VON JAGOW, ZIMMERMAN, AND GERMAN-AMERICANS
Our train drew into the Berlin station on the morning of February 3rd, 1916. The date is worth mentioning, for that marked an important crisis in German-American relations. Almost the first man I met was my old friend and colleague, Ambassador James W. Gerard. Mr. Gerard told me that he was packing up, and expected to leave Berlin at any moment, for he believed that a break between Germany and the United States was a matter only of days, perhaps of hours. At that time Germany and the United States were discussing the settlement of the Lusitania outrage. The negotiations had reached a point where the Imperial Government had expressed a willingness to express her regrets, pay an indemnity, and promise not to do it again. But the President and Mr. Lansing insisted that Germany should declare that the sinking of the Lusitania had been an illegal act. This meant that Germany at no time in the future could resume submarine warfare without stultifying herself and doing something which her own Government had denounced as contrary to international law. But our Government would accept nothing less, and the two nations were therefore at loggerheads.
“I can do nothing more,” said Mr. Gerard. “I want to have you talk to Zimmerman and von Jagow, and perhaps you can give them a new point of view.”
I soon discovered from my many callers that the atmosphere in Berlin was tense and exceedingly anti-American. Our country was regarded everywhere as practically an ally of the Entente, and I found that the most absurd ideas prevailed concerning the closeness of our relations with England. Thus it was generally believed that Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador in Washington, met regularly with President Wilson’s Cabinet and was consulted on all our national policies.
At three o’clock Mr. Gerard took me to the Foreign Office and we spent an hour there with von Jagow. Von Jagow was a small, slight man of nervous disposition. He lighted cigarette after cigarette during our interview. He was apparently greatly worried over the American situation. Let us not suppose that{262} the German Government regarded lightly a break with the United States. At that time their newspapers were ridiculing and insulting us and making fun of the idea that Uncle Sam would go to war. The contrast between these journalistic vapourings and the anxiety, even the fear, which this high German official displayed much impressed me. The prospect of having our men and our resources thrown on the side of the Entente he did not regard indifferently, whatever the Berlin Press might say.
“It seems to us a shame that Mr. Lansing should insist that we declare the Lusitania sinking illegal,” von Jagow began. “He is acting like a technical lawyer.”
“If you want the real truth,” I replied, “I do not think that the United States is particular or technical about the precise terms that you use. But you must give definite assurances that you are sorry for the act, say that you regard it as an improper one, and that it will not occur again. Unless you do this, the United States will not be satisfied.”
“We cannot do that,” he answered. “Public opinion in Germany would not permit it. If we should make a declaration such as you outline the present Cabinet would fall.”
“But I thought that you had public opinion here well under control,” I answered. “It may take a little time, but certainly you can change public sentiment so that it would approve such a settlement.”
“As far as the newspapers are concerned,” said von Jagow, “that is true. We can absolutely control them. However, that will take some time. The newspapers cannot reverse themselves immediately; they will have to do it gradually, taking two or three weeks. We can manage them. But there are members of Parliament whom we can’t control, and they would make so much trouble that we would all have to resign.”
“Yet it seems to me,” I rejoined, “that you could get these members together, explain to them the necessity of keeping the United States out of the war, and that they would be convinced. The trouble is that you Germans don’t understand conditions in my country. You don’t think that the United States will fight. You don’t understand President Wilson; you think that he is an idealist and a peace man, and that under no circumstances will he take up arms. You are making the greatest and most costly mistake that any nation could make. The President has two sides to his nature. Do not forget that he has Scotch-Irish blood in him. Up to the present you have seen only the Scotch side of him. That makes him very cautious, makes him weigh every{263} move, makes him patient and long-suffering. But he has also all the fire and combativeness of the Irish. Let him once set his jaws and it takes a crowbar to open them again. If he once decides to fight, he will fight with all his soul, and to the bitter end. You can go just so far with your provocations but no farther. You are also greatly deceived because certain important members of Congress, perhaps even a member of the Cabinet, have been for peace. But there is one man who is going to settle this matter—that is the President. He will settle it as he thinks right and just, irrespective of what other people may say or do.”
Von Jagow said that I had given him a new impression of the President. But he still had one more reason to believe that the United States would not go to war.
“How about the German-Americans?” he asked.
“I can tell you all about them,” I answered, “because I am one of them myself. I was born in Germany and spent the first nine years of my life here. I have always loved many things German, such as its music and its literature. But my parents left this country because they were dissatisfied and unhappy here. The United States gave us a friendly reception and a home, and made us prosperous and happy. There are many millions just like us; there is no business opportunity and no social position that is not open to us. I do not believe that there is a more contented people in the world than the so-called German-Americans. We have one loyalty and one love, and that is for the United States. Take my children—they are German-Americans of the second generation. Their sympathies all through this war have been with England and her Allies. My son is here with me; he tells me that if the United States goes to war he will enlist immediately. Do you suppose in case we should go to war with Germany that they would side with you? The idea is simply laughable. And the overwhelming mass of German-Americans feel precisely the same way.”
“But I am told,” said von Jagow, “that there will be an insurrection of German-Americans if your country makes war on us.”
“Dismiss any such idea from your mind,” I replied. “The first one who attempts it will be punished so promptly and so drastically that such a movement will not go far. And I think that the loyal German-Americans themselves will be the first to administer such punishment.”
“We wish to avoid a rupture with the United States,” said von Jagow, “but we must have time to change public sentiment here. There are two parties here, holding diametrically{264} opposed views on submarine warfare. One believes in pushing it to the limit, irrespective of consequences to the United States or any other Power. The present Cabinet takes the contrary view; we wish to meet the contentions of your President, but the militaristic faction is pushing us hard. They will force us out of office if we declare the Lusitania sinking illegal or improper. I think that President Wilson should understand this. We are working with him, but we must go cautiously. I should suppose that Mr. Wilson, since he wishes to avoid a break, would prefer to have us in power. Why should he take a stand that will drive us out of office and put in here people who will make war inevitable between Germany and the United States?”
“Do you wish Washington to understand,” I asked, “that your tenure of office depends on your not making this declaration?”
“We certainly do,” replied von Jagow. “I wish that you would telegraph Washington to that effect. Tell the President that, if we are displaced now, we shall be succeeded by people who advocate unlimited submarine warfare.”
He expressed himself as amazed at my description of President Wilson and his willingness to fight. ............