“It was thought that to engage the enemy to fight was our business.”—Cromwell at Preston.
“The part played varies according to the quality of the instrument and the capabilities of the operator.”—Cherfils.
In the last few years considerable prominence has been given to the action of independent cavalry, and there is reason to believe that this might lead to a large portion of the cavalry of an army being detached when a general engagement was imminent. This tendency may well arise where the general officer commanding has not a complete grasp34 or perhaps belief in the possibility of a r?le for cavalry on the battlefield, nor entire reliance on them for that assistance, which, if properly trained and directed, they are well able to give.35
70 The general officer commanding may, under the impression that the combat can be carried through by the artillery and infantry without much further assistance, order the cavalry commander to take the bulk of his squadrons and make a detour, involving half the night spent in the saddle, and thus place himself on the flank or rear of the enemy, and there to attack or wait his opportunity in the event of the enemy’s defeat.
Acting in accordance with these orders, we may picture the cavalry arrived at a point some twelve or fifteen miles away, where the leader may very well find it is by no means all plain sailing. His progress may be blocked at some bridge or defile, and, whilst he is endeavouring to push aside the opposition, reinforcements, including artillery, come upon the scene, and he finds that to avoid heavy loss he must draw off the larger portion of his force in order to make a still longer detour. This wastes several hours and results in a drawn fight, or, if he does get nearer to his objective, he finds that, with timely warning given, the enemy are well able to hold him off.
71 Meanwhile the flank left open, or practically denuded of mobile troops, has every chance of being turned; all the tendency of modern fighting is towards extension and dispersion, whilst the desperate counter-attack is the theme of every writer. We can imagine no more galling occurrence than a counter-attack,36 thrust in on one’s own flank (more probably than not, the very flank from which the cavalry have been sent), and, in their absence, carried through with decisive results. These wide turning movements, or rather action against the flank and rear of the enemy, are in the nature of putting all one’s eggs in one basket, and not infrequently taking it for granted that the enemy will not stand his ground.
It has been very well said that cavalry is an arm of opportunity, and opportunities are most likely to occur where actual fighting is going on. Against the Boers, who had no idea of counter-attack, these turning movements came off; against well-led troops, suitably disposed in depth,37 and avoiding wide dispersion, their success is very doubtful.
Napoleon said:
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Cavalry charges were good at the beginning, during the course of, and at the end of a battle. They should always be made, if possible, on the flanks of infantry, especially when this last is engaged in front.—Napoleon’s Maxim, No. 50.
He would no doubt go further now and speak of the intervention of cavalry with horse artillery and machine guns as likely to turn the scale in the crisis of battle.
But Napoleon would recognize that it is by rapidly prolonging their own flank against being turned, or by enveloping or enfilading the enemy’s line by participation in the counter-attack, or by work such as that done by the German horse artillery and cavalry at Loigny-Poupry on December 2, 1870 (late in the war when the German cavalry had learnt their lesson), that cavalry show to advantage. There 2150 German sabres and 24 guns, acting in combination, first dashed aside the opposition offered by the French in villages on the left flank of their line of battle, and then, sweeping round, proceeded to threaten and shell the left rear of the French infantry line—good work, and showing the value of mobile forces boldly thrown at a flank, but lacking in the final stage in that resolute determination which gives full value to such a movement, and this, no doubt, because they had not been trained in peace to act together.38
This leads one to consider what was the training73 of our own cavalry subsequent to 1870. Was it not the general tendency of our authorities and tactical experts to discredit the action of cavalry on the battlefield, without considering whether the armament, organization, and previous training of the cavalry of both France and Germany were such as to lead to success?
These points all influenced the course of the actions in the first months of the 1870 war in the most remarkable manner. Again, was the leading, except for a few bright exceptions, satisfactory? French and German writers on cavalry plainly intimate that the direction of cavalry enterprise by the higher leaders, and the action of the cavalry leaders, were distinctly disappointing.39
Meantime a belief gained from the American War that dismounted tactics were the solution to the cavalry question obsessed some, as it always will those who lack (i.) a practical knowledge of the arm, (ii.) imagination, (iii.) an acquaintance with military history, though the most acute thinker of that time, Henderson, lays down very concisely in Science of War, p. 60, “that mounted infantry were absolutely worthless against cavalry.”
In peace, as the value of the bullet rose, the use of cavalry fell in the mind of the man of theory. Probably only the few, who with an open mind thoroughly tested the two rival lines of action in the74 field, and on every kind of ground, were able to give a correct appreciation. But these never swerved from the opinion that mounted men relying only on the rifle were hopeless in attack or in the open against cavalry, but were, on the other hand, of great value in defence, or in broken ground, or in retreat, and further, that many small opportunities, far more than for shock action, would be offered to them, which cunning and versatility would enable them to profit by.
But all this talk had not been without its effect, and the result was that it was not considered ridiculous that a large force of mounted men should be frittered away in ineffective dismounted action, sitting all day on a hill or ridge, and firing at great distances at an equally sticky enemy. Such action is a slur on cavalry for whom “Action and again action” is the motto.
If both cavalries work on this principle, and this was often the case both in the early portion of the South African War40 and in the Manchurian campaign, certainly no important combats will take place; but, directly one side begins to “push,” mounted combats will result, and as each side finds that the greatest number of squadrons, ceteris paribus, wins, there will be great combats of masses, and a “fight to a finish” amongst the cavalry on the flank of the great general encounter.
As we have said, in the South African War during75 the first year, with few exceptions, fire at long distances and infinitely wearisome tactics were the rule; it was only in the last year of the war that the British cavalry, colonials, and mounted infantry—their attack in some cases supported by really effective and à propos artillery and machine-gun fire—began to push and gallop at the Boers at every opportunity. Then the Boers always galloped away, but gradually they, too, learnt from us the value of pushing, and Botha, Delarey, and others executed some good charges with marked effect, but they never attempted, and wisely so, to charge men armed with swords. That was too much for the cavalry soldier to hope for.
In the Manchurian War the Japanese, with their small force of cavalry, wisely played the defensive game; the Russians,41 trained and organized for twenty years on wrong principles, and led without much attempt at reasoned dash or enterprise, seldom imposed their will on the enemy, or made any effort to push in with their numerous squadrons and sotnias76 on an open flank. If there was an exception it was when, before the battle of Mukden, a force of Cossacks under General Liubarin attacked the Japanese right flank in the mountains, and are stated to have “rendered the situation critical” till driven off by mixed forces of infantry and cavalry. This is given as one of the few cavalry lessons of the Manchurian War. The Russian cavalry officer had not received sufficient training in grand tactics, nor does the combined action of their horse artillery with cavalry appear to have been in any respect effective.
The lesson for our cavalry from these two wars appears to be, that we should teach our officers to think about something bigger than the tactics of a squadron or regiment, to learn esprit d’armée, to remember that a few independent squadrons cut up rarely influence a war, whereas in every big combat the result (and that result may be affected largely by the leading of a few squadrons) is a national matter. And there always recurs the most supreme question for the cavalry leader of masses on the battlefield, whether, apart from the cases in which a sacrifice is necessary, the anticipated results are in any way proportionate with the stake. Even the riding down of an infantry brigade will not always compensate for the expenditure of a cavalry division.
Langlois pictures “cavalry with its light batteries in the decisive attack moving by ways which are hidden from view and fire ... falling on the enemy in mass and surprising him. Reconstructing his (the enemy’s) defences, and keeping hostile troops at a77 distance, measures which,” he says, “require a short dismounted fight, then part of the cavalry advance and harass and prevent the enemy returning, whilst the rest holds the position with fire. The infantry will follow the cavalry as quickly as possible.”
There is no more important subject of training for the cavalry officer than cavalry action on the battlefield of all arms. Theoretical study is not enough, it is absolutely necessary to study in the field with troops or flags representing troops. Since cavalry action is almost invariably42 on the flanks, staff rides, cavalry instructional rides, man?uvres, and other exercises can commence by dealing with only one flank, thus half the number of men, flags, etc., will suffice.
The director should never permit one side to know the strength in any arm on the other side; this is desirable, if only to increase the difficulty and value of gaining information by reconnaissance in these exercises. For this purpose a proportion of cavalry-scouting parties should be detailed. Too much stress can scarcely be laid on this essential of training. Cavalry can now simulate infantry, smokeless powder renders it impossible to judge the volume of fire, every bit of information has to be fought for, and will cost the lives of both horses and men. Even the boldest and most cunning scouting, without fighting, will not lead to any certa............