“The most arduous, while at the same time the most important, duties that devolve upon soldiers in the field are those of outposts ... all concerned should feel that the safety of the army and the honour of the country depend upon their untiring vigilance and activity.”—Lord Wolseley.
The art of maintaining himself and his command in the outpost line is a question of vigilance, imagination, and forethought on the part of the commander, and cunning on the part of his men. Let us place ourselves in the position of an officer commanding a hundred to two hundred men, and detached some ten miles out to the flank and front of a force.
The commander must take it for granted that he may be attacked at any moment, and so he must run through in his mind what he intends to do. It is his business to look ahead and foresee dangers and misfortunes—and by his preparations to rob them of their bad effect.56 If he has left his bivouac a couple of hours before dawn and moved, carefully feeling his way, in the direction of the enemy, and123 has perhaps driven in one of their outposts, he need not feel it incumbent on him to hold the ground gained à outrance. He has seen into their outpost line, gained certain information, and come to certain conclusions; therefore when the enemy attack him, as they certainly will do, he should have made all preparations to fall back to the bit of good ground previously selected, where he can see and where his movements cannot be seen. Here he can make a good show, and ten to one they will let him stay there. But instead of staying there with 100 men all day, which would fatigue his men and horses without result, he places some Cossack posts and a small picket or two and retires all the rest of his men, without the enemy’s knowledge, to his bivouac, and is at breakfast by 9 or 10 A.M., his horses watered and fed. At 4 P.M. he canters out to his posts, spends the remaining daylight in observation of the enemy’s movements, relief of posts, etc., and withdraws his Cossack posts and picket at dark, leaving the picket fires well stoked up; one or two men only are left to feed these fires at intervals through the night. His real line of night outposts is placed on the possible lines of advance to his bivouac. But if his bivouac can be observed, or is likely to be reported upon to the enemy, he may change it after dark. His men should have been practised so constantly in alarm posts at night that they know exactly where to go, and what to do in case of a night alarm, and how to do so in absolute silence. Only the C.O. may make a few uncomplimentary remarks about the enemy in124 a stentorian voice, and invite them to “come on,” which goes far to cool the ardour of a night attack and hearten up his own men.
Next morning up again at two hours before dawn by the sound of a long-drawn-out whistle, upsaddle and off again, and get into your outpost line before dawn or, if preferred, take up a fresh line.
During the day there is plenty to do, but it is well to have an hour or so during which the men get a sleep; though with most men, after a time, it becomes a habit to sleep whenever they have nothing to do or think about, and, if they go to sleep directly it is dark, and do not sit up and talk, they get enough sleep, and are alert before dawn. All talking should be stopped a quarter of an hour after dark in every part of the lines.
The men soon learn the routine, and know how to take care of themselves, sleeping, bathing, washing, and feeding when they get a chance, and forming into small messes of four or five, who co-operate in all their food, messing, and fuel arrangements. In a very short time everything begins to go smoothly. The kits are packed, horses saddled, waggons inspanned, and coffee drunk in twenty minutes to half an hour (considerably less if there is an alarm) from the time the men are roused, whether in the dark or not. It is only when they have attained a fair degree of celerity that their C.O. can feel any confidence in them in the outpost line.
The officers, except the quarter-master and adjutant, must attend every stable hour, see the125 horses finished before the men leave stables, and one officer per squadron must also go to water. One glance is enough to tell an experienced eye if all is right with a horse or not. They cannot speak, but they are very full of expression if anything is wrong. The good troop and squadron leader is for ever solicitous about his horses, and woe betide the unlucky stable-guard whom he catches resting his back against a bale of hay when there is a horse loose. Once it is understood that each man stands or falls in the squadron leader’s estimation, and is noted for punishment or a light reprimand when brought up before him, according to the care of his horse, everything will go well. Nothing less will make some of them always keep up to the mark.
Nor must you forget the magpie instinct in some men, which leads them to collect all sorts of rubbish and carry it on their horses. So, on some favourable occasion on the march, halt near a deep river or pond, hold a kit and saddlery inspection, and hurl far into the water all unauthorized articles. Let the leader set the example himself of walking and leading his horse a great deal, especially down hills, when the loaded saddle slips forward on to the shoulder-blades. This is the merest routine, but a hundred things will occupy the C.O.’s mind. First, forage and water in plenty for his horses. Second, food and firing for his men. It is essential to keep the men well fed, dry,57 if possible, and that they126 should always have their coffee and tea, and in trying times their glass of rum twice a week or so. Soap and tobacco are the other main essentials. If you can give them half their ration in flour and half in biscuit, it will preserve their health. There are at least twenty reasons why, if you requisition anything, you should never permit the slightest waste or prodigality. De Brack says truly: “In peace wastefulness is a wrong; in war it is a crime.” Always see a receipt is given in due form.
Detached, or in the outpost line, you are more likely to get shelter in rainy weather for your horses and men than in a big camp. Take advantage of this, but recollect that it entails extra vigilance as a rule in your outposts, and that to get out of a farm and into a fighting formation requires forethought, prearrangement, and test practice, and usually entails the improvement of existing exits, and the blocking of all approaches, etc.
One of the rules, in all contact with the enemy, is always to do the opposite to what you appear to him to be about to do, e.g. never go straight to the point for which you are really making. Never come straight back to your support. Mystify him as much as you can. Never do the same thing two days running. Always come back from a patrol by a different way from that by which you went out. When alone go across country rather than on the tracks. Patrols should go across open country in127 the dark and be in observation and concealed before dawn. Cunning rather than audacity is required, and should be rewarded when it has good results.
Scouts have a hard time, and it is most important to have relays of them and not to let them go out too many nights running. They must also learn to put up with or remain impervious to that foolish and abominable remark of Tommy Knowall, the young and inexperienced staff or intelligence officer: “WE knew all that before.” If chased in by superior numbers, double as a buck or fox does directly you are out of sight.
If you are scouting near the enemy’s lines do not take cover on your side of rocks, bushes, etc., but on theirs, and turn your horses and pretend to look back at your own side. They will hesitate to fire on you at 700 yards or upwards, as they will think you are their own scouts riding in. But never permit a party of your own scouts to ride in to your line without sending one of their number to gallop on and tell you who they are. A shot “across the bows” of one of your own parties which is coming into a line of videttes or bivouac, without taking this precaution, will soon teach them all to do so. à propos of this, “punishments should fit the crime,” they are more easily remembered; after all, punishments are for the prevention of similar conduct in others and not retaliatory.
A high standard of conduct, zeal, and bravery comes from the example set in the first few encounters of coolness and light-heartedness. A128 C.O. whose men were under a wearing fire was sent a message by a troop leader, who did not quite enjoy the situation, asking, “What shall I do?” The reply was, “Give your men the second lecture on musketry.”
No one likes to be out of the fashion, and it is desirable to lay stress on not coming off second best to the enemy; to give him more than you get; to make him pay for his audacity heavily, and so on. To do so distracts the men’s minds from your own losses in dead or wounded men, etc., of which you must make little.58 Much mourning for the dead makes men sorry for themselves too, and has a bad effect. Shakespeare tells us:
Wise men ne’er sit and wail their loss, But cheerly seek how to redress their harms.
(3 Henry VI. v. 4.)
Deceiving the enemy by ruses, and killing or taking him prisoner, is very desirable, and plans for doing so should be thought over and deliberately carried out. Henderson, Science of War, p. 101, says:
To sustain the moral of his own men; to break down the moral of his enemy—these are the great objects which, if he be ambitious of success, the leader must always keep in view.
Shaikh Sadi says:
If thou art harsh the foe will fight shy of thee; if thou art lenient they will be audacious and forward.
If the force to which you belong suffers reverses129 early in the war, “traitors,” “spies,” etc., are words which one may hear, and they will be applied ungenerously, indiscriminately, and invariably wrongly. Any talk of this sort should be sternly repressed; it is due to a craven desire to blame others for their own cowardice, which some men, curs and runaways themselves, are base enough to indulge in. This will certainly not help them to be brave on future occasions, whilst it serves to disintegrate a force. It will be found that on those men who are practised frequently in going up to the enemy’s pickets before dawn, and retiring gradually, there is not, even in a severe retreat, the same bad moral effect which there is on unpractised men.
A very important point to impress on your men is the following. No horseman should believe that he cannot escape capture, or that a bullet will hit him. Let it be clearly understood by all that, as the saying goes, “A horseman and a heavy shower of rain can get through anything.” Snap-shots fired by men in haste, or when excited, never do hit any one who is mounted and moving, especially if the firer is being “peppered” himself. A very good reason this for arranging for covering fire, if only by one rifle, when riding up to ground likely to be held by the enemy’s pickets. Another point to be remembered by scouts is that when they get into the dead ground, which is almost always to be found in front of a hill, they should always change both their pace and direction, and arrive at the top of the hill both sooner and at a different point from where they might be reasonably130 expected to arrive. Again, scouts in their advance should invariably look out for an alternative line of retreat, especially if they cross an obstacle such as a brook, ditch, or strong fence. They should not expect to see the enemy’s picket or videttes if they deliberately dismount in view and look for them. But if they ride back over a hill, disappear, and then creep back at another point, they are pretty sure to see some heads coming up.
In all the arrangements to be made for sending out scouts, never neglect the value of darkness for getting near the enemy’s lines, or through their line of pickets. What can be done with ease then, is impossible in daytime for th............