GENERAL JESSUP OVERTHROWS HIS OWN EFFORTS IN FAVOR OF PEACE.
Mr. Van Buren’s advent to the office of President—Follows the policy of his predecessor—General Jessup’s stipulation in favor of the Exiles—Sustained by precedent, and by National Law—Not contrary to General Jackson’s object in commencing the War—Citizens of Florida protest—Compact ratified by War Department—General Jessup for a time endeavors to carry out Articles of Capitulation—Begins to yield—Promises to make arrangements with Chiefs to deliver up Slaves who had left their Masters during the War—Then declared he had done so—No such Compact found by the Author—Subsequent history shows that he had made such arrangement, by parol, with Co-Hadjo only—He also uses army to seize and return Exiles claimed by citizens of Florida—Revokes Order No. 79—Indians and Exiles take alarm—Flee to their fastnesses—General Jessup acknowledges all is lost—The War renewed.
On the fourth of March, Mr. Van Buren assumed the duties of President of the United States, and General Jackson retired to private life. Belonging to the same political party to which General Jackson had attached himself, Mr. Van Buren was not expected to make any particular change in the administration of the Government. Indeed so popular had General Jackson been, that it would have required great boldness in his successor to attempt any very obvious change in our national policy; and so far as the Florida war was concerned, there was none whatever.
It was therefore fortunate that, under the administration of General Jackson, the existence of the Exiles, as a distinct people, had been acknowledged. In the articles of capitulation, they were again recognized as the “allies” of the Indians. In entering into this stipulation, General Jessup went no farther than his legitimate powers extended. The peace of the country in that region was entrusted to his judgment, under the direction of the President. If necessary to secure peace, he had the undoubted right to send every slave, of whatever description, from the Territory of Florida; and it would appear, that no doubt whatever could arise as to his authority to transport to the Western Country, all who were engaged in actual hostilities against our nation, and that too without stopping to inquire whether one portion of the people were, or were not, claimed as property by the people of Florida. General Jackson had set a noble example on this subject which was well worthy of imitation. When New Orleans was threatened by the British, in 1814, he proclaimed martial law—ordered men into service without inquiring whether they were slaves or freemen. Many of them were slaves, and on the day of battle were emancipated by being captured or killed by the enemy. The same powers had been exercised by our officers almost constantly during the Revolution. It is a principle understood by all intelligent men, that when war exists, peace may be obtained by the emancipation of all the slaves held by individuals, if necessary.[93]
These articles of capitulation were duly transmitted to the War Department, and were regularly approved by the Executive. It would appear impossible that General Jessup, or any other person, could either misapprehend or fail to understand this stipulation, which was in no respect modified by other covenants.
But this solemn covenant was in direct conflict with the views and feelings of the slaveholders in Florida and the adjoining States. They understood the war to have been commenced for the purpose of re?nslaving the Exiles. These articles of capitulation constituted not only an abandonment of that policy, but actually operated as an emancipation of all the slaves who, having fled from service in Florida, Georgia and Alabama, had joined the Seminoles and taken up arms against their oppressors. The slaveholders were indignant at this stipulation, nor did they fail to express their indignation.
A few gentlemen of distinction, who, with their families, had been driven from the Territory, were residing at Charleston, South Carolina. Having learned the character of the capitulation from private sources, without waiting for its publication, they at once addressed the Secretary of War, stating they had casually learned from a gentleman who was present, that a treaty of peace had been concluded with the Seminole Indians which contained “no stipulation for indemnity, on the part of the Indians, for such property of the inhabitants as had been captured by said Indians, and destroyed. Nor (say they) is it, we are told, exacted from them that they should even make restitution of such stolen and other property, to wit, NEGROES, etc., as they now have in possession, or as has been invited into their country and allowed refuge from its owners. We respectfully conceive, that the termination of the war on such terms, anxiously as we desire peace, would be a sacrifice of the national dignity, and an absolute and clear triumph on the part of the Indians, who cannot fail to view the proposition made to them, to close hostilities, followed up by a treaty permitting to them such extraordinary terms, as a virtual suing for peace on the part of the United States, and evidencing a want of confidence in their ability to conclude the war through the means of their belligerent and physical strength.”[94]
But the most singular portion of this memorial is the reference to the treaty of Camp Moultrie, by which the Indians agreed to arrest and return fugitives; and the memorialists insisted that unless the Indians be compelled to perform this stipulation the owners “may never regain their slaves.”
The gentlemen who thus attempted to control the action of our National Government appear to have forgotten that the treaty of Camp Moultrie had been abrogated by that of Payne’s Landing, which our Government was now professing to enforce. By this latter treaty, the Indians agreed to pay seven thousand dollars as an indemnity for all slaves then in their territory. This was accepted as a full indemnity, and the slaves then resident with the Indians became free in law.
This memorial, though written at Charleston, South Carolina, bears date only twelve days later than the articles of capitulation, entered into at “Fort Dade in Florida.” Of this movement of the slaveholders, General Jessup appears not to have been informed at the time; nor is there any doubt that he then intended to carry out this solemn compact in good faith. On the nineteenth of March, we find his aid-de-camp Colonel Chambers, by order of General Jessup, writing Lieutenant Colonel Harney, stationed at Fort Mellon, directing him not to permit the friendly Indians (the Creeks) to pass into the country occupied by the Seminoles, and to distinctly inform the Creeks they “must make no more captures of property;” and if they had made any since the signing of the treaty, (meaning the capitulation,) Harney was directed to take a list of such captures.
But the first serious difficulty suggested to General Jessup, in carrying out his stipulations with the “allies,” appears to have been a letter from Major Thomas Child, commanding at Fort Armstrong, informing him that a “Colonel Dill,” a citizen of Florida, was at that post, wishing to pass into the Indian country for the purpose of reclaiming certain negroes which he professed to have owned, but who were then supposed to have fled to the Seminoles.
In reply to this note Colonel Chambers said: “I am instructed by the commanding General to say, that ‘Colonel Dill,’ the person whom you report having detained at Fort Armstrong, must not be permitted to pass, but be required to return from whence he came with all convenient dispatch. Hereafter, no person, not in the employment of the Government, or express rider, must be allowed to pass your post. The necessity of this order, and the strict enforcement of it, arise from the necessity, that, if persons come forward to urge their claims to negroes, it will evidently prevent the negroes from coming in; and if they do not come in, the commanding General is decidedly of opinion, that the Indians themselves will be greatly delayed, if not entirely prevented, from compliance with the terms of capitulation.”
The termination of the war had been regarded as certain by the commanding officer, and by him so reported. The first article in the capitulation, provided for the cessation of hostilities. But they were renewed soon after, and the Indians and Exiles charged with a breach of faith, both by General Jessup and by the Executive. And it becomes important to the truth of history, that facts should be stated. The articles of capitulation pledged the faith of the nation for the safety of both persons and property of the “Seminoles and their allies.” Those “allies” could have been no other people than the black men who were with them contending against a common foe. It is also evident that Abraham and the Exiles who came in for the purpose of emigrating so understood it. It is equally certain that the people of Florida who memorialized the Secretary of War so understood it; and we need only read the letters and orders of General Jessup to learn that he surely so understood it: and the whole conduct of the Indians shows that they put the same construction upon it. While, therefore, justice should be done to General Jessup, we should be careful to do no injustice to either the Seminoles or the Exiles. As further evidence of General Jessup’s good faith at the time, we quote an extract from a letter, bearing date six days later than the one last referred to. It was addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Miller, commanding at Tampa Bay, and is dated March twenty-seventh, 1837. It is signed by General Jessup himself, who says: “I have also been informed that Mr. Cooley’s business at Tampa Bay is to look after negroes. If that be so, he must be sent away; a trifling circumstance would light up the war again. Any interference with the negroes which would produce alarm on their part would inevitably deprive us of all the advantages we have gained. I sympathize with Mr. Cooley in his afflictions and losses; but responsible as I am for the peace of the country, I cannot and will not permit that peace to be jeopardized by his imprudence.”
But these demands for slaves increased. The slaveholders were indignant at the loss of slaves, and it soon became apparent that the stipulation of safety to the “allies” of the Seminoles was unpopular in Florida.
On the twenty-ninth of March, General Jessup wrote Colonel Warner, of the Florida Militia, saying, “There is no disposition on the part of the great body of the Indians to renew hostilities; and they will, I am sure, faithfully fulfill their engagements, if the inhabitants of Florida be prudent: but any attempt to seize their negroes, or other property, would be followed by an instant resort to arms. I have some hopes of inducing both Indians and Indian negroes to unite in bringing in the negroes taken from the citizens during the war.”
In this letter, General Jessup begins to modify his former position. He still entertains no fear of the Indians, if their negroes or other property be not interfered with, and suggests the hope that he may effect an arrangement with the Indians and Indian negroes to bring in (that is, to surrender up,) the negroes taken during the war. This letter gives the first evidence, which we find on record, of General Jessup’s intention to modify or disregard the solemn compact he had made, or to make another with the Indians and Indian negroes by which they should betray those who had fled to them during the war.
But that he did make some arrangement of that character with the chiefs, we are led to infer from a letter bearing date May fifth, 1837, addressed to General Jessup by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, informing him that his articles of capitulation with the Seminoles had been submitted to the Secretary of War, “together with his letters of the first and fifteenth of April, and had been approved;” and the writer then adds: “In relation to the negroes captured by the Seminoles and to be surrendered, I am directed to say, that your arrangement for having them delivered to officers of posts on the St. John’s River, is approved.”[95]
This letter also directs General Jessup to keep a registry of all negroes delivered to citizens, showing their names, age, sex, etc.
A general order, dated Tampa Bay, April fifth, and numbered seventy-nine, announces first, “The commanding General has reason to believe that the interference of unprincipled white men with the negro property of the Seminole Indians will prevent their emigration, and lead to a renewal of the war. Responsible as he is for the peace and security of the country, he will not permit such interference under any pretense whatsoever. And he therefore orders that no white man, not in the service of the United States, be allowed to enter any part of the territory, between the St. John’s and the Gulf of Mexico, south of Fort Drane.”
On the eighth of April, General Jessup wrote Colonel Harney, saying, “I have made an arrangement with the chiefs to-day to surrender the negroes of white men, particularly those taken during the war.”
With what particular chiefs this arrangement was made, or what were the terms of the arrangement, the Author has not learned; yet, as we shall see hereafter, he represented it to have been made at “Fort King” with Co-Hadjo, an unimportant chief, and then attempted to hold the Seminole Nation responsible for Co-Hadjo’s promise. But under these circumstances, the reader will ask what consideration was paid Co-Hadjo to bribe him to enter into such a contract? That chief and General Jessup and General Cass, Secretary of War, must have known he possessed no power to bind the Seminole Nation, nor to surrender those persons to slavery. It will long remain a subject of inquiry. Why did the War Department sanction this violation of the so............