as to something imminent and know not whether to fear or be angry, but this in general means only a rapid alternation of fear and anger according as the mind runs back and forth between fear and anger-provoking 134elements. It is unlikely that we can trace in any such a purely undifferentiated emotion.

At the best we but throw the difficulty farther back, for emotion per se is then the de novo form to which the principle of continuity does not seem to apply. If anger is a traceable modification of some more general emotion as combined with definite representation and volition modes, yet how the peculiar anger quality is achieved is still unexplained. On the whole it seems simplest and truest to assume the first impulse of anger as a perfectly new and diverse wave of emotion suddenly generated in answer to some extreme urgency in the struggle of existence.

The analogy of organic and psychic evolution may be pressed to a certain extent. It is plainly possible to set in order an evolutionary series of light—sensing organs, eyes—from most elementary to most complex, and it is quite as possible, though yet to be done, to set forth in similar genetic order a series of psychic states as offence-sense, i.e., angers, in their increasing differentiation. But previous to any eye, to local visualization, there is a period of common sensation when an absolutely simple organism is in every part equally responsive to light; in a crude way the whole organism reacts to light, from which stage by traceable specialization the eye as a light-sensing organ is gradually developed. Here analogy would seem to fail, unless we consider it to be the stage when any psychosis, e.g., anger, requires the whole consciousness capacity, mind being merely a capacity for the recurrent but isolated single-activities. Mind certainly but slowly grows into that sum of organic coincident interdependent yet distinct consciousnesses which we commonly think of under the term, mind. Anger in its very earliest and lowest form is no doubt an absorbing na?ve isolated wave, as common to mind as a whole, that is, as making up the whole of mind for the time being, is perhaps 135in its measure an analogy to common sensation. Anger may then be but a common emotion, answering in a certain aspect to light-sense, sound-sense, etc., as purely common sensations. But we must remark that general sensation is not to be confounded with common sensation, or general emotion with common emotion. Common sensations are, indeed, usually very general in form, and a sensation per se, a purely general sensation, is probably very rarely anything else, yet when we close the eyes and direct them toward the sun, the general sensation of light we receive—very like the original primitive common sensation—is general, yet by a special organ. The word common refers, not to the special nature of the function itself, but the fact that the function, whether special or general, is performed indifferently, or practically so, by the common whole. A sensation of coloured light is more special than a mere sensation of light, and this than mere general sensation of force, but all may be accomplished either by common sensation or special sensation. General emotion may similarly be either common or in organic co-activity. There was certainly a time when consciousness existed which was not and could not be anger or fear or even an emotion per se. Pre-emotional and pre-representative consciousness was so absolutely primitive, general, and common, that psychology as a necessarily automorphic science will be very long in coming to any understanding of this field, but yet we must set it off as something which must always receive some consideration. Anger is not a property of all consciousness by the nature of consciousness itself, but is merely a possible mode dependent on circumstances for its development at a certain psychic stage.

What now is the inner nature and what the constituent elements of the anger state? Comparatively few reflect upon their emotions save from an ethical standpoint, and very few indeed attempt any analysis of them. To determine 136the process and exact psychical constituents of getting mad and being mad, may seem to many a quite useless and foolish introspective endeavour. If a person is angry, he is angry, and that is all there is of it, will be the general verdict of common sense. You can dissect flowers into their parts, you can analyse rocks and soils, but any emotion such as anger is wholly unanalyzable. No one can know what it is to be mad until he has once been mad, and, thereafter, he can only reflect upon it as a peculiar excitement, a powerful agitation, whose occasions and results may be fully traced, but which in itself is sui generis and irresolvable. The form of consciousness we know as being angry, is really a simple wave of emotion which stands by itself as an elementary and ultimate form.

Suppose we acknowledge these remarks as true, we may yet maintain that anger, like all emotions, is a highly complex state of manifold factors whose sum total, whose grand resultant, is a seemingly simple and peculiar status. Why should one arrangement of atoms produce a peculiar perfume, another a peculiar stench? Anger may likewise be merely an unexplainable ensemble of early ascertainable elements.

Certain it is, in the first place, that sense of object is necessary to anger. One cannot be mad without being mad at something. The attitude of mind is objective, and even rage in its blindest moment preserves this attitude. Blind with rage, means no more than that various definite qualities of the object are lost in the intense emotional reaction at pain-giver. At its height, anger preserves, indeed, only the barest apprehension of object; but this is intense and overpowering in connection with the sense of it as infringing and injuring. In the transports of rage and fury, the movements are wild and reckless enough, but always antagonistic, implying outward destructive activity. Anger is the fixation of the mind upon some object in its quality of personal hurtfulness, and 137is revulsion, not from it, as fear, but against it. With early psychisms, all perceptions of objects end in either anger or fear, and a large part of early education consists in learning what objects to be fearful of, and what to be angry at. The alertness of wild animals is determined mainly by either nascent fear or anger. When a dog is suddenly wakened from sleep he generally shows either fear or anger. This is merely an illustration of how the dimmest sense of object immediately connects itself with emotion as primitive and fundamental tendency. The organism perceives the object, and representing its imminent hurtfulness, feels fear and dashes away from it, or feels anger and dashes against it. These are the two simplest possible reactions with sense of the experienceable injurious. In fear there is elimination of oneself from the injury, and in anger the elimination of the injury from oneself. With later anger and fear these processes of elimination themselves become matters of representation, and make a large part in highly-developed forms.

A knowledge which very generally enters into anger is the comparative estimate of power. A cat scratches us, we are angry; a lion threatens us, we are afraid. The progress of the lower psychic life is largely in learning what is best to fear and what should excite anger. That which at first angers will often, when better understood, produce fear, and vice versa. Wild animals at first often show merely anger when molested by man, but soon manifest fear as they learn to appreciate his superior power. The African elephant learns to distinguish between the savage with his spear, and the white hunter with his rifle, and is merely irritated or angry with the one, while he manifests genuine fear of the other. The young of animals and of man continually show irrelevant fear and anger. They are generally either over fearful or over irritable. Our own feelings are powerfully modified by varying estimates of opposing force and injury. If, in passing through a dark 138street, I am tripped by what I take to be a child’s snare, I am angered, but upon noticing that it is a fuse to a dynamite bomb, I am thrown into intense fear. In general, any sensation, as of sound or light, in its lower grades of intensity produces anger, in higher occasions fear. As a rule when reactions induced by either fear or anger are uniformly unsuccessful, natural selection favours the development of the other.

While the comparative estimate of opposing force with one’s own is general ingredient in anger, anger being fear-limited, it is not, as Mercier would indicate (Mind, ix., p. 346), a constant element in anger. We often see cases of anger, and have perhaps, ourselves, experienced anger which is totally unrelated to a sense of power. Some animals seem at times utterly fearless and utterly unaware of the tremendous crushing force they angrily oppose. It is, moreover, altogether probable that anger and fear originated and received a certain measure of development before any capacity of measuring comparative force of antagonist arose in mind. However, the discrimination between overwhelming and slight force is certainly tolerably early, and is obviously a very necessary factor in self-conservative action. Yet it is very unlikely that this was an element in primitive fear or anger, which must have been no more than a simple emotional reaction to perceived injury without any reference to whether pain-giver is more or less strong than pain-receiver. The earliest fears and angers of infants seem to be quite devoid of any guidance from sense of powerlessness or power, but merely direct, unthinking reactions.

A marked and constant element in anger is hostility. This is the aggressive fighting attitude of will which is exercised toward and against the perceived pain-giving object. Anger can never subsist without this volition element, and it always appears as direct simple reaction to anger-provoking object. Anger always exhibits itself as 139hostility, openly and freely in lower life, and in higher life, which is often disingenuous, the hostility as real psychic act remains, though somewhat concealed in physical manifestation as long as angry mood exists. The will tendency is always toward the violent removing and destroying of the offending object. However, na?ve primitive anger does not include in its hostility giving pain for pain received, making the object suffer in turn, which is, indeed, far removed from the capacity of primitive mind to conceive. Anger in its earliest form does, of course, inflict pain where its object is pain-susceptible; but this, it may confidently be said, cannot lie in the intent of the pain-inflicter. The simple original ebullitions of anger do not include intent in any form. Volition is powerfully and directly incited by the emotion without the intervention of any idea. The only representation in the simplest anger is the representation of pain experience impending which occasions the excitement, which then directly and violently starts will-activity; but the representations of destructiveness and pain-infliction as ends become guiding ideas only in the slow evolution of anger toward more intelligent forms.

Pain is certainly a prominent element in anger. This pain is the emotional pain, the pain at pain, whose nature and origin we have commented on in the chapter on fear. The mere representation of pain to be starts a violent pain quite distinct from the fear-pain, yet like it, pre-eminently central and subjective. Precedent, however, to both fear and anger-pain, is the simple pain which immediately arises on representation of pain, the prospect of pain being immediately and peculiarly painful in itself. This commonly continues throughout, and gives a dominant pain tone. But there immediately succeeds a rush of either fear or anger emotion, each intensely painful in opposite ways. The pain which results from the anger, which is by the anger occasioned in me, is again distinct from the pain 140in and of the anger. Anger is itself a state of pain. In its earliest forms, as rarely and with difficulty attained, there is still another pain connected with anger, the pain of exertion and stress. But all the pain factors, as more or less continuous, make anger, as emotion in general, a complex pain state. Thus, when angered by a man shaking his fist in my face, we trace first a purely subjective pain at prospect of pain, then a rush of aggressive emotion which embodies in it a pain of its own, then a pain which reacts from the peculiar tension of the anger state. Of course, in our stage of evolution, anger has become such an inwrought factor that it arises spontaneously, it overtakes and overcomes us, not we reaching it; and so the stress or labour pain is absent. It is never or very rarely an effort for us to get angry, but it must have been for our very remote psychical ancestors.

While it may be said with truth that some people are never so happy as when mad, yet we must remember this does not alter the fact that anger is radically a pain state. There may be a pleasure from anger excitement, and from successful anger; there may be a pleasure in the mere exercise of aggressive power; but the happiness meant is mostly the excitement pleasure plus the delight which always comes from freely following out one’s nature. Especially when the outflow of natural force in an irascible man has been pent up and restrained for some time, a fit of anger is altogether a delightful experience, the pleasure of relief in a habitual function. Thus an occasional fight is necessary to the pugnacious amongst both animals and men; it is an inbred function and tendency which must work itself out, or render the being as miserable as a rodent kept from gnawing. But all this does not interfere with the analysis of anger as fundamentally painful. Happiness is a very late evolution, and, as the reaction from freely working out one’s strongest tendency, it is unfelt by early minds, which only gradually attain 141inwrought tendencies and so the capacity for being happy or unhappy. To witness a fight is likewise to a large class of minds a supreme felicity. This is largely the pleasure which comes at second hand from representation of participancy. And so, to have a fight described, or to read about it even, is a source of considerable representative pleasure to many, a spurious and reflected anger, and an ideal fighting in the fray. However, all this leads far away from primitive emotion, which is now our main concern.

We may grant then that sense of the object giving pain, sense of comparative power, hostility, and pains of various kinds, are usual elements in anger; yet it is evident that anger is explained by no one or all of them. It is not a mere aggregation and mixture of states, it is essentially a compound which has in some unexplained way a peculiar quality which is not in any of its constituent elements. When I am angry, there occurs a phenomenon which, while based on and inclusive of these factors, is yet peculiar in itself. The flush of anger, the wave of emotion, the tempest of passion, bases itself on and includes cognition, hostility, and pain; but it is more—it is a deep psychic disturbance of a peculiar and undefinable kind which we recognise when we have it, but which we cannot analyse. We express the nature of anger metaphorically, indeed, when we speak of an angry man being “hot,” “boiling with rage,” etc., as opposed to being chilled and frozen stiff by fear. The being angry is obviously a kind of being pained at pain quite opposite to that of fear. It is also true that I may see threatening injury, I may be pained, I may combat, but not be angry. There are other and higher motives which may bring about the violent will offensive activity so often required in the struggle of life; but we may take it that anger is the most primitive, and throughout the whole range of psychism the most common offensive motive, and so of the utmost importance as a life factor.

142Which shall we regard as the more primitive, anger or fear? Were animals at first universally timid, and subsequently acquired anger as an advantageous variation, or was anger the first, and fear the complementary and later evolution, or may we suppose that they developed in strict correlation? The earliest manifestations of emotion with some animals, and with some human infants, seem to be anger. Everything perceived to be painful irritates and makes them mad, and they are quite fearless in the presence of overwhelming danger. These but slowly learn to fear; by hard experience they learn the hurtfulness and inutility of combatting in many cases, and occasions which would once make them mad now cause them to fear. On the other hand, we observe many of the very young who seem to be universally fearful, and but slowly acquire “spunk” and spirit. Mental embryology thus, at least with our present very imperfect knowledge, is quite indecisive on the question. If fear and anger were wholly determined by relation of predacious and prey, then we might suppose correlated simultaneous origin; but we know that obstacles and injuries, not from competitors, but from elements, forces, and objects of nature, were the first environment and the first field for struggle. Organism began as a weak thing planted amongst manifold opposing forces, where fear was quite the most salutary emotion and anger useless. If, as we must deem probable, mental function in general and emotion in particular reaches back toward primitive organism, it is likely, on merely general grounds, that fear is the more ancient and original emotion, though anger was closely subsequent. The general conditions of life at the first would demand the development of fear more imperatively than anger. Certainly, however, both emotions are sufficiently primitive, as is shown by their being so ingrained and dominant forces in the whole range of lower psychic life.

All higher animals, moreover, are peculiarly sensitive to 143and observant of signs of anger and fear. Rarey, a most excellent judge, made it an axiom of his method that horses are extremely acute in detecting either fear or anger in those who deal with them, and this is also noticeably true of animals in general. These are also the emotional attitudes which are earliest interpreted by children. Now what is soonest, easiest and surest interpreted by psychisms above the lowest may be taken to be fundamentally primitive and such are fear and anger. To discover with readiness and certainty the emotional states of organisms about them, because these states are the motives of very important activities, is clearly an advantage early gained in the struggle of existence. It means preparedness, and there is a nascent anger to break forth against the fearful, or fear or counter-anger prepared against the fear discerned or suspected. The inter-related activity of these two emotions is the chiefest and most interesting spectacle we see in all lower psychic phases.

But we must notice now a form which seems on the whole to belong to the anger group, and that is hate. Hate often precedes and succeeds anger, and the object of anger is peculiarly apt to be the object of hate. The man whom we hate very easily angers us, and he who provokes us is one whom we are apt to hate. Yet a person may be very provoking, even exasperating, and not be hateful, and vice versa for hate. It is obvious then that while the object of anger and hate is apt to be the same, yet it is viewed from very different standpoints, and the emotion reactions are somehow very different. “I hate him,” and “I am angry at him,”—these expressions denote very distinct emotions. While anger and hate are both aggressive emotion reactions against the pain-giver, yet in their nature they are essentially diverse. In general we hate him who deliberately and constantly provokes us, who establishes himself as a deliberate enemy. It is harmful, 144opposed intent that particularly stimulates hate. But anger is most generally a sudden flash of feeling leading to violent repulsive effort against pain-giver, but without any insight into intent. The immediacy of reaction is accomplished through anger; but hate, having more of insight and foresight, is more slowly generated, and is not so directly and promptly active. I may be angry at one who casually pinches me in sport, but I will hate him who continually pinches me in spite. I may be angry at the child who in its childish play often interrupts my studies, but I do not hate it; this I reserve for the malicious boys who continually put tick-tacks on my windows. And so also inanimate things often arouse anger; but we hate only the animate, and then mainly when we discern deliberate, purposed offence. To be sure we often hear some such expression as, “I hate the very sight of that house”; but here the term hate denotes loathing, and is only a little less flagrant misuse than when I say “I hate ham, but love beefsteak.”

Hate, then, marks in a very noticeable way the growth of psychic responsiveness. A prevision of psychic attitude of others, especially the emotional and volitional, is of the utmost service as ............