I remembered that in the event of the flag-ship leaving the line, the torpedo-boats, Biedovy and Buistry, were to come to her in order to transfer the Admiral and his staff to another and uninjured ship. In such circumstances, in order to avoid confusion, until the flag had been transferred or until a signal had been made as to the handing over of the command, the fleet was to be led by the ship following the one which had fallen out of the line.
I do not presume to be able to say whether our other ships could see112 that no torpedo-boats had come up to the Suvoroff! Whether they could all see that no signal was possible from the battered, burning battleship, minus funnels and masts! Whether it ought in consequence to have been taken for granted that the command naturally devolved on the next ship according to seniority! and whether she should in some way or another have shown that she had taken over command! In any case the Alexander (more correctly, her captain, Bukvostoff) carried out the orders and did her duty. After the flag-ship had fallen out of the line, receiving no fresh instructions, she took the lead and continued the fight.
From the time when I saw the Alexander passing close to us on a113 south-easterly course, she steamed for twenty minutes, gradually inclining to the south in order to prevent the enemy from getting ahead and crossing her T. At the same time the Japanese, elated by their first success, again endeavoured to realise their main idea of a concentrated attack on the leading ship, and so wrapped up were they in this objective that they went ahead too fast, leaving nothing to prevent the Alexander passing astern in a north-easterly direction.
She immediately took advantage of this and turned sharp to the north, calculating with luck to fall in force upon their rear and subject them to a raking fire. The Japanese in their reports fix the time of this movement differently; some at 2.40 P.M., others at 2.50 P.M.114 (the moment of the sinking of the Oslyabya, which under the concentrated fire of six of Admiral Kamimura’s armoured cruisers had left the line even before the Suvoroff). According to my own calculations, the latter time was the more likely to be correct. If the enemy’s fleet had turned “in succession,” as it had done at the commencement of the battle, this man?uvre of the Alexander’s might have been successful, but, realising the gravity of the moment, Togo, on this occasion, gave the order to turn 16 points to port “together.” The man?uvre was not altogether successful. The 1st squadron (Mikasa, Shikishima, Fuji, Asahi, Kasuga, and Nisshin) performed it correctly, but Kamimura, with his cruisers—probably not having115 made out the signal and expecting the order to turn “in succession” on to the former course—quickly passed our fleet as well as his own battleships (which were on the opposite course), and masked their fire. He then had plenty of room to turn (he turned “in succession”) and, after overtaking the battleships, to form single column line ahead.
For a moment confusion prevailed, for which the Japanese might have paid dearly, but owing to its condition our fleet was unable to reap the advantage. Making full use of their speed, the Japanese not only succeeded in righting their distances, but attained their object, i.e. came out across the Alexander’s course, forcing her to the south.
116 Through the starboard portholes of our batteries we were now able plainly to see the Alexander, which was almost on our beam and steering straight towards us—the remainder following her. The distance rapidly diminished, and with our glasses we could clearly see her battered sides, broken bridges, burning cabins and spar-deck, but her funnels and masts were still standing. After her came the Borodino, burning furiously. The enemy had already succeeded in forging ahead, and we now lay between the fleets. Our ships approached from starboard, i.e. the port side of the Suvoroff, and we came under a hot fire. Our forward 12-inch turret (the only one that was now serviceable) took an active part in the fight, and no attention was117 paid to falling shells. I was wounded in the left leg, but only looked down with regret at my torn boot! We all waited, holding our breath, watching the Japanese fire, which was apparently concentrated on the Alexander. At times she seemed completely enveloped in flames and brown smoke, while round her the sea literally boiled, throwing up great pillars of water. Nearer and nearer she came, till the distance was scarcely 2,000 yards. Then—one after another, we saw a whole series of shells strike her fore-bridge and port 6-inch turret, and turning sharply to starboard she steamed away, having almost reversed her course, while after her went the Borodino, Orel, and others. The turn was hastily made, being neither “in succession” nor “all118 together,”24 and the line ahead formation was not maintained. A deafening clamour resounded in our batteries.
“They’ve given it up. They are going off. They couldn’t do it,” I heard on all sides.
These simple folk had, of course, imagined that our fleet was returning to the flag-ship in order to rescue her. Their disenchantment was distressing to witness, but still more was it distressing to realise the true significance of what had happened.
How pitiless is memory!—A scene never to be forgotten came clearly and distinctly before my eyes—just such another scene—the same awful picture. After Prince Utomsky’s signal on the 10th119 August our battleships had steamed north-west in the same disorder and just as hurriedly.
“They couldn’t do it!”
And the awful, fatal word, which I had not even dared to think, rang in my brain, and seemed to be written in letters of fire on the smoke, on the battered sides, and even on the pale, confused faces of the crew.
Bogdanoff was standing beside me. I caught his eye, and we understood one another. He commenced to talk of it, but suddenly stopping, looked round, and said in an unnaturally calm voice: “We seem to be heeling over to port.”
“Yes—some 8 degrees,” I answered, and, pulling out my watch and note-book, jotted down:120 “3.25 p.m.—a heavy list to port, and a bad fire in the upper battery.”
I often afterwards thought: why is it that we hide things from one another and from ourselves? Why did not Bogdanoff express his thoughts aloud? and why was it that I did not dare to write even in my own note-book the cheerless word “Defeat”? Perhaps within us there still existed some dim hope of a miracle, of some kind of surprise which would change everything? I do not know.
After the Alexander had turned, the enemy’s ships also turned 16 points “together,” and this time the man?uvre was successfully performed—so successfully, in fact, that it seemed as if they were merely at drill and not in action.
Steering on an opposite course, they121 passed under our bows, and from the Suvoroff it seemed as if we could almost cut into their column. We inclined to starboard after our fleet. (This was, of course, only imagination, for, not being able to steer by surrounding objects but only by compass in the lower fighting position, we were in reality not moving ahead, but were only turning to starboard and to port; remaining almost in the same place.) In passing close to us, the enemy did not miss his opportunity of concentrating his fire on the obstinate ship which refused to sink, and it was, apparently, now that our last turret, the forward 12-inch, was destroyed. According to Japanese reports their torpedo-boats came up at the same time as their fleet and attacked us unsuccessfully, but I did not see them.
122 A shell entered the gun port of the fourth (from the bows) 12-pounder gun of the lower battery on the port side, and it was a lucky shot, for in addition to carrying away the gun it penetrated the armoured deck. The water poured into the damaged port, and being unable to run back on account of the list to port, fell through this hole into the mess deck, which was most dangerous.
Bogdanoff was the first to call attention to it, and we at once started to make some kind of an obstacle out of coal sacks, and anything else that was handy, so as to cover the hole and stop the water getting in. I say “we,” because the few hands left in the battery could not be brought to obey orders. They huddled123 in corners in a sort of stupor, and we had almost to drag them out by force, and were obliged to work ourselves to set them an example. We were joined by Flag Torpedo Officer Lieutenant Leontieff and Demchinsky, but the latter could only encourage us with words, as both his wrists were bandaged.
At 3.40 p.m. a cheer broke out in the battery, which was taken up all over the vessel, but we were unable to ascertain what had caused it or whence it had originated............